

# Resource Control in Network Elements

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# Summary

Increasingly, substantial data path processing is happening on devices within the network. At or near the edges of the network, data rates are low enough that commodity workstations may be used to process packet flows. However, the operating systems such machines use are not suited to the needs of data-driven processing. This dissertation shows why this is a problem, how current work fails to address it, and proposes a new approach.

The principal problem is that *crosstalk* occurs in the processing of different data flows when they contend for a shared resource and their accesses to this resource are not scheduled appropriately; typically the shared resource is located in a server process. Previous work on *vertically structured* operating systems reduces the need for such shared servers by making applications responsible for performing as much of their own processing as possible, protecting and multiplexing devices at the lowest level consistent with allowing untrusted user access.

However, shared servers remain on the data path in two circumstances: firstly, dumb network adaptors need non-trivial processing to allow safe access by untrusted user applications. Secondly, shared servers are needed wherever trusted code must be executed for security reasons.

This dissertation presents the design and implementation of *Expert*, an operating system which avoids crosstalk by removing the need for such servers.

This dissertation describes how *Expert* handles dumb network adaptors to enable applications to access them via a low-level interface which is cheap to implement in the kernel, and retains application responsibility for the work involved in running a network stack.

*Expert* further reduces the need for application-level shared servers by introducing *paths* which can trap into protected modules of code to perform actions which would otherwise have to be implemented within a server.

*Expert* allows traditional compute-bound tasks to be freely mixed with these I/O-driven paths in a single system, and schedules them in a unified manner. This allows the processing performed in a network element to be resource controlled, both for background processing tasks such as statistics gathering, and for data path processing such as encryption.

# Preface

Except where otherwise stated in the text, this dissertation is the result of my own work and is not the outcome of work done in collaboration.

This dissertation is not substantially the same as any I have submitted for a degree or diploma or any other qualification at any other university.

No part of my dissertation has already been, or is being currently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification.

This dissertation does not exceed sixty thousand words, including tables and footnotes, but excluding appendices, bibliography, photographs and diagrams.

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# Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor for starting me on this long and varied journey, and to Ian Leslie, Jonathan Smith and Steve Hand whose encouragement and practical advice enabled me to complete it.

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I appreciate the time taken by James Bulpin, Jon Crowcroft, Tim Deegan, Keir Fraser, Tim Harris, and Richard Mortier in proof-reading drafts of this dissertation. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my own.

I spent the summer of 1999 at AT&T Florham Park during which time I discovered about working in a commercial research setting. I'd like to thank Kobus van der Merwe, Cormac Sreenan, and Chuck Kalmanek for making my time at Florham Park productive and enjoyable.

The first three years of this work were funded by ESPRIT Long-Term Research project 21917 (Pegasus II); I am eternally grateful to my parents for their support after this, both financial and familial.

Finally, I'd like to thank my friends from the various outdoor activity clubs – their welcome weekend distractions ensured I returned on Mondays with a fresh outlook.

“All we know is the phenomenon: we spend our time sending messages to each other, talking and trying to listen at the same time, exchanging information. This seems to be our most urgent biological function; it is what we do with our lives.”

— Lewis Thomas, “The Lives of a Cell”

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

As processing on the data path moves into the network, the problem emerges of how best to allocate and schedule scarce resources within routers. This dissertation describes why this is a problem, how current work fails to address this problem, and presents its solution in the form of Expert; a new NEOS (Network Element Operating System) which supports accurate accounting and scheduling of all resources.

### 1.1 Data processing in the network

The Internet is a hierarchy of interconnected networks. As distance from the high-speed core increases, link speeds drop, aggregation decreases and the amount of router memory and processing power available per byte increases.

In the core, traffic is switched entirely in hardware in order to cope with the vast data rate. However, the static nature of this hardware acceleration loses flexibility: the ability to meet unplanned, evolving requirements has been exchanged for performance gains. For a core offering only basic connectivity, this is not a serious problem. In contrast, towards the edge of the network programmable software-based routers become feasible, allowing considerable intelligence in routing decisions [Pradhan99, Peterson99].

Furthermore, there are sufficient resources available near the edge today to allow these programmable routers to manipulate data in the packets [Amir98]. Useful data processing includes media transcoding, for example to allow heterogeneous receivers to participate in a high-bandwidth flow by down-sampling

the media to an appropriate rate [Fox96]. Other potential manipulations include information distillation or filtering, for example to aggregate sensor data, or generate a “thumbnails” video channel based on scaling down several other channels.

Other uses of in-network data processing are transparent to the endpoints involved. For example, protocol boosters [Feldmeier98] perform extra processing in portions of the network to improve performance in some manner, e.g. by ACK spacing, or maintaining a segment cache to shorten retransmit times on a lossy network.

The need to process packet data is not limited to experimental or research systems; currently deployed network applications do so too. For example, some protocols (e.g. FTP [Postel85], RTSP [Schulzrinne98], and H.323 [H323]) embed endpoint information in the packet payload. Network elements that read or rewrite this endpoint information (such as firewalls or NAT (Network Address Translation) gateways [Egevang94]) thus need access not only to packet headers, but also to packet bodies.

Another example of data processing on packet payloads arises in VPN (Virtual Private Network) endpoints [Gleeson00]. A VPN ingress router aggregates packets from multiple sources and encapsulates them for transmission through a tunnel. At the far end of the tunnel, an egress router decapsulates and routes the packets on to their next hop. Both of these VPN endpoint operations require the packet payload to be processed (e.g. for checksum purposes), and in the case of a secure VPN either encrypted or decrypted, both of which can be CPU-intensive processing.

As these and other resource-intensive network-hosted functions are merged to run on a single router, competition for scarce resources arises. The pressure to integrate multiple functions into a single router comes from a variety of directions:

- Separate network elements are more costly, partly due to the increased amount of redundant equipment purchased, but also in terms of precious rack-space.
- Having multiple network elements composed together may also complicate the network architecture, especially if it needs to be transparent to network users or an ISP (Internet Service Provider).
- A composition of network elements also makes dimensioning harder,

since a single under-powered element can cause the whole chain to under-perform.

A programmable router integrating multiple functions requires resource allocation problems to be addressed in one location by flexible software scheduling.

If no scheduling is performed then the system's performance is not predictable during overload conditions. Proper resource management also enables administrative control over how system resources are allocated to various applications or flows. For example, this allows latency-sensitive ASP (Application Service Provider) or VoIP (Voice over IP) flows to be isolated from the effects of best-effort flows such as email or web traffic. This need to schedule computation on routers is gradually being recognised by others (e.g. [Qie01]), however the majority of current systems lack proper resource control.

There are two main reasons why this is the case. The first is that when the primary resource being consumed is outgoing link bandwidth, scheduling just this implicitly controls the consumption of other resources. However, sophisticated per-packet processing now consumes multiple resources. This mandates a holistic approach to managing system resources such as network bandwidth, the CPU, memory, and disk.

The second reason that resource control is not currently provided is that over-provisioning is seen as a viable alternative. Over-provisioning is an insufficient replacement for resource management for several reasons. Peak loads can be between a hundred and a thousand times larger than average loads [Schwarz00] necessitating larger, more expensive, configurations which are only fully used during short peak periods. Also, for the largest systems, the average load will be approaching the maximum possible capacity of the system, so there is simply no way to over-provision. Finally, the hardware in use tends to lag behind the cutting edge, due to the expense and disruption involved in commissioning new equipment.

This dissertation has argued for a flexible NEOS which can support new applications as they emerge, while giving QoS (Quality of Service) guarantees to the processing of data flows in order to remain in control of resource consumption when under overload conditions. The next section claims that current OSEs are unsuitable platforms for resource-intensive network-hosted applications, and gives reasons why this is the case.

## 1.2 Network Element Operating Systems

A NEOS is different from a workstation or server OS because it is transparent to all but its administrators. For example, in a client OS, users are explicitly authenticated. Server OSes run services on behalf of some local user, and the services typically do their own application-level user authentication. However, in a NEOS users are not explicitly authenticated. This is why resource control on a network element is a challenge, because it is difficult to track resource usage when the consumer has to be inferred from flow information combined with administrative policy. Some protocols (for example IPSec) allow flows to be tracked explicitly, making this problem somewhat easier.

This section now considers several existing NEOSes and argues that they are inadequate because either they are inflexible, or they do not have sufficiently detailed resource accounting.

Commercial embedded OSes are used by many network equipment vendors in their products. For example, 3Com uses a mixture of VxWorks, QNX and ThreadX [VxWorks99, Hildebrand92, ThreadX] along with other privately developed embedded OSes [Nessett00]. Cisco uses similar systems [QNX98], alongside their own proprietary system known as IOS.

None of these products are designed with flexibility in mind; these closed systems do not allow administrator-supplied code to be run on them. They use hard real-time OSes, requiring the job mix to be known in advance to allow a one-off static resource partitioning to be made at design time.

We do not consider this kind of system any further, since they cannot be classed as programmable routers either in name or in function.

Both Unix and Windows NT can be used to route traffic, and are general enough platforms to enable data to be processed by locally-supplied code. Windows 2000 has support for scheduling network I/O, as do many of the modern Unices, for example Linux with CBQ (Class-Based Queueing). However, their model assumes that the only resource used by network flows is bandwidth; they do not schedule other resources used in processing packets in the kernel.


In the case of a split kernel/user-space implementation, the amount of time spent in the kernel is hard (if not impossible) to schedule, resulting in live-lock [Mogul96, Druschel96] unless steps are taken to ensure new packets are not accepted until they can be properly accommodated. For example, clocked

interrupts [Smith93] can be used to reduce interrupt processing overheads.

The fundamental problem with these kinds of operating systems is that they are built on a *task*-based scheduling paradigm which is ill-suited to recording the resources used in processing flows of packets.

There are four reasons why task-based scheduling is inappropriate for processing flows of packets:

1. When a single data flow is processed by multiple cooperating tasks, each with their own resource allocations, it is hard to understand the required allocation levels needed to achieve a balanced system, i.e. one in which each task has a sufficient resource allocation, and no more.
2. There is a performance penalty due to the overheads of context switching between tasks on a per-packet basis. These may be amortised by batching multiple packets together before context switching, and this can happen at any level in a system from interrupt mitigation schemes implemented in devices to application-specified buffer flush trigger levels. However any scheme which batches packets for common processing will by definition increase their latency. There is a fundamental trade-off between batch granularity and context switch overheads.
3. Multiple tasks co-operating to process a flow complicates resource reclamation since resources are owned by tasks, not flows. If the resources associated with a flow need to be retracted, all the tasks involved need to participate in the revocation. Depending on the system, atomic resource release may be impossible. As an example, Unix provides the mechanism of *process groups* to allow multiple processes (e.g. a shell-constructed pipeline) to be sent a signal atomically. However, killing entire processes is a fairly coarse-grained approach to resource reclamation, and more importantly, does not work if the processes were handling multiple flows and the intention was to terminate just one flow.
4. When multiple tasks co-operate to process multiple flows, there are two additional problems. Firstly, each task needs to perform a demultiplex operation to recover the flow state. This is not too severe in the case where there are few flows to distinguish between, but becomes time-consuming when many flows are active. The standardisation of POSIX.1b asynchronous I/O (which allows a callback function to be invoked when data arrives) is an implicit acknowledgement of this problem. Secondly,



**Figure 1.1: An example path through a networking stack and an MPEG code module.**

if flows are to be differentiated within a task, the task needs to sub-schedule any processing it does. However, this aggravates the first problem by greatly increasing the number of scheduler settings needing to be decided for the system as a whole.

In the case of a Unix-like system, it is tempting to argue that if there is only one user-space process on the data path, then only one task is involved and thus many of the problems listed above become moot. This is not so, since the kernel itself must be considered a task: context switches occur between it and user processes.

In fact, in most Unices this situation is exacerbated, since the kernel is scheduled implicitly on interrupts. [Black95] argues that if any significant processing is performed in the kernel, then this is automatically work which is not scheduled according to administrative policy but rather scheduled by external (in this case, network) events. This implies an undesirable loss of control over the system's resource usage.

These problems with task-based systems can be addressed by the introduction of the notion of a *path* as a first-class schedulable entity. The Scout OS [Mosberger96, Mosberger97] is an example of a system designed around such data communication paths.

Paths map closely onto the human view of the processing performed on a packet as it traverses OS and application code; an example path is shown in Figure 1.1. The motivations the Scout authors give for paths are the increased performance of embedded Internet appliances available through ILP (Integrated Layer Processing), code specialisation, and early discard of work under overload conditions. The path is also the entity to which the use of resources is charged. A side-effect of this work on performance tuning is the improved QoS isolation, although the authors do not cite this as a major motivation for

them.

However, Scout is a static system which is configured and type-checked at build-time: it does not support the dynamic loading of new code modules. Its typesystem is fixed, and new types cannot be added at run-time. This is unsurprising, given its original niche as an OS for Internet appliances.

Despite these problems with Scout, the concept of using paths as schedulable entities is sound: per-path resource control directly simplifies the resource allocation problem by providing one parameter per resource that governs all processing applied to a particular flow of packets.

However, not all processing performed on a programmable router can be meaningfully captured using only paths. For batch computation which proceeds without significant interaction with other system components or is unrelated to any particular traffic stream, the resource consumption is best represented and controlled by a task abstraction.

Examples of such workloads includes system management tasks such as the gathering and processing of statistics (e.g. for admission control), background routing table optimisation [Draves99], or background management of cached data (e.g. expiry, preemptive refresh, compression, index generation).

Having both paths and tasks allows each abstraction to be used where most appropriate. A task-based system (e.g. Unix) without paths is not well suited to accounting and scheduling different data streams. In contrast, a path-based system (such as Scout) is optimised for processing high performance data streams, but cannot account resources consumed on behalf of system housekeeping tasks correctly.

It is the thesis of this dissertation that in an environment where a mix of data-driven processing occurs alongside batch processing, both path and task abstractions need to be provided by the underlying operating system in order to prevent quality of service crosstalk between the competing workloads.

### **1.3 Dissertation outline**

The balance of this dissertation is composed as follows. Chapter 2 covers related work and further motivates this dissertation by describing why previous approaches are insufficient. Since Expert is substantially based on Nemesis,

Chapter 3 provides a brief summary for readers unfamiliar with it. The Expert architecture and its prototype implementation are described in Chapters 4 and 5: Chapter 4 covers the network device driver model, while Chapter 5 describes paths in Expert. Chapter 6 presents a large-scale example application showing how Expert's unique features can be used to differentiate the processing performed on flows of data. Finally, Chapter 7 describes how the techniques developed for Expert might be implemented on other operating systems, suggests areas for further work, and concludes this dissertation.



## Chapter 2

# Background

Today most enterprise-class routers offer some form of traffic shaping, which their manufacturers are all too keen to pass off as a QoS-control architecture. Cisco's GSR12000 [McKeown95] is a typical example of such a router, offering weighted fair queueing on outbound links. This is a reasonable way of controlling the use of scarce link bandwidth, however the implicit assumption is that most traffic is never subjected to much processing.

While this may be true of today's protocols, open programmable routers offer the potential to deploy new network-hosted functions that perform much more computation on each packet, needing proper resource control for all resources consumed. The IETF have recognised the existence of this niche, and termed them *middle boxes* [Carpenter01], however they have not addressed resource control concerns as yet.

Due to rapid changes in requirements, most middle boxes will be initially implemented as modifications to existing software routers, even if they are subsequently turned into hardware.

There are a number of extant QoS-aware software routers, however they tend to share the hardware vendors' pre-occupation with scheduling bandwidth and hoping other resources (mainly CPU) are adequately provisioned.

For example, the Pronto router [Hjálmtýsson00] concentrates on separating service-specific logic from the forwarding fast path. This allows the coupling between the service logic and the data path to be varied, giving a range of performance trade-offs. Using service logic to perform connection admission control is an example of a lightweight service entirely on the control plane. Service

logic which needs to peek frames occasionally or needs to sample all frames but in an asynchronous manner is an example of a more resource-intensive application. Finally, the most heavyweight variety of service logic supported by Pronto makes service decisions inline on a per-packet basis; this corresponds closely to the classic Active Network model described in [Tennenhouse96]. Unfortunately, the decision to implement Pronto as a minimal set of hooks within the Linux kernel, while understandable, leads to the usual problems associated with resource control under Unix.

The Click modular router [Kohler00] is a more ambitious extension to the Linux networking stack.<sup>1</sup> It provides a convenient way of plugging code modules together to form a data-processing pipeline, type-checking the interconnections to ensure they are sensible. Click does not provide an integrated resource scheduling framework: it allows traffic shaping, but it cannot identify and schedule flows differently since its scheduling parameters are per-class, not per flow. Click uses a non-preemptive scheduler, with packet queue modules to force yields.


Click concentrates on the flow of data along paths between various modules. This data-driven path-centric focus is not unique to Click: it is a recurring idiom with some history.

This chapter begins by discussing other systems which use path-like abstractions to perform I/O. The use of IPC systems to perform I/O is considered next, and previous work on IPC by thread tunnelling is described. Vertically structured OSES are presented as a means of avoiding IPC by allowing applications to perform most of their own processing, but problems with their device handling are outlined.

This chapter continues by describing active networks – they form a class of applications which may benefit from being implemented over an OS offering quality of service guarantees to paths processing network flows. Finally, this chapter discusses the conflicting pressures operating on device complexity: some factors result in smarter devices, some result in dumber devices.

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<sup>1</sup>It has since been ported to run natively over the University of Utah's Flux OSKit, however, the arguments presented here are still relevant.



**Figure 2.1: Protocol demux traces a path through session objects in the *x*-Kernel.**

## 2.1 The path concept

The idea of an execution path through code induced by a flow of packets with certain properties common among them is not particularly new. This section summarises the innovations in this field and traces the concepts back to their sources.

### 2.1.1 The *x*-Kernel

The *x*-Kernel [Hutchinson91] is a flexible architecture to aid protocol implementation. Its modular design provides facilities for hierarchical protocol composition, reference counted buffer management, hash tables, timeouts, and threads within multiple address spaces. The *x*-Kernel defines three sorts of object: *protocol*, *session*, and *message*. Protocol objects hold global state about a particular network protocol (e.g. which ports are in use), and are similar to classes in an object-oriented language. Session objects hold per-flow state, and can be viewed as the instantiation of protocol objects. Message objects are the active entities in the system; they are moved through sessions by shepherd threads.

When a packet arrives, a shepherd thread is dispatched from a pool in the kernel to handle the network interrupt. It calls the demultiplex operation on each protocol in turn, discovering which session object is associated with this packet (or creating a new one if there is no current association). The demultiplex

operation also selects the next protocol object to process the message with, thus tracing a path through session objects and their associated protocol objects as shown in Figure 2.1. If the next protocol object resides in user-space then the shepherd thread switches to user mode and upcalls the application-supplied protocol code. No pass is made through the CPU scheduler.

Packets are transmitted by an application pushing its payload into a previously established session object. The session object encapsulates the payload according to the protocol it is an instantiation of, and pushes the message down towards the root of the protocol tree where the network device finally transmits the frame. The user-space process issues a system call when it needs to cross the user-kernel boundary on its way down towards the network device.

The motivation behind the *x*-Kernel was to allow layered protocol implementations to get the usual advantages of layered systems (e.g. maintainability and flexibility) without the commonly perceived performance penalties described in [Wakeman92]. The *x*-Kernel's use of one thread per message was certainly better than the alternative prevalent at the time: one thread per layer, with queueing between each layer leading to high thread synchronisation overheads and large queueing delays. Another problem with thread-per-layer schemes is that bottlenecks are easily created: a single layer run by a thread with an insufficient guarantee limits the performance of all data flows through that layer.

However, thread-per-message also has its own problems. Without suitable interlocking, threads can overtake each other leading to out-of-order message delivery to the application. Care also needs to be taken to limit how many shepherd threads are allocated to each connection, such that no connection is starved due to other (overactive) connections. The *x*-Kernel uses a global pool of shepherd threads, and so is vulnerable to this.

### 2.1.2 Scout v2

The Scout OS [Mosberger96, Mosberger97] was inspired by the *x*-Kernel, and thus shares many of its features. The first public release of Scout was actually the second internal version to be developed, hence it is known as "Scout v2". This section first describes Scout's architecture in some detail, then considers how it differs from the *x*-Kernel, and finally comments on Scout's key features and their suitability for providing QoS isolation between traffic flows.

## Architecture


Scout introduced the *path* as a core OS abstraction. A path encapsulates the processing which happens to a flow of packets, and provides fast access to per-flow state. Scout's model of a path arose as the unifying concept tying together multiple optimisations such as ILP, fbufs (Section 2.2.1), and per-connection code specialisation [Massalin92].

Scout code modules are (confusingly) called *routers*. Routers are analogous to *x*-Kernel protocol objects, and are organised at system configuration time into a graph showing possible interactions between routers. Scout routers demultiplex incoming packets to *stages*, the corresponding entity to *x*-Kernel sessions. A *path* is defined to be the sequence of stages used to process packets in a flow. A path also includes four queues (two at each end of the path, one for outgoing and one for incoming data), and any per-flow state required by the code the path traverses.

Paths are created based on a set of attributes (or invariants) which are true for all packets in a flow. Typically this will be the participants' IP addresses, port numbers and protocol types but in theory any other data could be used to select the packets to be handled by the new path. The attributes are placed in a hash table which the path creator then passes to the initial router on the path. This router creates a stage for the path, and selects the next router needed based on the path's attributes. The next router is then invoked to extend the path with its corresponding stage; this extension procedure continues in a recursive fashion until one of two situations occur. Firstly, the attributes may not be sufficient to determine the next router, in which case a per-packet decision will be needed on the data path at that stage. An example of this occurs in the IP-level router, in order to select the appropriate interface to transmit a packet. The second reason the path extension procedure may stop is because the router has no successor (e.g. it is an application, or an Ethernet driver).

Once all the stages are linked together to form the path their `establish()` functions are called, giving them the chance to perform any path-global optimisations or initialisations. The path is now live and will begin receiving packets, assuming that it grew all the way to a device driver.

When a frame arrives at a network device driver it calls the `demux()` operation on the router connected to it, as specified at system configuration time. The `demux()` function recursively calls the routers above it to determine which



**Figure 2.2: Receive processing in Scout.**

path the frame is for. Finally, a few other criteria are tested (see Figure 2.2) before the frame is accepted.

Later, the system scheduler will select a thread from the receiving path’s thread pool and activate it at the path’s entry point. This typically dequeues the first message from the path’s input queue and calls the first stage’s `deliver()` function. Processing of the message then continues from stage to stage until the message reaches the end of the path, where it is added to the path’s output queue. Scout uses a non-preemptive thread scheduler by default, so the thread runs the entire path to completion (assuming there are no explicit yield points in the code).


User applications are written to behave like routers. They can transmit packets by creating a path with appropriate attributes. Once the path is created, `deliver()`-ing a packet to its user end results in the packet being encapsulated and eventually queued for transmission by a device driver.

### Comparison with *x*-Kernel

At first glance, the differences between Scout and the *x*-Kernel may seem cosmetic, but there are some crucial changes:

**Paths.** Scout paths centralise state for all code layers involved in processing packets from one flow, whereas the *x*-Kernel keeps this state distributed with each layer, requiring flow state to be looked up at each layer for every packet. This is despite [Tennenhouse89] giving clear reasons why this kind of layered demultiplexing scheme gives rise to QoS crosstalk.

**VM system.** Because Scout is aimed at embedded Internet-connected systems,



**Figure 2.3: Structure of Scout.**

it uses a simple, single address space with no memory protection as shown in Figure 2.3. This is in contrast to *x-Kernel*'s Unix-like protected multiple address spaces.

**Specialisation.** By storing method pointers on a per-path basis, the Scout architecture allows the selective replacement of a router implementation with one tailored to the path in hand, potentially generated at run time. This feature is not used in Scout v2, but it is not even possible on the *x-Kernel* since its protocol methods are not per-session.

**Flexibility.** A Scout path can be used to represent *any* flow of data though the system, whereas the *x-Kernel* is limited to network I/O. This is because a Scout router can have multiple interfaces to its code, whereas *x-Kernel*'s protocol object only has a packet delivery interface. As an example, Scout includes a framebuffer router which implements an additional control API (Application Programming Interface).

In summary, Scout is a complete system with a small footprint built from the ground up around paths, whereas the *x-Kernel* is more focused on replacing a host OS's network stack.

## Discussion

While the Scout architecture also notes that paths can be used for resource control, the chief motivation is performance. This also explains the decision to use a non-preemptive thread scheduler, since it has lower run-time overheads and makes programming the system simpler and less error-prone than a fully preemptive scheduler would.

Scout's use of an early demultiplex strategy together with per-path input queues ensures that paths do not have to share buffer resources, which would otherwise lead to unpredictable loss behaviour during overload. Dedicated buffering is more expensive in terms of total buffer memory needed, but offers better isolation properties [Black97, Figure 7].

Although the demultiplex is done early on during receive processing, it is performed by recursive upcalls; each router supplies a small amount of router-specific demultiplex logic. While this is inherently flexible, it adds extra cost to the demultiplex operation in the form of procedure call overhead and loss of some locality of reference compared to an integrated table lookup based approach, which eventually leads to livelock [Qie01, Figure 4]. This problem is exacerbated if the routers are in separate protection domains (e.g. some may be from the core OS but others might be application-supplied). Work on safe kernel extensions (see Section 2.4.3) addresses these concerns, but the problem can be avoided entirely by deciding ahead of time what the demultiplex criteria are to be, and implementing an efficient system that fulfils them. Packet filters also attempt to solve this problem, but current technology is unable to handle the longest-prefix matches needed to build an IP router.

Each Scout path also has a dedicated output queue, which means that messages may be buffered after processing to postpone the execution of later stages, for example to allow transmit shaping at the device driver. Unfortunately, the back-pressure from later stages is only loosely coupled to the input stage, since all available threads in the path's thread pool must become blocked waiting to enqueue their message in the output queue before the input queue is no longer serviced. Thus the maximum number of messages in the path at any time is only indirectly controlled, consisting of those queued in the path's output queue, plus one message per thread from the path's thread pool, plus those messages awaiting processing in the path's input queue.

This uncertainty about exactly how many messages are being processed by a



path is compounded by the fact that despite the Scout architecture encouraging the use of long paths, in actual systems most paths are quite short because their invariants are insufficiently strong. In particular, the design of the IP protocol makes it impossible to know at path creation time which interface to use for outgoing traffic since this requires a per-packet route lookup, whose result may change depending on external network conditions [Mosberger97, Section 2.2.3.1]. Short paths lead to extra buffering where they join or split, and result in the following problems:

- There is a performance problem where two paths meet: messages need to be queued on the source path's output queue and the shepherd thread suspended before scheduling a new thread from the destination path to dequeue the message and start processing it. The Scout developers address this situation by providing a mechanism for migrating a running thread between paths, thus streamlining the queue operations and avoiding the pass through the scheduler. However this solution has its own problems: they do not limit the number of shepherd threads that may tunnel in, thus further reducing their ability to reason about the maximum number of buffered packets in a Scout system.
- If there is a join or split then this is a point of resource contention, and as such it needs to be scheduled to avoid crosstalk. Scout v2 does not do this.
- Applying global optimisations to short paths may not be as useful as applying them to long paths, since there is less scope for optimisations to be applicable. In some ways this is the same as doing piecewise optimisation as the path is built up.
- Finally, if paths are to be principals in a resource control scheme then they must fully encapsulate all processing done to packets belonging to a flow from the moment they are recognised as such until they ultimately leave the machine. Concatenating many short paths does nothing to help account resource usage to traffic flows.

CPU time allocation is further confused by Scout's scheduler architecture, where a top-level scheduler delegates control to a fixed set of thread schedulers in a round-robin fashion. Scout originally used a single system scheduler to directly schedule threads. However, applications may benefit from an appropriate scheduler choice, for example a video decoder may benefit from an

EDF scheduler by specifying the next frame time as its deadline, thus ensuring frames are displayed in a timely manner. Scout v2 accommodates this desire for application-specific schedulers by the crude delegation system described above, but note that applications still cannot implement an arbitrary scheduler: they are restricted to the system-provided ones.

All Scout's thread schedulers are non-preemptive and thus have a number of advantages over preemptive schemes. Non-preemptive schedulers are simpler to implement because there is much less machinery needed: there is no need to save and restore CPU state, or provide any synchronisation facilities such as semaphores, mutices or condition variables. Scout's non-preemptive scheduler also provides two kinds of block: one which preserves the stack, and one which does not. The second of these is used to reduce the total amount of memory used for thread stacks, which would otherwise be large given the thread-per-message model Scout uses. Another benefit of explicitly yielding means data is not competing against data from other threads for space in the processor's caches. Together, these effects mean that non-preemptive schedulers tend to have higher performance than their preemptive counterparts. Finally, the concurrency model is easier to understand so programmer errors are less likely to happen.

However there are also drawbacks to non-preemptive schedulers. Programmers using these systems need to be aware of how much time passes between yield points, so that time-sensitive threads are not starved of the CPU. On a system like Scout where small, bounded, amounts of time are spent processing each packet, this is a reasonable assumption. It becomes necessary to perform proper preemptive scheduling if unknown amounts of processing need to be done to the packet along a path, or if timeouts elsewhere need to be serviced in a timely manner, or if the system is to remain interactive in the face of unknown workloads. As system complexity increases it becomes harder to bound the maximum time between when a thread yields until when it next regains the CPU in a non-preemptive system, making it harder to offer latency guarantees to threads or (ultimately) traffic flows. Furthermore, on multiprocessor systems where threads can genuinely execute in parallel, the assumptions made by programmers using non-preemptive schedulers no longer hold true; proper locking of shared data structures is needed, voiding most performance boosts or gains in simplicity.


Systems that use scheduler activations [Anderson92] defer the choice of thread scheduling policy to the user code being activated. For example, a simple path

that merely forwards IP datagrams could run directly from the activation handler in a non-preemptive manner, while a more complex path doing media rate conversion involving a shared buffer might use a preemptive scheduler to decouple the producer and consumer threads. In this manner, the simple IP forwarding path can run with all the advantages of a stripped environment, while the more complex processing is given a more supportive and richer environment.

Scout's focus on embedded devices means that the system is static, i.e. most configuration happens at build time, and runtime reconfiguration is impossible. For example, all bindings between modules are specified in a configuration file at system boot time, not based on evolving conditions at runtime; a path cannot bind to a new module at runtime if the interaction has not already been provided for in the `config.build` file. This lack of flexibility is understandable for an embedded device, but undesirable in systems intended for continuous operation (e.g. network elements) where service interruption is unacceptable, even for reconfiguration or upgrades.

The typesystem used by Scout is fairly basic. A typesystem's primary goal is to allow the system architect to make assertions about data as it is passed between code modules via typed interfaces, in the hope of catching and containing programmer errors. Scout's typesystem has runtime type assertions and querying for primitive types, but not for interfaces. Interface type checks are performed at system build time, when interfaces that are connected together are checked to be of an appropriate type. Invocations on an interface are made by passing the required operation code as an integer and passing in an opaque buffer supplying any further arguments that might be needed, much like the `ioctl()` feature of Unix. It is impossible to ensure at compile time that the buffer contains correctly typed arguments, making the called code responsible for argument checking at runtime. Adding new interface types at runtime is not possible. All of these features make it harder to extend Scout dynamically.

Scout's simple memory system makes the sharing of code and data easy, since all memory is available to all paths. This protectionless scheme has its disadvantages, however. Without memory protection, malicious or erroneous code continues to run unchecked, either producing incorrect results or causing an error long after the initial problem has occurred. While Scout's niche as an embedded system with a fixed workload avoids the possibility of malicious code being run, fine-grained memory protection would improve robustness.



**Figure 2.4: Structure of Escort, here shown running with three protection domains: one for the MPEG application, one for the protocol stack, and one for the device driver.**

### 2.1.3 Escort

Escort is evolved from Scout v2, and extends it in two security-related directions [Spatscheck99]. Firstly, it adds memory protection between code modules to allow the safe execution of untrusted modules. Secondly, it adds accurate accounting for resources consumed in an attempt to mitigate the effects of DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. This section describes Escort and considers its suitability for providing QoS isolation between competing traffic streams.

#### Architecture

Escort introduces pdoms (protection domains), specifying memory access rights to the address space. Each module has a pdom associated with it; access rights are linked to the module code, not the path running it. Potentially each module can be in its own pdom, however for efficiency reasons modules which cooperate closely (e.g. IP, TCP, ARP) should be in the same pdom, as shown in Figure 2.4. The kernel operates within a privileged protection domain, which

other pdoms may enter at fixed locations by making system call traps.

Shared libraries implement hash tables, queues, heaps, time, and the C language library. They are trusted by all modules so their code is mapped executable by all pdoms. To enable sharing, modules access mutable data by explicitly passing an environment around instead of using absolute addresses fixed at link time. This is very similar to the “closures” scheme described in [Roscoe94] and used in Nemesis.

To track resource usage Escort uses an *owner* record, the principal to which resources (such as CPU cycles, memory, threads and buffers) are accounted. Owner records also specify limits on how much of these resource may be consumed, and what action the operating system should take if it discovers overconsumption. Escort extends Scout’s path data structure to include an owner record, and the whole path structure is managed by the kernel to prevent unauthorised modification of the fields. Each pdom is also associated with an owner record, allowing pdoms to have threads and memory accrued to them. Thus, a pdom together with some threads allows Escort to schedule work in a more traditional task-like manner. The Escort kernel also provides *events*. An event is a function to be called at a specified time; the function runs in the context of a module’s pdom, and uses a fresh thread.

Threads are accounted to a particular owner record, i.e. either a path or pdom. Threads from a path migrate across pdoms boundaries as path processing occurs, but threads from a pdom cannot migrate; they must remain within the modules the pdom encompasses.

The migration happens using the normal procedure call standard. A protection fault occurs because the destination of the call instruction is not executable by the current pdom, and the kernel interprets this as a thread migration request. If migration is allowed for this thread, it is given a fresh stack based on the destination pdom, and the old pdom is pushed onto a kernel-maintained stack of pdoms traversed. The kernel arranges for the new stack to contain an initial stackframe with a distinctive (faulting) return address, so that it can regain control when the function call returns in order to switch back to the previous pdom, as recorded by its pdom stack.

Small parameters are passed via registers, while larger objects need buffers. Escort uses IOBuffers to handle this case.

IOBuffers are a combination of user-accessible buffer memory together with

some metadata. The metadata is kept and managed in the kernel which looks after the allocation, freeing, locking and unlocking of buffers. All buffers are owned, either by a pdom or a path. If the IOBuffer is owned by a pdom, then the buffer is mapped read/write to that pdom, and no access to all other pdoms. If the IOBuffer is owned by a path then it is mapped read/write to the allocating pdom, and read-only to all other pdoms on the path. If later pdoms on the path should not have read access to the buffer, then a *termination domain* can be used to mark the desired limit of readability, and thus limit data transfer.

An IOBuffer can also be handed off to another owner record; for example, a disk cache may want to hand out references to buffers. Both the original and the new owner record are charged for the buffer to ensure that if the new owner no longer wishes the buffer, the original owner is still below their ownership limit. This is the same problem as Unix hardlinks in a quota-enabled filesystem.

IOBuffers are shared by a reference counting scheme, making read-only access cheap. However, a locking mechanism is needed to ensure exclusive access, for example to perform a consistency check on the data. When an IOBuffer is locked, all write permissions are revoked, and the reference count incremented. When the IOBuffer is later unlocked, the reference count is decremented. If the count becomes zero, the IOBuffer is freed. The previously-held pdom access rights are remembered, so if a buffer with the same rights is later needed this buffer may be re-used without needing to clear it.

To summarise, Escort adds protection domains and a little extra book-keeping to Scout. A side-effect of this is that task-like scheduling is possible by using pdoms with threads or events within a module.

## **Discussion**

Adding memory protection to Scout is worthwhile, addressing its lack of fault-isolation. However, each pdom crossing needed on the data path incurs some overhead: a system configured with a pdom per module suffers around a factor of 4 lower performance than one with no protection crossings [Spatscheck99, Figure 8]. There are two axes along which trade-offs can be made to improve this situation: the pdoms can apply to larger collections of modules, reducing the number of pdom crossings needed; and packets can be buffered before pdom crossings, so that they may be processed in a batch thus amortising the cost of the pdom switch over multiple packets.

The end result is the same: the number of pdom switches per packet is reduced. As larger pdoms covering more code are used, so the fault-isolation granularity is reduced but the number of pdom crossings needed along a path is reduced. Batching multiple packets before moving them together across a pdom boundary increases the latency experienced by the packets but improves throughput by reducing the number of pdom crossings needed per packet. Escort allows control over the pdom granularity at system configuration time, but it has no buffering between pdoms, and so offers no way to trade latency for throughput.

Because Escort (like Scout) uses a non-preemptive thread scheduler, it has a number of problems scheduling the system. Although threads have a cycle limit, the only way the kernel has to enforce these limits is retroactive: when the kernel becomes aware that a thread has exceeded its cycle cap, it terminates the thread. However, this happens *after* the limit has been exceeded, stealing time from other threads and increasing jitter in the system. A preemptive scheduler could instead suspend the over-active thread until it has sufficient cycle credit to run once more, thus protecting other threads' guarantees. Of course, this assumes that the code will still run correctly (i.e. without races or deadlocks) under a preemptive scheduler.

Background processing and timer-driven actions can be hard to implement in non-preemptive systems. Most rely on registering functions to be called from the idle loop or at a specified time, and keep the function's state as a continuation [Draves91, Milne76]. Escort events provide this facility, but also need to record the pdom in which to execute the event's function. Events are an elegant solution to the background processing problem, but should be considered as evidence of the need for task-like scheduling even in a path-centric operating system.

Further evidence for the need to schedule tasks as well as paths come from the combination of a pdom owner with threads. If Escort needs this combination to simulate a task, the conclusion must be that certain jobs are best described and scheduled in a task-like manner, even in the context of a path-based operating system. Protection domains highlight the issue by requiring that all threads be owned, either by a path or something else. If processing needs to be performed out-with a path, then it can either be done in the kernel, or in a module by a pdom-owned thread. Scout did such work in the kernel, but as it is unscheduled the amount that can be done must be bounded to avoid affecting of the rest of the system.

While Escort correctly segments the work performed into path and task abstractions, it is not able to offer fine-grained QoS isolation guarantees, mainly because it lacks preemptive scheduling. However, there are other design decisions which also impede its ability to isolate workloads:

- Escort’s demultiplexing strategy is almost identical to Scout’s: every router’s `demux()` function is called to discover which path through the routers the packet should take. The difference is that the `demux()` functions are called from the kernel’s `pdom`, and thus have privileged access to the entire memory space. Escort’s authors realise this is a problem, and suggest using a filter language or proof carrying code to avoid running untrusted code. Another alternative would be a table-lookup based approach which has the attraction of giving predictable demultiplex times.
- In Escort `pdoms` own heaps, but paths cannot. This means paths must “borrow” memory from the `pdoms` they cross, complicating the accounting of memory resources. While this solves the problem of protecting state which is private to a particular  $(module, path)$  combination, it does not offer a clean solution to cross-module state (e.g. path global attributes). The loaning arrangement also complicates resource reclamation when a path terminates: each module that loans a path some memory must register a hook function with the OS which the OS calls on path termination to allow the module to free its memory.
- Scout’s problems at inter-path boundaries (see Section 2.1.2) are aggravated in Escort, because the previous solution of tunnelling a thread directly from one path to the next cannot be used: quite correctly, the threads are not allowed to tunnel between owners. Allowing tunnelling between owners would make resource accounting much harder. Instead Escort has a handoff function which creates a new thread belonging to the destination owner. This extra overhead could be avoided by addressing the root problem, i.e. avoiding the creation of overly-short paths.
- Escort keeps a number of critical structures in the kernel in order to vet access to them, e.g. path and `pdom` records, and `IOBuffer` metadata. A large number of system calls are provided to manipulate these structures, but putting so much into the kernel risks making it a source of QoS crosstalk, since the manipulations are unscheduled. Alternative OSes (e.g. Exokernel or Nemesis) keep only the minimal functions required in the kernel, usually thread creation, memory access rights modification, and lightweight interprocess communication primitives. Then,



more complex components like IOBuffers may be implemented over basic memory protection change primitives. The only critical data structures kept in the kernel are system scheduler related (and even then, with activations the complexity of user-level threads can be kept out of the kernel).

### Scout v3


Scout v3 is currently in development. The aim is to extend Escort to include a finer-granularity CPU scheduler [Qie01, Bavier99] capable of dealing with a mixture of best-effort as well as real-time paths. This would address most of the CPU scheduling problems in Scout and Escort, however it still leaves the larger architectural questions open.

#### 2.1.4 Resource containers

The motivation for Resource Containers [Banga99] is substantially similar to that for this work: Banga *et al* observe a fundamental mismatch between the original design assumptions surrounding resource control in general-purpose OS designs, and OS use today as networked servers. Protection and scheduling domains are made inseparable by the process abstraction, thus preventing the correct scheduling of complex systems which span multiple protection domains. Banga *et al* modify OSF/1 to add a new abstraction they call a *resource container* to which CPU time and kernel resources such as network sockets are accounted.

Processes then become purely protection domains, with threads bound to resource containers executing within them as shown in Figure 2.5. Banga *et al* focus on improving web server performance by using resource containers to partition incoming requests into two sets: high-priority and low-priority. Low-priority requests are preferentially dropped to guarantee low response times for high-priority requests. In this scenario, resource containers are used for the same purpose as paths in Scout: as resource accounting principals.

Resource containers are not the scheduled entity, however: threads are. This means it is entirely possible to have a resource container with no threads bound to it. The authors argue that this is desirable in the case where one thread services multiple resource containers, reducing the number of threads in the



**Figure 2.5: Resource containers in Unix: application 1 uses two threads each within their own resource container.**

system and scheduler state required. However, this means that resource containers become purely a passive accounting receptacle, rather than a scheduling principal. It is meaningless to attach soft real-time deadlines to a resource container, because the service thread's scheduling is influenced by the other resource containers it is servicing.

Banga *et al* distinguish their work from the previously discussed path-based resource control schemes by claiming a more general solution, and presenting an implementation set within a commodity operating system. It is different from the research presented in this dissertation because their resource containers cannot span protection domains. They also target server systems, whereas this work is focused on NEOSes. While there is much common ground, network element OSes are different from server OSes for two reasons:

**Flexibility.** Server operating systems are tied to legacy APIs because of the large body of existing code which would no longer compile were the API to be changed. This limits possible OS improvements to those which are not visible to user-supplied code. As a concrete example, witness the fact that while zero-copy I/O schemes are widely accepted to enhance performance, few OSes provide in-place receive semantics largely because of the widespread popularity of the BSD sockets API. In contrast, since applications on a NEOS tend to be bespoke, they are written afresh. Thus, a NEOS can have a radically different design including application-visible

changes; the design constraints on a NEOS are imposed by the externally defined protocols exchanged with other network elements, rather than the code running on them.

**Load.** Load on a server is imposed by processes running on behalf of some explicitly authenticated user, to which the consumed resources are charged. Load on a NEOS is imposed by flows of traffic, which are only tied to resource guarantees by flow classification: there is no explicit concept of a user consuming network element resources. For example, web servers which commonly run as a single user yet provide service to many different traffic flows make it impossible for a traditional server OS's resource control mechanisms to distinguish and process separately the individual flows. Such workloads are typical on a NEOS. Banga *et al* describe this same problem, but see the solution as a suite of modifications to the server OS rather than as a separate class of OS.

### 2.1.5 Cohort scheduling

Cohort scheduling strives to increase instruction and data cache hit rates by batching multiple server requests into *cohorts* and processing them together in small stages, rather than individually all the way to completion [Larus01]. These chains of stages can be viewed as paths through the server's code, with data passing through them in waves. Larus *et al* focus on the speed gains possible by using cohorts to group related operations together in time and space.

The authors do not comment on the feasibility of scheduling cohorts with different CPU guarantees; indeed, by deliberately delaying some operations to group them with others, latency is greatly increased (see [Larus01, Figure 6]).

Cohort scheduling deliberately introduces crosstalk by linking the fate of the requests it batches together into a single cohort, in return for improved global throughput. Cohort scheduling is therefore not useful as a system-wide scheduler in a NEOS offering quality of service guarantees to paths. However, within individual paths the idea of batching related work together and performing it in stages is sound. This batching topic is returned to several times in this dissertation.

## 2.2 Other path-like I/O abstractions

While the *x*-Kernel, Scout and Escort all use paths as first-class schedulable entities, the majority of the previously published work on I/O architectures does not tie I/O channels to the OS scheduler. However, since the general principles involved in moving bulk data through protection boundaries are largely the same irrespective of scheduler interactions, this related work is now covered.

There are a number of approaches to giving another protection domain access to data: the most basic is simply to copy it, however this has a high cost in terms of the memory bandwidth consumed. An alternative is known as *copy-on-write*, where the source buffer is marked read-only in both the producer and consumer's page tables. The first time either attempts to modify the buffer it is copied. This allows cheap sharing of buffers, assuming most shared copies are not written to.

Several more sophisticated buffer copying schemes have been proposed over the years. These are now discussed.

### 2.2.1 Refcounted copy semantics: Fbufs, IO-Lite

The Fbufs [Druschel93] I/O system was implemented within the *x*-Kernel to provide a zero-copy framework for data movement. Fbufs have *refcounted copy* semantics, described below.

Individual fbufs are chained together into a *buffer aggregate* datatype, with operations allowing truncation, prepending, appending, concatenation and splitting of data in fbufs. Buffers are passed by reference to eliminate copying and save memory. This means that buffers are immutable; if a buffer aggregate needs to be modified, then a new (writable) buffer is allocated and linked into the position where the change needs to be made, thus preserving the original buffer and maintaining the validity of previously-issued references.

To copy an fbuf to another domain, the fbuf's VM mappings are updated to reflect the new access rights of the receiving domain, and the buffer's reference count incremented. When an fbuf is freed its reference count is decremented; if it becomes zero then the buffer is put on a free list associated with its access rights. This is to speed future allocation of buffers: the assumption is that the producer and consumer protection domains will exchange further data in the

future, and so will require buffers with those particular privileges again shortly. This caching of appropriately protected buffers solves the main problem with all page remapping schemes, which is their inherent cost due to page table updates and TLB and cache flushes, especially on multiprocessor systems. By caching buffers, MMU (Memory Management Unit) operations are only required when previously inactive domains begin exchanging data.

To be able to use these buffer caches effectively, an fbufs system needs to know at buffer allocation time what path the data will traverse, so it can select appropriate permissions. In this way, the permissions cache can be considered to induce paths in the I/O stream.

[Thadani95] describes how they implemented fbufs on Solaris. They extend the Unix API to allow fbufs to be used as parameters to read and write calls; they allow fbufs to be created from memory-mapped files; and they modify certain device drivers to use fbufs.

IO-Lite [Pai00] generalises fbufs to make them more suitable as a generic I/O facility, for example allowing them to be used to implement a filesystem cache. Pai *et al* ported fbufs from the *x*-Kernel to FreeBSD, replacing both the buffer cache and the networking subsystem thus allowing them to be unified.

## 2.2.2 Move semantics: Roadrunner, container shipping

Roadrunner [Miller98], like fbufs, uses buffer descriptors to keep references on data movement within the system. However, it differs from fbufs in three broad areas. Firstly, it uses *move semantics* when buffers cross protection boundaries: once a buffer is handed off, access to it is no longer allowed. This is so the receiver can perform in-place read/write accesses to the data without interfering with the buffer's originator. Secondly, in contrast with fbufs, Roadrunner's buffer descriptors only specify a single, contiguous, data area; any scatter-gather lists must be maintained separately by the application. Roadrunner allows buffers to be trimmed in-place both at the start and end, however this only affects the single data area; it does not allow other buffers to be chained together. Roadrunner's final difference is that it supports in-kernel streaming between arbitrary devices via a `splice()` system call.

While IO-Lite's emphasis is on providing a unified caching model, Roadrunner's focus is on cross-device streaming. This explains Roadrunner's use of *move* rather than *refcounted copy* semantics, however its lack of gather sup-

port means that headers need to be written directly in front of the data to be transmitted. This makes copy-transmit (as used for TCP retransmissions) expensive, since the previous block is corrupted when the next block is prepared for transmission.

The main reason Roadrunner is unsuitable for dealing with QoS-assured streams is that all streaming is done by kernel threads, with weak isolation between the threads being scheduled.

While Roadrunner is a complete OS, its I/O subsystem is substantially similar to (and predated by) both the Container Shipping I/O system [Anderson95b, Anderson95a], and the Penn. ATM Host Interface [Smith93]. Like Roadrunner, Container Shipping uses page flipping (i.e. move semantics) to transfer buffers between protection domains, however it moves lists of buffers, thereby allowing data aggregation.

Because data transfer happens along explicit channels (named by a file descriptor) and the Container Shipping system chooses buffer addresses, it can recycle pages and page table entries, much like fbufs. In this way, file descriptors can be considered as a path identifier for a one-hop path.

### 2.2.3 Upcalls

Upcalls [Clark85] allow receivers to be efficiently notified when new data arrives. This inspired the design of the POSIX.1b<sup>2</sup> Asynchronous I/O (AIO) architecture, which allows clients to register a function which will be called when an I/O request completes [Gallmeister94]. The repeated association of a function with a stream of similar I/O requests induces an implicit processing path, and avoids the need to re-demultiplex the data once it arrives in the user application.

Windows NT provides *I/O Completion Ports* which allow threads to block awaiting for I/O associated with the port to complete. This unblocks a thread and returns a status record [Russovich98]. Completions ports can be used to perform asynchronous I/O, and since the completion port is associated with a particular file or socket, no further demultiplexing is necessary.

These solutions provide upcalls (or emulations of them) from the kernel to

---

<sup>2</sup>The standard was known as 1003.4 (realtime) before being renumbered to 1003.1b (realtime extensions) in 1994.

user processes. Within the kernel itself, the SysV STREAMS architecture uses function calls to deliver data between modular layers [Sun95]. An upcall occurs when protocol processing leaves the kernel and enters a user process. This chain of calls through layer instances can be viewed as tracing a path through the kernel, much in the same way as the *x*-Kernel does.

#### **2.2.4 Path-based component frameworks**

Building distributed systems that can handle time-sensitive data streams is made easier by appropriate middleware abstractions. [Nicolaou91] presents an extension to the ANSA platform [Herbert94] which allows complex multimedia applications to be built. Nicolaou's architecture uses a context id to demultiplex data along an appropriate processing path, making it the earliest use of a path-like concept. In this incarnation, it is not an OS mechanism, but one provided by middleware above the OS.

More recently, InfoPipes [Koster01] and Strings of Beads [BeComm] are both component frameworks where data travels along paths between code modules with strongly typed interfaces. This allows the middleware to type-check module chains, thus ensuring correct data flow. The Strings framework goes further, using a prolog-like unification engine to infer the correct sequence of code modules to compose in order to meet goal conditions set in a system configuration file.

Such frameworks allow application logic to be specified at a high semantic level of abstraction, and while they seem useful as system configuration tools, ultimately the application must be run over an OS. If resource guarantees are to be offered to these applications, the base OS must provide some support. Additionally, an OS with a native path abstraction should allow a simpler, more direct implementation of such path-based middleware.

### **2.3 Protection and IPC (Inter-Process Communication)**

When today's widely-deployed OSes were originally designed, I/O devices were the bottleneck. How they were managed by the OS was immaterial: I/O could be performed using the OS's standard syscall or IPC mechanism (often requiring inline transfers of large data buffers) without limiting performance. The faster I/O devices now available benefit in terms of performance and/or

functionality by appropriately tailored OS support for communication.


Much work has been done on IPC over the past 15 years, either to enrich the primitives, or purely for performance reasons e.g. [Birrell84, Karger89, Bershad90, Schroeder90, Liedtke93, Johnson93]. This work is relevant to the provision of QoS-isolated traffic streams, because any system with protection boundaries on the data path needs to ensure that IPC does not become a bottleneck, as argued in [Hsieh93].

### **2.3.1 Lightweight IPC**

The early work on RPC [Birrell84, Schroeder90, Johnson93] focused on making the non-local interactions appear to the programmer as simple procedure calls. They are all message-based, since ultimately messages must cross the network. Research into local-only RPC systems was prompted by the growth in popularity of microkernels such as Mach 3.0, Amoeba, and Chorus [Golub90, Tanenbaum90, Rozier92]. Such local RPC systems are typified by that used in L3/L4 [Liedtke93]. While not offering a particularly rich IPC environment, Liedtke's system does present a variety of techniques which work well together to increase IPC performance. In particular, he espouses scheduler by-passing<sup>3</sup>, registers for small arguments, and the use of out-of-band data.

Liedtke is by no means the first researcher to propose a minimal IPC system concerned only with local communication. [Karger89] describes how a trusted linker can be used to minimise the number of registers that need to be spilled to the stack or cleared when performing a cross-domain call. Procedure arguments must either fit in the registers, or are placed in a separate argument segment, and a capability for this segment is transferred instead. In both schemes no marshaling of arguments is performed. Complex messages can be implemented over the basic primitives, but are not discussed.





**Figure 2.6: Structure of the CAP.**

### 2.3.2 Capability-based IPC

#### The Cambridge CAP computer

The Cambridge CAP [Wilkes79] was a microcoded computer built to investigate memory protection architectures. Access to memory was controlled by capabilities describing the rights available to segments specified by  $(base, limit)$  tuples. The memory was tagged in order to stop untrusted programs from forging capabilities; only the privileged supervisor code was allowed to treat capabilities as data and thus create or modify them freely.

Programs were structured using a number of *protected procedures* as depicted in Figure 2.6. A protected procedure could be invoked by a process only if it had an EN (enter) capability for it. An EN capability was a capability segment containing capabilities for the protected procedure's code, data, stack and per-instance data. The only way an EN capability could be used is as an argument to the ENTER instruction, which switched the stack and data to those described by the EN capability, and forced the program counter to the start of the proce-

<sup>3</sup>Scheduler by-passing is a technique where control is transferred from the caller to the callee directly, i.e. without a pass through the scheduler.

cedure's code segment. The ENTER microcode also kept track of the previous state on a special C-stack, allowing the RETURN instruction to revert to the previous capabilities in force. Arguments could be passed to the protected procedure using the processor registers for numerical arguments and the C-stack for capability arguments.

IPC in the CAP could either be done using this protected procedure model to tunnel a process into trusted code, or it could use OS-provided libraries to pass a message to a server process and block waiting for a reply. This second mode of IPC needed a message channel to be negotiated with the server before any messages could be exchanged; this is analogous to the *binding* stage in today's IPC systems.

Thus, the CAP computer provided a rich environment where either tunnelling or message-based IPC could be used, as appropriate.

### **Mach 3.0**

Mach's original IPC system [Draves90] used *ports* to which requests could be sent; knowing the name of a port was sufficient to be allowed to make invocations on it. Ports can be considered capabilities, since they cannot be fabricated by untrusted applications. The only way an application could get a port is by binding to the server.

### **EROS**

Shapiro's EROS system re-examines the use of capabilities in a modern OS. In particular, the EROS IPC system [Shapiro96] uses true capabilities as ports. By generating a fresh reply capability for each call, EROS allows a deeply nested call chain to be short-circuited so long as the initial reply capability is handed down to the innermost call level. When the innermost procedure wishes to return to the top level, it uses the provided reply capability, directly returning its result to the original caller.

While this is attractive from a theoretical viewpoint, it is doubtful whether this feature is much use in real systems where each layer needs to perform error handling for the failure case, making tail calls uncommon.

### 2.3.3 IPC by thread tunnelling

Most of the IPC systems described so far have been *message-based*: a client thread sends a request message to a server thread, causing it to unblock and start processing the request. The client thread commonly blocks waiting for the server's reply. This can be called an *active object* [Chin91] IPC model, because the server is an active arbitrator over its internal state, offering a well-defined calling interface much like methods on an object.

By contrast, a thread tunnelling IPC model has no thread of control associated with the "server" code. The server captures the calling client's thread and uses it to run its code within its own protection domain. This is very similar to the protected procedures provided by the CAP computer and described previously in Section 2.3.2.

#### Taos LRPC

[Bershad90] presents a full IPC implementation, complete with binding phase. Control is transferred by trapping to the kernel, which provides CAP-like `ENTER` and `RETURN` system calls to invoke operations on an interface once bound. Arguments are passed by copying them onto a special A-stack, which is mapped to the server's protection domain. Although a stack is kept recording crossed protection domains thus allowing a thread to traverse multiple servers, no provision is made for recovery from failure mid-call.

#### Spring shuttles

Spring was designed as a platform for object-oriented distributed systems, and thus needed an efficient IPC system. Spring introduces *doors* and *shuttles* as the building blocks of its IPC system [Hamilton93].

Spring *doors* are analogous to Mach ports: they are capabilities, possession of which allows a call to be made to another protection domain. Each door is tailored to a specific client at bind time to allow servers to track their callers. Servers provide a pool of threads (with stacks) which are made available to service calls. When a call is made through a door, a free server thread is selected by the kernel, and resumed at the door's entry point. This creates a chain of threads, one per server crossed. Spring threads are only an execution context

and are not used for resource accounting or scheduling. Such information is instead kept in a *shuttle* object shared by all threads in a call chain.

Their system is complicated by the need to deal with a process in the middle of a tunnel chain failing. This is partly a consequence of their retention of threads within servers, rather than tightly binding a protection domain to code as done in the CAP computer. Further complications arise from the need to support Unix signals, and `ptrace`-style debugging and tracing.

### **Mach migrating threads**

Ford and Lepreau [Ford94] present modifications to the previously described Mach 3.0 IPC system, adding tunnelling behaviour. They use the terms *static threads* and *migrating threads* for the two schemes. They use migrating threads where possible, but retain the previous static threads system for use in some more complex cases which their system cannot handle.

While they quote impressive speedups (a factor of 3.4 improvement when using migrating threads in place of static threads), they also encounter the same problems as Spring: the need to support thread debugging/tracing, and propagating aborts due to server failures. Unsurprisingly, their solutions are identical to Spring's, and unsatisfying for the same reasons.

### **2.3.4 Discussion**

While thread tunnelling IPC systems are attractive both for their efficiency and their directness in resource accounting, past implementations have been complicated by attempting to solve too many problems. Both Mach and Spring are forced to deal with intermediate server processes that fail, either in the local case due to some other thread within the server performing an illegal access, or due to whole machine failure in the remote case. Both Mach and Spring also want to allow debugging and profiling of threads, but then need to ensure that these facilities are disabled while the thread is executing code in a protection domain other than the tracing one. This restriction is analogous to that on `strace()`ing setuid binaries on Unix, and imposed for exactly the same security reasons.

By only tunnelling into passive objects, the CAP computer neatly side-steps problems with failure within a protected procedure. The CAP also does not

have a cross-domain debugging facility, and so does not need to check such accesses. One problem the CAP does not address is what to do about failures within a protected procedure while holding locks. In this case, it is more than likely that data structures are not in a consistent state (after all, ensuring this was presumably the reason the lock was acquired). How to recover from this is hard, and impossible in the general case. This problem is considered later, in Section 5.3.3.

These arguments supporting thread tunnelling are very similar to those presented in [Menage00, Section 5.6.1], the difference being that in Menage's environment, safety is assured by the use of a strongly typed language (ML), rather than by hardware. A hardware implementation will necessarily have larger overheads compared with a software scheme since the TLB (and possibly data caches) need to be flushed when memory access rights are modified.


## 2.4 Protection models

Having considered ways of moving bulk data between protection domains, and ways of passing control and small arguments between domains, this section now discusses how such protection domains might be organised in a complete system.

### 2.4.1 Kernel-based systems

In a kernel-based system such as Unix or NT, the operating system machinery that implements confinement and resource allocation is protected from untrusted and potentially malicious user applications by placing it in a *kernel*. Figure 2.7 shows how the address-spaces and protection domains are related to each other. There is one protection domain for the kernel, granting it unrestricted access to the entire memory map and any attached devices. This protection domain is also the domain within which CPU exceptions and interrupts are handled. Each task in the system runs within its own address space and protection domain, which allows access to text and data, a dynamically allocated stack and heap, and any regions shared between other tasks in the system.

This inseparably joins task scheduling and protection, making it impossible to schedule across protection boundaries (be it user–user or kernel–user). A



**Figure 2.7: Structure of Unix.**

number of different system organisations have been proposed that allow control to be regained over scheduling.

## 2.4.2 Protected shared libraries

Banerji *et al* [Banerji97] introduce Protected shared libraries (PSLs) as a mechanism enabling the modular construction of high performance systems. PSLs extend Unix shared libraries so they can access and update protected state, allowing them to provide the services usually implemented as separate tasks.

PSLs are an implementation of passive objects, as discussed above in Section 2.3.4, and as such are an implementation of thread tunnelling. Like the previously discussed schemes, PSLs use an activation stack to record crossed protection domains to allow nested PSL invocations. The difference is that there is only one execution stack, whose access rights are changed so that only the currently executing protection domain has access to it, thus avoiding the complexity of maintaining thread or stack pools in the service protection domains.

In addition to these protected libraries, Banerji *et al* describe context specific libraries (CSLs), a flexible data sharing framework. A CSL can offer three different scopes for data visibility: *global*, *client*, or *domain*. Global CSLs are read/write shared memory areas much like Unix SysV shared memory, with

the added feature that symbols may be used to refer to locations within the shared region. Client CSLs allow library code read/write access to a per-client read-only area, which can be used to maintain client-specific state. Domain CSLs are poorly described, but appear to be identical to client CSLs with the added property that dynamically allocated memory is read-only to all clients, read/write to the library. The authors claim this is necessary to support the sharing of C++ objects with virtual table pointers.

Whereas other tunnelling systems require clients to pre-register with servers via a binding phase, PSLs do this implicitly during the execution of the dynamic linker. This means that there can be only one instance of each library per client. Also, the authors make only passing reference to the thorny issue of what environment signal handlers should be run in when they are delivered while executing within a PSL.

In summary, while this work is poorly presented and lacking detail, it is significant because it shows a continuing interest in thread tunnelling and alternative protection schemes that improve performance while retaining modularity.

### **2.4.3 Safe kernel extensions**

A finer-grained alternative to the usual kernel/user split is presented by Chiueh *et al* [Chiueh99]. They argue that a monolithic kernel lacks extensibility, and agree that dynamically loadable modules provide a reasonable model for extension. However they are unwilling to completely trust certain modules and find previous work in this area (e.g. software-based fault isolation [Wahbe93], type safe [Bershad95] or interpreted [Arnold96] languages, or proof carrying code [Necula97]) unsatisfying, and thus propose placing untrusted extensions in a separate segment.

Virtual to physical address translations are unchanged from the usual kernel ones, however the extension segment only confers access rights to extension code and data, not the whole kernel. The authors correctly note that it may be better to load each extension into a separate segment, but their initial implementation does not do this. Kernel services are exported to extension modules much like system calls are offered to user processes, and there is a shared memory region used to exchange large arguments, e.g. packet contents for filtering extensions.

There are a number of drawbacks to the whole scheme. Firstly, it is irrevocably

tied to the integrated segmentation and paging of the Intel IA-32 architecture, and while this processor is in widespread use in desktop and server machines the situation in embedded systems is by no means so clear. Secondly, this work is not suitable as a general way of structuring an entire system, since it is not re-entrant: the underlying assumption is that calls are made from kernel to extension, but not between extensions, and only in limited circumstances back to the kernel (and certainly not with parameters which would lead to an extension being re-invoked).

## **2.5 Vertically structured OSes**

Vertically-structured OS designs (e.g. Exokernels or Nemesis) avoid the need for many protection domains and the associated problems with IPC by devolving as much as possible directly to untrusted applications.

### **2.5.1 Nemesis**

The Nemesis architecture is covered in detail in Chapter 3. This section assesses Nemesis' suitability as a resource-controlled NEOS.

Nemesis' vertical structure is motivated by a desire to reduce quality of service crosstalk between applications on a multimedia workstation [Leslie96]. By multiplexing and protecting a machine's real resources at the lowest possible level, shared servers on the data path are reduced to those strictly necessary for protection or multiplexing.

QoS crosstalk can occur when requests from multiple clients contend for access to a shared resource in a server. Unless servers internally schedule the resources they expend on a per-client basis, clients cannot be given meaningful QoS guarantees. The X Server on Unix is cited as an example of such a shared server whose use can be monopolised by one client to the detriment of all others.

Instead of implementing OS services in shared servers, Nemesis places as much functionality as possible into the applications themselves. Shared libraries are used to provide default implementations of all OS components, while freeing the application writer to override these defaults to make application-specific trade-offs.




However, shared servers are still needed for two reasons. Firstly, servers are needed whenever state needs to be updated in a controlled manner, for example network port allocations need to be serialised and centrally administered. Secondly, servers are needed whenever a known-good portion of code must be executed, usually for protection, security or policy reasons.

Mostly, servers of the first kind are on the control path and pose no performance problems, as in the port allocation example given previously. However, when the state being managed is for an I/O device, then the server is on the data path and so is a potential source of QoS crosstalk or a performance bottleneck. Drivers for devices which cannot be safely exposed to user code fall into this category. [Barham96] describes in detail how devices are managed in Nemesis.

Barham considers both *self-selecting* and *non-self-selecting* network adaptors. Self-selecting adaptors are able to identify data's ultimate destination while non-self-selecting adaptors cannot. This means that self-selecting adaptors typically need very little device driver intervention on the data path. Barham uses the OTTO ATM host interface adaptor and its Nemesis driver as an example of how self-selecting interfaces should be managed.

When Nemesis was designed, it was hoped that future high bandwidth I/O devices would be self-selecting. However, this has not turned out to be the case: there is a vicious circle between hardware vendors reluctant to change their API due to lack of OS support, and OS vendors not wishing to change their device driver model because no existing hardware would take advantage of it, along with the need to re-write every driver to fit the new model. The upshot is that the OS/device interface tends to stay fixed, and the result is high bandwidth network adaptors which are non-self-selecting. For such interfaces, a packet filter is needed in the device driver to demultiplex data to the correct application. Naturally this means that the device driver is on the data path, but this breaks Nemesis' vertical structure and leads to the following problems:

- **Increased crosstalk.** Nemesis device drivers are scheduled like any other process in order to bound their impact on the system. This design decision is understandable for a multimedia workstation where multiple devices compete for limited system resources, however in a network element the network devices need prompt servicing in order not to overrun their input queues, and are thus the most important. If the receive DMA ring overflows then the hardware will drop packets indiscriminately, thus introducing crosstalk.



**Figure 2.8: Cross traffic overflows pre-demux queue.**

	IRQ response (cycles)	packets per IRQ	context switches	loss %age
idle system	4290	26.8	2.33	<b>0</b>
while(1)	7370	28.7	3.33	<b>48</b>


**Table 2.1: Crosstalk in the receive DMA ring**

Figure 2.8 shows a low rate client flow multiplexed with high speed cross traffic in a device’s DMA ring prior to being demultiplexed into client-specific buffers. Functions left of line A are implemented in hardware; the functions between lines A and B are in the kernel in most systems, but in user-space in Nemesis. There are two points where loss can occur: in hardware because the DMA ring overflows (line A), and in software because the demultiplex failed or there is inadequate client buffering (line B). If loss occurs before line A then this will introduce crosstalk since there is no discrimination between flows.

In an OS with kernel-resident device drivers the interrupt response time is bounded and has low jitter, allowing the size of the receive DMA ring to be statically determined to avoid this crosstalk. In Nemesis, separately scheduled device drivers mean that the interrupt response latency is both of larger magnitude and subject to a larger variance due to other system activity. This means there must be larger amounts of buffering, and the required size is harder to determine. This is the case regardless of the device driver’s scheduling parameters, because even just passing through the scheduler adds latency which is not present if the interrupt is serviced immediately in the kernel.

The following experiment demonstrates crosstalk in the receive DMA ring. A probe flow of 10 pps (packets per second) is multiplexed with cross-traffic at 116,000 pps and this mix sent to a Nemesis machine (a 200MHz Intel Pentium Pro with 32MB memory and a DEC DE500BA 100Mb/s Ethernet adaptor). The machine's device driver classifies the packets and is configured to discard the cross-traffic and deliver the probe flow to an application which reflects the probe packets back to the sender, where its loss rate is calculated. Table 2.1 shows various metrics for two cases: when the Nemesis machine is idle; and when the Nemesis machine is running an infinite loop in user-space with no guarantee, only using slack time in the schedule. The table lists the loss experienced by the probe stream, as well as the average number of cycles it takes to respond to an interrupt for the network device, the maximum number of packets processed in response to a single IRQ, and how many context switches were made while processing the DMA ring. The data was gathered by instrumenting the device driver to read the processor's cycle count register. This data shows that with no other processing on the machine, it can classify packets sufficiently fast to distinguish all probe packets and respond to them correctly. However, once an extra context switch is forced by using a looping process, the overhead is sufficient to delay the demultiplex long enough to cause the DMA ring to overflow, and so cause crosstalk between the probe flow and the cross-traffic. Changing the scheduler parameters to give the device driver a shorter period and thus a faster response time would not help, since the overhead is due to context switching.

- **Increased latency.** Any delay to the demultiplex will necessarily increase latency, since applications cannot receive and take action on their data before the demultiplex has taken place. Figure 2.9 shows the average round trip time taken by UDP packets of a given size for both Nemesis and Linux 2.2.14 on the same hardware. The gradient in both cases is the same, showing that data-dependent processing costs are equivalent for each OS. However, Nemesis has a much larger per-packet overhead. Table 2.2 details the sources of this overhead. It shows where CPU time is spent in receiving then reflecting back 980 byte UDP packets on the same 200MHz machine. Note that over 10% of this delay is between receiving the interrupt and the driver responding to it, a delay which is not present in operating systems with kernel-resident device drivers. However, the largest sources of latency are the RX and TX processing, which



**Figure 2.9: UDP round trip time vs. packet size.**

both involve a full scheduler pass and context switch away from the device driver process to the application process. Again, this cost is due to the device driver's status as a separately protected and scheduled process, and would not be present to the same extent in a more traditional operating system.

- Complex accounting.** As the number of clients using a device driver increases, so does the driver's resource requirements. Figure 2.10 shows the percentage of total available CPU time used by the DE500 device driver against the number of flows sent through the machine. Line A shows the CPU requirement if flows are demultiplexed to individual clients; line B shows the baseline, delivering the same data rate but as a single flow to a single client. The CPU usage is also bandwidth dependent, as shown by lines C and D. Therefore, when admitting a new flow it is not enough to consider just the resources needed to process the flow in an application; the additional resources needed though the entire system need to be taken account of, with particular attention to the device driver. Having the device driver domain as a separately scheduled entity makes this extra resource requirement visible, but does not separate it out into per-flow contributions to the overall resources needed. This makes

Subsystem	cycles	%age
IRQ response time	6890	10.7
RX demux	2580	4.0
RX processing	25600	40.1
<b>RX subtotal</b>	<b>35100</b>	<b>54.9</b>
TX processing	19400	30.3
TX filter, DMA setup	9330	14.6
<b>TX subtotal</b>	<b>28700</b>	<b>45.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>63800</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 2.2: UDP ping-pongs: latency contribution by subsystem. Does not sum to 100% due to rounding.**


it difficult to predict appropriate resource guarantees for device drivers as flows are setup and torn down.

In short, the Nemesis network I/O model is predicated on self-selecting interfaces and copes poorly with today’s badly designed devices. While recent research into self-selecting adaptors is promising [Pratt01], the economic factors discussed previously mean that non-self-selecting interfaces are likely to continue to dominate commodity systems.

## 2.5.2 Exokernels

Exokernels such as Aegis [Engler95] and Xok [Kaashoek97] also start from the point of view that applications should be made responsible for as much of their processing as possible. However, rather than doing this for QoS isolation reasons, Exokernel’s design is motivated by the performance enhancements available to applications which by-pass inappropriate OS abstractions [Kaashoek96]. Exokernels make the OS a library which application writers are free to use or ignore as they see fit.

Xok’s network support uses a compiled packet filter language, DPF, to demultiplex incoming packets [Engler96]. They are delivered to rings of application supplied buffers for later processing in user-space. Alternatively, the packets may be processed directly within the kernel by ASHs (Application-specific Safe Handlers) [Wallach96]. Such processing is designed to have bounded run-



**Figure 2.10: Driver CPU usage vs. flows.**

time, however it occurs within the kernel on packet receipt and is not scheduled. While individually an ASH may be innocuous, in a NEOS many ASHs would be expected to be active concurrently and their cumulative effect can grow to represent a sizable unscheduled workload on the system.

Packets are transmitted by handing wire-ready frames to the kernel which sends them without performing any source address checking or bandwidth scheduling. This minimal support is consistent with Exokernel's focus on the efficient multiplexing of multiple library OSes above the hardware, but it completely ignores resource accounting and scheduling.

## 2.6 Active networks

In recent years, not many genuinely new operating systems have been developed [Pike00]. In part, this is due to the large body of legacy applications one wishes to run on an operating system, which constrains the APIs which can be offered. This interoperability problem is mitigated in operating systems for network elements because existing protocols are normally well-documented and there are well-understood mechanisms for deploying new protocols alongside

existing ones; the set of “applications” is smaller and better defined.

This lower barrier to entry, along with recent work in Active Networks has renewed interest in Network Element Operating Systems: researchers have agreed on a NodeOS design [Peterson01] to act as a common platform for active network experimentation. A NodeOS is a NEOS which runs EE (Execution Environment) sandboxes within which untrusted code may be executed, usually in the form of bytecode [Wetherall98, Moore01]. Active networks cover a spectrum of possibilities, ranging from automated firmware updates on management timescales, via per-connection code installation, all the way to code run on per-packet timescales.

Resource control in a NodeOS can be done in a variety of ways. Basic control can be achieved by deliberately restricting the power of the bytecode language, for example removing looping constructs to ensure that run time is proportional to code length, as is done in the SNAP scheme. More sophisticated control can be achieved by using similar techniques to those used in soft real-time or multimedia workstation OSES [Menage00].

Irrespective of the precise higher-level functionality presented to the network or the user, Active Network EEs need to perform resource control on the code they run. This means that they would benefit from being implemented over a NEOS which supports accurate resource control natively.

The RCANE system [Menage00] is an architecture for just such a NEOS, capable of simultaneously hosting and isolating multiple EEs. However, because it relies on OCaml bytecode to ensure protection between EEs, all environments must be implemented in languages which can be compiled down to the OCaml bytecode. This restriction meant that off-the-shelf EEs such as the Java-based ANTS Toolkit needed to be re-implemented before they were runnable on RCANE. By contrast, the system described in this dissertation runs native machine instructions which serve as a *lingua franca* for all high-level languages, allowing pre-existing bodies of code to be reused.

In conclusion, EEs are a class of application which would benefit from being implemented over a resource-controlled NEOS.

## 2.7 Smart devices

Commodity PC workstations are the hardware platform of choice for the majority of open programmable routers today, and it is not difficult to see why: they offer plentiful cheap processor cycles, storage, and reasonable I/O performance. In addition to this, their widely documented architecture allows a competent programmer to target an OS for them with relative ease.

While the hardware's I/O architecture is primitive compared to that of a mainframe, this is not such an issue for two reasons. Firstly, having the main CPU closely involved in directing I/O allows a great degree of flexibility in how such I/O is managed, and this is naturally of interest to those implementing open programmable routers. Secondly, there is a general trend towards more powerful and flexible devices.

Evidence for this move towards more complex devices can be seen as early as the work on Jetstream/Afterburner [Edwards95]. More recently, [Pratt97] argues for the offloading of the OS protection and multiplexing functions directly onto devices, thus allowing them to be accessed safely by untrusted users. [Fiuczynski98] describes an operating system for a smart device which can be safely extended by untrusted users.

In a commercial setting, Alteon Web Systems have produced a very flexible gigabit Ethernet chipset [Alt97]. A typical configuration consists of two MIPS R4000-compatible processors and 1MB of RAM, allowing around 500 cycles of processing to be performed per packet. [Pratt01] describes how this cycle budget can be used to demultiplex incoming flows directly to the appropriate user process and enforce per-flow transmit rate limits, so allowing safe user-level access to the device.

This trends towards smarter devices with considerable CPU power and memory is evinced further by Intel's IXP1200 network processor [Int01]. This is a more aggressively parallel architecture than the Alteon described above: a single IXP1200 chip has 6 micro-engines managed by a single StrongARM core. The micro-engines perform data path manipulations such as TCP checksum offloading, and post events to the ARM core when more extensive processing is required. A typical switch or router built using these on line cards would almost certainly have a further processor to manage the system, leading to a three-tier hierarchy of processing power: (1) route processor, (2) ARM cores, (3) micro-engines. From top to bottom the amount of power available decreases while



the proximity to the data stream increases.

Both smart devices like the Alteon and more complex CPU hierarchies like the IXP1200 can be emulated on multiprocessor workstations by dedicating one (or more) CPUs to I/O tasks, rather than using them in the more common SMP (Symmetric Multi-Processing) arrangement [Muir98, Muir00].

These processor hierarchies come about because for technical or administrative reasons, device vendors wish to isolate the resources used on their device from others in the system. While dedicated hardware is certainly effective in segregating processing, the correct resource balance needs to be statically determined at hardware design time. This is unsuitable if the system is ever to change role since it is likely that the processing balance between components will be different from the initially-provisioned system. By using scheduling in the OS to make the resource split, the system remains flexible.

For example, software modems have recently become popular for cost reasons because the host processor is responsible for implementing higher level protocol features and often lower level signal processing. The OS must isolate of the driver from the rest of the system to achieve correct operation of the device. Often software modem device drivers will not trust the OS to schedule them correctly, and so they disable interrupts to ensure they are not preempted. This is a really a symptom of inadequate scheduler support for hard real-time processing. Alternatively, some drivers take no steps to ensure they are appropriately scheduled and hope that the system is lightly loaded, which results in mysterious malfunctions when this assumption breaks down. A NEOS with a real-time scheduling facility could correctly handle such devices, and would allow a dial-in server consisting of many modems to be built more cheaply by using software modems rather than full hardware implementations. An added benefit is that new line coding schemes can be introduced simply by updating the drivers.

By analogy with the modem example, smart Ethernet devices cost more than dumb devices but are more easily virtualised. If many Ethernet interfaces are needed in a single system then an implementation using dumb devices and a proper resource controlled NEOS which can emulate a smart API over them will lead to a cheaper, more flexible system. This is covered in Chapter 4.

Resource control in systems with multiple, asymmetric, processors is an interesting problem, but not the main focus of this dissertation. The problem is briefly considered in Section 7.4.

## 2.8 Summary

The rise in use of middle boxes and active networks means that increasingly, processing is being moved into the network. Current routers and switches perform only outbound link bandwidth scheduling, so are unsuited as a platform on which these more complex services may be built. Current OS designs are poorly adapted to an I/O-centric workload, and although a number of researchers have investigated promising path-based scheduling schemes, these are not flexible enough to also schedule the background computations needed in a realistic environment. A middle-ground is sought, blending traditional task-based scheduling together with I/O-driven path-based scheduling in order to correctly account and isolate the processing performed on resource-strapped intelligent network nodes.

This dissertation presents the Expert OS,<sup>4</sup> an operating system designed with these issues in mind. Expert draws on the ideas of the Nemesis OS, which are described in greater detail in the next chapter.

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<sup>4</sup>“Expert” is an acronym: EXtensible Platform for Experimental Router Technology

# Chapter 3

## Nemesis

As Expert is substantially based on Nemesis, this chapter presents a brief summary of the main concepts embodied in Nemesis. Readers already familiar with Nemesis may wish to skip this chapter as no new work is described here.

Nemesis is an operating system for multi-service workstations. It is designed to facilitate the accurate resource accounting and fine-grained scheduling needed to support the processing of time-sensitive data such as audio or video streams.

Nemesis is *vertically structured*, i.e. applications are made responsible for as much of their own processing as is compatible with the need to retain system security. The entire operating system is structured to this end, redefining the kernel-user boundary.


### 3.1 NTSC (Nemesis Trusted Supervisor Code)

The NTSC is Nemesis' kernel. It exists only to multiplex the CPU and memory between domains,<sup>1</sup> and provides only a very basic event sending mechanism for cross-domain communication. The NTSC converts CPU exceptions such as page faults into events sent to the faulting user domain, thus allowing user domains to perform their own paging [Hand99].

Nemesis is a single address space OS. This simplifies communication, since pointers can be passed unmodified from one domain to another, although note that just because Nemesis uses a single address space does not mean it lacks

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<sup>1</sup>Described in Section 3.3.



**Figure 3.1: Structure of Nemesis.**

memory protection – if a pointer references memory which is not readable by the current domain then an attempt to dereference it causes a protection fault. Another advantage of using a single address space is that it eliminates the need to flush virtually-addressed caches on context switches, thus allowing higher context switch rates to be used without adversely affecting overall system performance. Frequent context switches allow device drivers to be scheduled no differently than standard user domains.

Figure 3.1 shows how Nemesis uses its single address space. It contains multiple protection domains within which applications run, perhaps using shared libraries. This diagram is included to aid comparison with the other operating systems previously described in Chapter 2.

### 3.1.1 Interrupts

Interrupts may be reserved by privileged device driver domains. Once claimed, the NTSC handles that interrupt by running a driver-supplied function, which typically does nothing more than send an event to the driver domain, making it runnable. The NTSC then masks the interrupt and performs a reschedule, only selecting the device driver to run if it is within its guarantee. Eventually the

driver's event handler thread is run, performing any device-specific actions and unmasking the interrupt.

Note that the CPU scheduler decides when to run a driver domain based on its guarantees; it is not run directly in response to the interrupt. While this increases the interrupt handling latency, it allows time spent within the device driver to be bounded. Because the interrupt remains masked until explicitly re-enabled by the driver, further device activity does not interrupt the CPU, reducing the potential for livelock.

### 3.1.2 API

The NTSC is sufficiently small that its entire API may be summarised here. It can be broadly divided into two categories: a passive API with no synchronisation between the user domain and NTSC, and a more traditional active API using system calls.

#### Passive API

The NTSC exports a read-only PIP (Public Information Page) globally at a well known address, allowing the cheap publication of system-wide information such as the current system time, enabled CPU features, and performance counters.

Each domain has a DCB (Domain Control Block) split into two: a read-only (`dcb_ro`) and a read/write (`dcb_rw`) portion. The `dcb_ro` is used by the NTSC to publish information to the user domain, such as its domain id, current privileges, event endpoints, and memory manager bindings. The `dcb_rw` is written to by the user domain to communicate back to the NTSC, in order to specify activation-related information (see Section 3.2) and memory manager state. The `dcb_rw` also holds an initial stack, and maintains event state.

#### Active API

The NTSC also makes available a number of system calls to manage the machine, interact with the scheduler, send events, perform low-level console I/O, manage memory, and mask/unmask interrupts.

## 3.2 Scheduler activations

Recognising that individual applications can benefit from tailored thread schedulers, Nemesis allows user applications to schedule their own threads. The NTSC uses a scheme based on scheduler activations [Anderson92] to allow efficient user-level thread schedulers to be implemented.

While traditional OSes virtualise the CPU, attempting to hide preemption from user processes, scheduler activations can expose each OS-level reschedule. A user process has an *activation handler* which is upcalled by the kernel whenever the process is given the CPU. This activation vector is typically set to the process's thread scheduler entry point. While this runs activations are disabled to avoid the need for a re-entrant thread scheduler. When activations are disabled and a process is preempted, its context is saved in a reserved context slot. When the CPU is later given back to this process, it is resumed from the reserved context slot.

The activation handler upcall can terminate in a number of different ways. The upcall can finish by re-enabling activations and continuing, or more commonly by atomically re-enabling activations and restoring a previously saved thread context. The upcall can also choose to re-enable activations and block waiting for events or a timeout: this is used when the user-level thread scheduler has decided that there are no currently runnable threads.

## 3.3 Protection, scheduling and activation domains

Nemesis distinguishes the three related but distinct concepts of *protection*, *scheduling*, and *activation domain*, called pdom, sdom, and adom respectively. A Nemesis domain runs with memory privileges granted by its pdom (protection domain); it is scheduled according to the resource guaranteed to it by its sdom (scheduling domain); and it is entered at the location defined by its adom (activation domain).

A *protection domain* defines the permissions on virtual address ranges; it does not define a translation from virtual to physical addresses. Permissions include the usual read, write and execute bits, as well as a meta bit. When set, the meta bit allows the other bits to be modified, allowing primitive access control. There is one special protection domain which is used to specify global access

rights. A Nemesis domain's memory access rights are thus the union of its own pdom and any further global rights.

A *scheduling domain* is the entity dealt with by the kernel scheduler. An sdom has a CPU time guarantee specified by the triple  $(p, s, l)$  and a boolean flag  $x$ . The sdom receives a guaranteed slice of  $s$  nanoseconds in every period  $p$ , with a latency of no more than  $l$ ns between becoming eligible to run and actually receiving the CPU. If the boolean  $x$  is true, it means the sdom is eligible to receive a share of any slack time in the system.

An *activation domain* is the entity which is activated by the kernel. This comprises the address of an activation handler, and the state used by the activation handler to make its user-level scheduling decisions. Nemesis only ever uses a single adom with each sdom, however the concepts remain distinct.

When the word "domain" is used by itself, it means a Nemesis domain consisting of one each of the above components. Chapter 5 examines the consequences of binding pdoms to code modules and allowing sdoms to migrate between them.

## **3.4 Same-machine communication**

Another benefit of having a single address space is that sharing data is easy: marshaling is kept to a minimum, and pointer representations are identical across pdoms. Nemesis builds rich inter-domain communication facilities over the basic event send mechanism provided by the kernel.

### **3.4.1 IDC (Inter-Domain Communication)**

Servers export typed interfaces described by an IDL (Interface Definition Language). Clients bind to server interface offers, at which time a buffer shared between client and server is allocated with appropriate permissions, and two event channels are connected so the server can block waiting for incoming calls, and clients can block waiting for a server reply.

When a client makes a call to a server, the client marshals its arguments into the pre-negotiated buffer and sends the server an event. This unblocks the server which parses the call number and any arguments, invokes the operation, and marshals any results back into the buffer before finally sending an event back

to the client to notify it the call has completed. Since clients marshal their own arguments, servers cannot assume the arguments are correctly formatted and must parse them with care.

The Nemesis typesystem includes provision for runtime type queries, type-cases, and reflection, all implemented over C's native typesystem by macros and programming conventions. New interfaces may be added to the system at runtime, since the default marshaling system uses interface reflection to discover the number and shape of method arguments. This also allows shells to make arbitrary interface invocations without needing the interfaces to be available at build time [Roscoe95].

### **3.4.2 CALLPRIV sections**

A CALLPRIV is a small critical section of code which trusted domains such as device drivers can insert into the kernel to make some function available to all domains in the system via the `ntsc_callpriv()` system call. They are run with the CPU in supervisor mode, with full access to all memory and interrupts disabled. Naturally, this means they cannot be preempted by the scheduler, so they should run for a minimum amount of time.


For example, the framebuffer subsystem registers a CALLPRIV which untrusted clients use to write to the framestore. The CALLPRIV accepts a tile of pixel data and a location, checks the client is allowed to write to the co-ordinates given, and if so masks the client pixels against an ownership bitmask and updates the framestore.

They can be viewed as “custom CPU instructions” which drivers make available to the system. Like an instruction, they are atomic with respect to interrupts, however this means their scope is limited to time-bounded code portions.

### **3.4.3 I/O channels**

When bulk data needs to be passed between domains, there are two possibilities open to the programmer. Firstly, they can use the normal IDC system to pass the data either inline or via a pointer to a stretch of memory accessible in the destination domain. However this is a synchronous operation between the producer and consumer; by buffering multiple payloads before sending them to the consumer, protection switch overheads can be amortised leading to im-





**Figure 3.2: An I/O channel.**

proved throughput. This section describes this second, asynchronous, style of I/O, and Nemesis' support for it by I/O channels [Black95].

I/O channels are a connection-based unidirectional packet I/O system which integrates: (1) buffer allocation, (2) queueing to amortise context switch overheads, and (3) back-pressure. Packets are described by `iovecs`: vectors of  $(base, length)$  pairs which facilitate the common protocol processing steps of adding or removing headers without needing to copy packet data.

At connection setup time a data area is allocated with permissions read/write for the producer, read-only for the consumer. From this data area individual packet buffers are allocated. In addition, two FIFO queues are used to hold `iovecs` describing the packet data to be exchanged between producer and consumer. Figure 3.2 shows this arrangement. The bottom FIFO holds empty buffers from the consumer to the producer, which fills them with the payload it wishes to transfer. The top FIFO holds these filled buffers en-route to the consumer.

The FIFOs decouple the producer and consumer from each other, meaning that queueing a full or empty buffer for transfer is unlikely to cause a context switch immediately. The limited FIFO depth provides all four back-pressure points needed:

- **Producer underflow.** Blocking the producer when there are no remaining empty buffers (bottom FIFO empty).
- **Consumer underflow.** Blocking the consumer when there is no data (top FIFO empty).

- **Producer overflow.** Blocking the producer when the consumer has yet to collect valid data (top FIFO full).
- **Consumer overflow.** Blocking the consumer when the producer has yet to collect empty buffers (bottom FIFO full).

If the producer and consumer operate at different rates, then only two of these four conditions will be regularly exercised. This makes it easy to forget the other two block conditions, and leads to subtle bugs. All four block conditions must be correctly implemented in a general system.

## 3.5 Network stack


Originally, Nemesis used a port of the *x*-Kernel as an expedient way of getting a network stack. However, this suffered from the problems common to any protocol server in a micro-kernel based system: because applications must exchange payload data with the protocol server in order to perform network I/O, the protocol server itself becomes a point of resource contention and leads to QoS crosstalk between data flows.

The network stack was re-designed following the Nemesis philosophy of pushing as much functionality as possible into applications as possible. I implemented this new native network stack. Its main features are outlined below; a fuller discussion has been published previously [Black97].

Figure 3.3 shows the organisation of the main components of the network stack. Dotted boxes surround independently scheduled domains, while dark arrows represent I/O channels (and show the direction of data transfer). Two applications have a total of three bi-directional flows directly connected to the device driver domain. These flows were set up by the applications performing IDC to the Flow Manager domain. The Flow Manager is the central control-plane entity responsible for flow setup and teardown, port allocation, ARP cache maintenance, and routing.

### 3.5.1 Receive processing

Packets arriving cause the hardware to generate interrupts which are converted to events, making the device driver domain runnable. When the CPU sched-



**Figure 3.3: Overview of the Nemesis network architecture.**

uler next allows it, the device driver runs and uses a table-driven demultiplex to discover which flow the packet is destined for. If no applications have registered an interest in the packet, it is delivered to the Flow Manager so it can reply with an ICMP Port Unreachable in response to unwanted UDP packets, or a TCP reset (RST) packet for unwanted TCP segments. Non-IP packets are silently discarded at this stage as well.

Assuming the demultiplex identified a flow, the data is copied from the DMA receive ring into the flow’s application-supplied buffers, splitting the header out into the first rec if multiple `iovecs` are available. The header size is determined as part of the demultiplex operation, and will typically include all headers up to OSI layer 4 (transport). If the I/O channel has no free buffers available, then the application is not processing received data fast enough. In this case, the device driver discards the received packet. This discard happens before any protocol processing has occurred, and is early enough to provide some measure of protection against traffic flooding [Black97, Figure 7].

Raw Ethernet frames are delivered to the application, making it the application’s responsibility to perform receive protocol processing such as consistency

checking and checksum verification, fragment reassembly, and Ethernet frame padding removal. Should the application wish to forgo such sanity checks (e.g. for performance reasons), it may directly access the payload delivered in the second `iovec` without examining the headers at all. Such behaviour would be a gross violation of RFC1122 (Host Requirements),<sup>2</sup> but may be expedient in purely local networks with low bit error rate datalink layers.

### 3.5.2 Transmit processing

Similarly, applications are also made responsible for formatting their own wire-ready Ethernet frames. For programmer convenience, shared libraries are provided which implement the standard protocols. These libraries encapsulate the application-supplied payload with appropriate headers, and queue the packet in the I/O channel to the device driver.

The device driver domain performs two functions. Firstly, it verifies the frames presented to it for transmission to ensure that they show the correct provenance. This is done by a simple offset plus value and mask filtering technique, asserting that particular values such as protocol type and source address/port are the required ones for this I/O channel. This is fairly efficient since the driver already knows which channel it is working on, and can directly find the associated transmit filter to be applied.

The device driver's second function is to schedule packets from I/O channels based on QoS parameters expressed in a similar fashion to the CPU parameters:  $(p, s, x)$ . Note that the resource being scheduled is not network bandwidth, since with Ethernet there is no reservation mechanism. Instead, the resource scheduled is the *opportunity* for this I/O channel to transmit frames for  $s$  nanoseconds out of a period  $p$ . Once all I/O channels have been granted their guaranteed allocations, any channels with the  $x$  flag set are then given round-robin access to the media. This unified scheduling model for both CPU and network bandwidth is fairly simple to understand. Peak rates can be limited by setting the slice to one Ethernet frame packetisation delay, and the period to be the minimum desired mean inter-frame start time. In practice, since the packetisation delay depends on the frame size, this does not give good results.

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<sup>2</sup>In particular, it would violate at least sections 3.2.1.1 (IP version must be checked), 3.2.1.2 (IP header checksum must be verified), 3.2.1.3 (must discard mis-delivered IP datagrams); 3.2.1.8 (must pass IP options to transport layer), 3.2.1.8c (source route option); 3.3.2 (must reassemble IP fragments); 4.1.3.4 (must validate UDP checksum), and 4.1.3.6 (must discard mis-delivered UDP).

### 3.5.3 Control plane

The Flow Manager domain is a trusted system server which has both an active and a passive role. In its active role, it responds to packets which are otherwise unclaimed and require a response, as described earlier. It also performs ARP and caches the results on behalf of applications, thus ensuring that untrusted applications cannot poison the ARP cache. In its passive role, the Flow Manager maintains the routing table which applications consult to decide which interface to connect through. It also performs TCP and UDP port allocation to ensure no two applications are allocated the same port.

The Flow Manager also uses the port tables to instantiate the packet filters needed when it causes new I/O channels between applications and device drivers to be established.

Nemesis was designed as a host OS, and its network stack reflects this. There is no provision for the forwarding of IP datagrams, mainly because the table-driven receive packet filter performs exact matches only. This means it is not suitable for the longest prefix matches needed to discover the outgoing interface for packets with destination addresses which are not local.

## 3.6 Summary

This chapter has briefly described Nemesis. It has shown how domains interact with the kernel in a minimal fashion, building their own abstractions over the low-level primitives offered by the NTSC.

It has introduced the separate notions of scheduling domain and protection domain, despite the fact that Nemesis domains always consist of exactly one *sdom* and one *pdom*.

It has shown how Nemesis supports bulk packetised I/O, and how this facility may be extended into a network architecture where device drivers safely export a raw packet interface directly to untrusted user applications.

Section 2.5.1 argued that Nemesis is not directly suitable for use as a network element OS. The next two chapters describe the problems faced in designing a NEOS capable of offering resource control, and how Expert resolves them.

## Chapter 4

# Network device driver model

This chapter describes how network devices are handled in the Expert architecture. It discusses design trade-offs and presents evidence that shows it is possible to achieve good performance while preserving isolation between simple processing of data flows. Isolation is desirable because in an overloaded system, it enables meaningful resource guarantees to be given.

This chapter concentrates on the network device driver model because it has such a large effect on the overall performance of the system. Expert's performance goal encompasses not just the usual metrics of low latency, high bandwidth, and high packets per second; but also includes isolation, for example limiting the jitter clients experience due to the activities of each other, and ensuring that all clients make progress (i.e. none suffer from deadlock or livelock).

Prior work has shown that vertically structured operating systems (and correspondingly, user-space network stacks) allow more accurate resource accounting than either monolithic kernel or micro-kernel systems [Black97]. For example, by placing protocol processing in the application and using dedicated application-supplied receive and transmit buffers, the Nemesis network stack can control the resources consumed by packet communications on an Ethernet. However, Nemesis uses a user-space device driver to demultiplex received packets and rate-limit transmissions, effectively placing a shared server on the data path.

Shared servers on the data path introduce three problems: firstly, they complicate resource management, since both application and server resource guaran-

tees need to be set appropriately. Secondly, shared servers degrade performance by increasing the number of context switches (and thus protection switches and expensive cache invalidations) needed, which directly increases the latency experienced by packets traversing the system. Finally, shared servers need to be carefully coded to ensure they internally schedule their clients in order to avoid crosstalk between them. Section 2.5.1 presented results demonstrating the first two of these detrimental effects in Nemesis (see Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.9 in particular); because Nemesis drivers schedule their clients they do not suffer from excessive crosstalk, the third disadvantage of shared servers.

Expert uses two complementary mechanisms to avoid such shared servers. Firstly, some device driver functionality is moved back into the kernel. Secondly, a limited form of thread tunnelling is introduced, allowing *paths* to execute server functions using their own guarantees. A single system-wide scheduler arbitrates the allocation of CPU time between both paths and tasks, allowing data-driven processing to be scheduled on an equal footing with traditional compute bound tasks.


Expert's design is described in two stages: basic interaction with network devices is covered in this chapter while the thread tunnelling sub-system used by paths is covered in the next chapter.

## 4.1 Receive processing

The fundamental problem in managing network devices is the following: until an incoming packet has been classified, any resources expended in processing it (e.g. CPU cycles or buffer memory) cannot be scheduled properly.

The best solution would be to use self-selecting devices capable of classifying incoming packets in hardware [Pratt01], thus providing a hard partition between classification processing and the host CPU. As discussed previously in Section 2.5.1, such devices are unfortunately not common. The rest of this section describes how to best cope with non-self-selecting devices; when self-selecting devices become widespread, it is likely that the techniques described here can be moved out of the kernel and into the device.

Assuming non-self-selecting interfaces, the host CPU must expend resources in classifying and buffering packets. How should these resources be accounted? Accounting resource usage in arrears allows retrospectively accurate account-



**Figure 4.1: Network device driver models.**

ing, but it cannot be used for scheduling purposes since any action taken on the basis of such information would be out of date. This approach is not considered any further.

Having accepted that it is impractical to account the cycle cost of demultiplexing to the flows themselves, we are left with two options: either the costs are accounted to a stand-alone driver entity, or the costs are distributed as evenly as possible amongst all scheduling principals. User-space device drivers under Nemesis are an example of the first of these; Unix-style drivers where interrupts are handled in the context of the interrupted process epitomises the second approach (assuming smooth arrivals).

Expert's contribution is to emulate a smart device by performing receive device handling and demultiplexing in the kernel directly in response to network interrupts. This shares the cost of emulating a self-selecting device amongst all processes as in the Unix model. Figure 4.1 shows for each device model the location where card-specific receive processing (RX), demultiplexing (demux), protocol processing (stack), and transmit scheduling and device handling (TX) occurs. The location of code dealing with device discovery (probe) and management (control) is also shown. Management of a device means configuring its demultiplex tables, changing transmit scheduler parameters, and gathering statistics on the device or media (for example, to determine bytes transferred, number of collisions, or line rate).

Splitting the device driver allows the best features of each of the other models to be obtained without their accompanying deficiencies. Kernel-resident drivers



both minimise interrupt response time and have lower context switch induced penalties. This is because the arrival of an interrupt causes the CPU to trap to supervisor mode, so remaining there to run the device driver has lower overhead than switching to a separate protection domain, running driver code, then switching back to the originally interrupted protection domain. Modern CPUs rely on aggressive caching and prefetching of all manner of information (e.g. branch prediction tables, TLBs, speculative execution, code and data) to yield their full performance; this trend is unlikely to reverse. Expert is designed to minimise protection switches, and amortise their cost by performing sufficient work after a switch: placing the device driver's data path in the kernel achieves this goal.

The disadvantage of a kernel-resident driver is that all cycles spent executing in the kernel are not cycles controlled by the system's scheduler, so it adds jitter to user-space processes. Table 2.2 showed that the receive portion of the Nemesis device driver code is small enough and bounded in time such that the jitter experienced by user processes is minimal: around 2580 cycles are need to manage the device and perform a demultiplex. Section 4.4.2 provides further results quantifying jitter on Expert and comparing it to jitter on Nemesis and Linux.

One further question remains: should the device be handled by polling it, or via interrupts? The assumption so far has been that the device posts an interrupt to the kernel to signal the arrival or departure of packets. Polling has the advantage of limiting livelock [Mogul96], and can lead to low latencies (depending on polling frequency). On multi-processors machines, one CPU can be devoted entirely to polled device management, allowing a more sophisticated self-selecting device to be emulated. Such an arrangement would be substantially similar to the Piglet OS [Muir00]. The disadvantage of reserving an entire CPU to poll devices is that the resource partition formed is static: by design, there is no way of allowing spare cycles on the I/O processor to be used by other system components or user code. Polling schemes fit well into hard real-time systems, where CPU requirements are known *a priori*, so that the devices may be polled in a timely manner.

Clocked interrupts [Smith93] use regular interrupts to trigger device polls, thus limiting interrupt processing overheads without needing the entire system to be structured to support polling. The main problem with clocked interrupts is in deciding how frequently they should be delivered: too fast and the system degenerates into polling, too slow and the event delivery latency becomes too

high.

The wide range of workloads expected to be run over a resource controlled NEOS is unlikely to offer the a structured execution environment needed for polling – indeed, part of the motivation for this style of NEOS comes from the problems with the existing inflexible switch and router OSES of today. Thus, Expert uses interrupts together with techniques similar to clocked interrupts to be notified of device events.

Livelock is addressed by a variety of complementary techniques:

**Limited interrupt processing.** Expert, like other vertically structured operating systems, makes applications responsible for their own protocol processing. This means the only functionality needed in the kernel device driver is device-specific handling, and packet classification. By delaying further processing to an explicitly scheduled application, the system scheduler remains in control of processing. The system is not scheduled by interrupts from network traffic arrivals, unlike event-based systems such as Scout or Wanda [Black95].

**Kernel resident driver.** Livelock is caused by interrupts causing large amounts of fruitless work to be performed. Even if protocol processing is no longer performed in the interrupt handler, if the device driver is not in the kernel the cost of context switching to the driver to classify and subsequently discard packets can be considerably larger than the cost of remaining in supervisor mode and doing the demultiplex and discard immediately. Therefore Expert uses kernel-resident receive processing and demultiplexing.

**Interrupt mitigation.** Most current network adaptors such as those based on the Intel 21143 [Int98] have two interrupt mitigation parameters  $n$  and  $t$  which can be used to limit the number of interrupts generated. Instead of raising an interrupt for every packet received, the hardware generates one for each batch of  $n$  packets. So that the system does not deadlock when fewer than  $n$  packets have been received, an interrupt is also generated if there are packets outstanding and time  $t$  has elapsed since the previous interrupt was generated. These two parameters together allow the number of interrupts to be decreased by a factor of  $n$  at high packet arrival rates while bounding the notification latency by  $t$  at low rates.

Sadly, many OSES do not use interrupt mitigation because picking appropriate values for  $n$  and  $t$  remains something of a black art. The follow-

ing discussion attempts to clarify this guesswork by providing concrete bounds on sensible parameter settings.

Modelling the system as a DMA queue with maximum depth  $d$ , an interrupt response time  $r$ , and a minimum packet inter-arrival time  $i$ , we get an upper limit for  $n$ :

$$n_{max} = d - \frac{r}{i}$$

This assumes that the driver can process a packet from the DMA ring faster than time  $i$  (i.e. the arrival rate is less than the departure rate). The minimum value for  $n$  is 1, where the interrupt mitigation scheme degenerates into the usual single interrupt per packet. As  $n$  approaches  $n_{max}$ , the probability of queue overrun increases, depending on the variance of  $i$  and  $r$ . Since  $i$  has a fixed lower bound set by the wire format and  $r$  can be directly measured on a running system, it should be feasible to modify  $n$  dynamically in response to measured system metrics. As  $n$  is increased two other effects become apparent: firstly, more buffers are needed between the application and device to avoid underrun; and secondly TCP ACKs arrive in bursts, liberating bursts of data which multiplex poorly in the network, causing congestion.

The choice for parameter  $t$  is wider, since it is purely an expression of the applications' tolerance of additional latency. At the lower limit,  $t > i$  otherwise no batching will occur; the upper limit on  $t$  is unbounded. Again,  $t$  can be set mechanically assuming that applications provide information on their latency tolerance. The latency  $l$  experienced by an application is  $l = t + r$ , so if  $lt_{min}$  is the minimum of all application latency tolerances  $lt$  requested, then  $t = lt_{min} - r$ . Note that  $lt_{min} < r$  means there is an unsatisfiable application latency tolerance.

To summarise: Expert locates the receive processing and classification functions of device drivers in the kernel in order to reduce application visible latency, crosstalk in the DMA ring, and livelock.

#### 4.1.1 Demultiplexing data

Once an Ethernet frame has been successfully received by the device driver, the next task is to discover the packet's destination. On workstations and servers, most packets arriving will be for the local machine. However, for a NEOS, local delivery is assumed to be an exceptional case: the majority of packets

will require some processing before being forwarded towards their ultimate destination.

While on the surface it seems that these two cases are distinct, they can be unified. In the general form, classification discovers which FEC (Forwarding Equivalence Class) each packet belongs to. Each FEC has associated parameters specifying outgoing interface, queueing behaviour, and any transmit shaping needed. Local delivery is achieved by defining a FEC with a special “outgoing” interface; packets destined for a local address are classified as belonging to this FEC, removing this special case from the classification code. To further reduce special cases, I assume that packets are always a member of some FEC: packets which are unrouteable (i.e. match no routing table entry) are considered members of a “discard all” FEC. This may be useful in a default-deny firewall, where unexpected packets from external interfaces should be discarded.

Note that this says nothing about the granularity at which packets are assigned to FECs. At one extreme, one FEC per flow may be desirable, for example if each flow is to receive dedicated queueing resources. At the other end of the spectrum one FEC may be used per outgoing interface, modelling the behaviour of traditional best-effort routers. Intermediate variations are useful where best-effort traffic is to be handled as one resource class while picking out specific flows for special processing or preferential queueing.

Expert uses *paths* to encapsulate the abstract notion of a FEC. A path is a separate schedulable entity, with guarantees of CPU time, buffer memory availability, and transmit bandwidth. A path also defines a sequence of code modules which are to be traversed on receiving the packet. Packets are delivered to paths and tasks via I/O channels. Paths are described in more detail in Chapter 5; this section concentrates on how packets are demultiplexed to an appropriate I/O channel.

### **Classification strategies**

The way 4.4BSD demultiplexes received packets is by using branching compares to determine the correct protocol, then using hash tables on source and destination IP address and port numbers to find an appropriate socket buffer in which to place the payload for locally terminated connections. For Unix machines configured as routers, additional processing is performed if the destination IP address is not a local one. Usually some trie-based scheme is used

to find the longest prefix in the routing table which matches the destination IP address [Bays74].

Research over the previous five years or so has been on two fronts, both improving the performance of this longest prefix match [Degermark97, Waldvogel97, Srinivasan98a, Nilsson98], and generalising the classification to more dimensions to additionally allow the source IP address and port numbers to determine forwarding behaviour [Srinivasan98b, Lakhsman98].

Since it seems likely that further improvements will be made in this field, Expert encapsulates the demultiplexing decision behind a high-level interface, PF, which may be implemented using any of the techniques cited above (or their successors). Operations on PF include the `Apply()` method which takes a buffer containing an Ethernet frame and returns which I/O channel the frame is destined for, along with the header length, and IP fragment related information (see later). Returning the IP header length enables application data and IP headers to be delivered to different buffers despite variations in header length, leading to a performance boost in some circumstances. Determining the header length as a by-product of the classification stage is an approach which was first used in the Nemesis network stack and later adopted by [Pratt01], but does not seem to be prevalent elsewhere.

A separate interface is used to configure the classifier to add and remove prefixes. Tasks and paths supply a 5-tuple specifying protocol, source and destination port ranges and source and destination IP address prefixes. Because the implementation of the demultiplex step is hidden behind this interface, tasks and paths cannot directly supply an arbitrary bytecode filter describing the packets they are to operate on. While less flexible, this insulates applications from knowledge about the particular classification algorithm in use. This loss in flexibility is not an issue, since in practice the limited number of protocols in common use in the Internet and their hierarchical nature means that arbitrary filters are unnecessary. Also, if a major new protocol were introduced, the timescale would allow a new version of Expert to be released; a major new protocol would not need to be supported faster than management timescales.

### **Classification despite incomplete information**

One further problem faced by any demultiplexing scheme is how to handle frames which do not contain sufficient information to be fully classified. TCP

data segments and IP fragments are two examples of such frames: TCP data segments cannot be associated with a particular flow until an appropriate SYN packet has been seen, and IP body fragments do not carry port information so they cannot be classified until the first (or head) fragment has arrived. Expert's basic solution is to allow the classifier to *delay* a decision until more information is available (i.e. when the TCP SYN or IP head fragment arrives). The delayed packet is held in temporary storage until either its destination is discovered, or it is evicted (either by timing out or due to memory pressure). The remainder of this section uses Expert's handling of IP fragments as a concrete example of how classification can still take place despite incomplete information.

Most packet filter languages ignore IP fragments: only MPF [Yuhara94] supports them directly. Other filter languages (for example [McCanne93, Bailey94, Engler96]) need the filter rules to be modified to explicitly recognise non-head fragments. Expert's solution separates fragment handling into three parts: (1) the demux decision on head fragments, (2) postponing fragments until the head arrives, and (3) actual reassembly (if any). This separation has the twofold advantage of insulating the classification algorithm from fragments, and delegating any reassembly to applications.

Since the head fragment is the only one to include port information, its arrival sets up an additional temporary demux association keyed (in part) on the IP identity field. This temporary association allows non-head fragments to be recognised as continuations of the head so they may be delivered to the same I/O channel. In order to allow a broad range of classification algorithms to be used, they are not required to support such temporary associations themselves; they are managed by a fragment pool. The only requirement of the classification algorithm is that its `Apply()` method return a flag which is set if the frame is an IP fragment, either the head or a body.

Body fragments which do not match any temporary demux associations are delayed in the fragment pool until their head fragment arrives. The arrival of the head fragment sets up a new temporary demux association and causes any delayed body fragments to be delivered to the application for reassembly. Head fragments which arrive but are discarded by the classifier nevertheless cause a temporary demux association to be installed in the fragment pool, so that future body fragments can be recognised and swiftly discarded. Body fragments in the fragment pool are also discarded if no matching head fragment arrives before some timeout, or if there is pressure for space.

In this manner, rather than attempt a full reassembly (a fairly complex and notoriously error-prone procedure), the device driver postpones the delivery of fragments which arrive out of order until a corresponding head fragment arrives. When it does, the head fragment is delivered to the application, followed by any further fragments queued. Re-ordering, packet overlap trimming and the discarding of duplicates is left entirely up to the application to perform in any manner it chooses, including the option of not performing reassembly at all should this be useful (as might be the case in a normal non-defragmenting router). In this way, bugs in reassembly do not compromise the safety of the system; they are limited to the applications using the particular shared library with that bug. As far as I am aware, this split between a trusted postponement stage before demux and a later untrusted reassembly is unique to Expert, although any other system performing early demux and supporting IP fragments will necessarily need a similar system.

## 4.2 Kernel-to-user packet transport

Expert's cross domain packet transport is based on the Nemesis I/O channel model as described in Section 3.4.3. Packets are described by a vector of `iovecs`:  $(base, length)$  pairs. Experience with the Nemesis model has led to two refinements.

Firstly, although Nemesis allows an arbitrary number of  $(base, length)$  pairs to describe a packet, it was observed that this feature is hardly ever used and considerably complicates even the most straightforward code. Since in Nemesis at most two `iovecs` are ever used (one for the header and one for the payload), Expert limits packet vectors to two `iovecs` only. The usual argument given for why multiple `iovecs` are needed is that lack of co-ordination in a modular protocol stack means that neighbouring layers cannot assume space is available in the packet buffer and so need to link in their own headers written into private buffers. This line of reasoning does not take into account that the protocol stack stays fixed once specified and will remain so for the duration of a particular conversation. This can be exploited so that at stack configuration time the various protocol layers ensure there is enough space for their headers in the first `iovec` by reserving an appropriate amount. This relies on knowing the most common header size, which is true of the fielded protocols in the Internet. Variable length headers (e.g. TCP or IP options) are dealt with by reserving for the largest common header size at stack configuration time.

The packet classification stage determines the actual header size, and if headers overflow the first `iovec` they continue in the second, into the application area. This means that receiving oversized headers is possible, but incurs the additional cost of either copying the application payload back over the extraneous header bytes once they outlive their use, or writing applications which can deal with the payload arriving at any address. This technique works well for TCP options, where the connection MSS and SACK capability are negotiated during connection establishment, but otherwise options (except SACK) are rare during the data transfer phase.

The second refinement Expert provides over Nemesis relates to Packet Contexts. Packet Contexts are optional in Nemesis, and provide information to the application-resident stack about original buffer allocation sizes, so that after topping and tailing occurs, the original buffers may be recovered at a later stage (most often as part of error recovery). Expert makes Packet Contexts mandatory and expands their remit to carry demultiplex-related information such as the flow and receiving interface's identifier. In this way Packet Contexts are similar to MPLS labels. This allows multiple flows to share buffering and be handled by the same path, while allowing the path to efficiently distinguish between them. Processing may also be keyed on incoming interface, a facility particularly useful for firewall or encrypted VPN applications where packets from "inside" and "outside" interfaces need separate treatment.

The major strength of the Nemesis model is retained: there is a closed loop of packet buffers between the application and the driver. All buffers are owned by the application, leading to clear accounting of the memory. The application primes the device driver with empty buffers to be filled on packet arrival; should packets for this application arrive and there are no free buffers the driver drops the packets, controlling the load and minimising crosstalk to other flows. The fixed number of buffers in circulation means that memory resources for a particular application are both dedicated and bounded.

### **4.3 Transmit processing**

Having eliminated the need for a separately scheduled device driver to perform receive processing, this section now discusses how the same may be done for transmit processing. The motivation for this is the same as for receive processing: if instead of performing a user-to-user context switch, transmission can be



triggered by a trap into the kernel then this should further reduce latency. Again the small amounts of code involved should not greatly impact schedulability; evidence that this is indeed the case is presented in Section 4.4.2.

### 4.3.1 Efficient explicit wake-ups


The model most Ethernet adaptors use is that of a *transmit process* which once started by a driver command, asynchronously scans the transmit DMA ring looking for frames to transmit. If the transmit process completes a full scan of the DMA ring and finds no work, it stops and raises a status interrupt to inform the driver of this fact.

The main advantage of this scheme is that the transmit costs scale with the rate at which packets are queued. If packets are queued infrequently, then the driver is continually starting the transmit process and being notified that it stops; this overhead is not a problem since by definition the system is lightly loaded. If the driver queues packets for DMA faster than they are drained, the driver need only start the transmit process after queueing the first packet; after this further packets may be queued without restarting the transmit process until the driver is notified that it has stopped (when the ring drains). Note that this also minimises the number of status interrupts generated.

These auto-tuning and self-scaling properties are attractive, so Expert uses a scheme inspired by this model as Expert's transmit API between applications and the kernel-resident device driver. As in receive processing, the guiding architectural principle here is that of a kernel-based emulation of a user-safe Ethernet device.

Client applications have their own dedicated transmit queues, implemented as I/O channels similar to those in Nemesis (Figure 3.2). Expert emulates an asynchronous transmit process servicing these channels by running a *transmit scan* in the kernel at strategic times. The transmit scan checks which user I/O channels have packets available for transmission and loads them into the hardware DMA ring, using a transmit scheduler to arbitrate access to the DMA ring should multiple I/O channels have packets outstanding. Before loading a packet onto the DMA ring, the transmit scan matches a template against the packet's header to ensure the application cannot transmit packets with forged source address or port.

Network transmission in Expert is a two stage process: firstly the client queues



**Figure 4.2: Expert's transmit scan.**

one or more packet(s) in an I/O channel, then secondly the client explicitly wakes the transmit scan, much as a device driver needs to explicitly start the transmit process.

Figure 4.2 shows how the transmit scan is triggered initially by a client making a `kick_tx CALLPRIV` (1), and subsequently by the arrival of a *transmit complete* interrupt (4). The transmit complete interrupt is raised by the adaptor hardware when a frame has been transmitted, and causes the driver to do two things: firstly, the transmitted buffer is returned to the client for re-use; secondly, another transmit scan is run, potentially loading more packets onto the DMA ring (perhaps even from other clients' I/O channels).

This means that once started, the transmit scan is regularly re-run by the transmit complete interrupt, thus polling clients' transmit queues. As packets leave the DMA ring, more are loaded onto it. Once all clients' queues drain, the transmit scan loads no further packets onto the DMA ring and eventually the ring clears, leaving the transmit subsystem back in the idle state.

The transmit scan is run as part of handling transmit complete interrupts for efficiency reasons. Because once started the transmit scan becomes self-clocking, clients need only perform a `kick_tx CALLPRIV` when there are no items on the DMA ring (i.e. no transmit complete interrupt is expected). This means the cost of explicitly waking the transmit subsystem is kept to a minimum when

there are many packets to be transmitted – exactly the time when resources are at their most scarce.

Clients discover the current status of the hardware by means of a PCSR (Public Card Status Record) which is maintained by the device driver in a globally readable stretch of memory. This allows clients to check whether a transmit complete interrupt is pending before issuing a `kick_tx` request, thus eliminating redundant kicks. The device driver announces the location of the PCSR when clients bind to I/O channels. The PCSR contains the `kick_tx` `CALLPRIV` vector used to wake the transmit subsystem, and a boolean flag which is set by the kernel-resident portion of the driver if the transmit scan will shortly be run.

Under Nemesis, when a client queues a packet in an I/O channel an event is sent to the network device driver domain, causing it to be marked runnable. The act of queueing a packet implicitly wakes the driver domain. Later, when the driver is next run by the system scheduler, the client's packet is then dequeued. This is in contrast with the scheme used by Expert described here, where the device driver domain exists purely for control-path interactions and is not involved in data path exchanges. Because Expert clients decide when to invoke the `kick_tx` `CALLPRIV`, they explicitly control when the transmit subsystem is woken; and because it uses a `CALLPRIV`, a scheduler pass and expensive user-to-user context switch is avoided. Furthermore, because of the self-clocking behaviour of the transmit scan, transmission can be as cheap as the few memory writes needed to queue a packet in a FIFO and check the flag in the PCSR. When multiple clients are transmitting, one client's transmit queue may be drained as a result of another client's `kick_tx` `CALLPRIV`, thus amortising the cost of entering the kernel by servicing multiple clients. The cost of the transmit scan is accounted to the kernel for scans run from the transmit complete interrupt handler; for scans run by an explicit kick the cost is accounted to the client performing the kick. While this does introduce extra crosstalk between clients, it was felt that the much increased system throughput outweighed the slight increase in crosstalk.

In summary, Expert's design uses an efficient implementation of explicit wake-ups to increase the performance of the transmit subsystem by eliminating the need for a user-space device driver on the data path. Section 4.4.1 below presents results which quantify the performance of systems configured with various device driver architectures, showing the benefit gained from moving both transmit and receive processing into the kernel.

## **“Transmit complete” interrupt mitigation**

As already described, transmit complete interrupts are generated by the Ethernet adaptor when the transmit DMA ring empties. However, most hardware allows the transmit complete interrupt to be generated more often than this. There exists a spectrum of possibilities, going from one interrupt when the whole DMA ring drains to an interrupt for each transmitted frame, via intermediate choices such as interrupting when the DMA ring is half empty. One interrupt per frame certainly minimises the latency with which the driver learns of the success (or otherwise) of transmissions, however the CPU overhead is increased. Alternately, if the hardware raises an interrupt only once the DMA ring is fully drained then the outgoing link will lie idle for the time taken to run the device driver and have it queue further packets onto the transmit ring.

Expert’s solution to this dilemma is to dynamically adjust how often transmit complete interrupts are raised. This relies on the adaptor having a flag in each DMA descriptor specifying whether the adaptor should generate an interrupt once the frame has been transmitted (such functionality is a standard feature of the Intel 21143 family). When adding a descriptor to the DMA ring, the driver always sets the new descriptor’s tx-complete flag. It also reads the previous ring descriptor, and if the frame has not yet been transmitted then the driver clears the tx-complete flag. In order to avoid the ring draining at high load when no descriptors would have the tx-complete flag set, it is always set if the descriptor is at the start or the mid-point of the ring, thus ensuring that the ring is reloaded regularly.

This ensures that should a number of packets be queued in quick succession only one interrupt will be generated, at the end of the burst. When packets are queued into an empty ring slower than the ring’s drain rate then each packet generates one tx-complete interrupt. In this manner the system automatically adjusts to conditions, minimising interrupt load at high throughput while retaining low-latency when lightly loaded. While this enhancement was originally developed by me for Nemesis, I passed the idea and a sample implementation over to the author of the Linux de4x5 driver and as a result it is now a standard feature of this widely-deployed driver. Naturally, this feature is also present in Expert.

### 4.3.2 User-to-kernel packet transport

The I/O channels used by clients to transmit packets need to be different from standard inter-domain I/O channels for two reasons. Firstly, because the transmit scan (which dequeues packets from client I/O channels) is performed asynchronously from within a transmit complete interrupt, the I/O channel's enqueue (`PutPkt()`) and dequeue (`GetPkt()`) methods need to be atomic with respect to interrupts. A second consequence of `GetPkt()` being invoked from within the kernel is that a blocking `GetPkt()` call should never be attempted: supporting blocking within the kernel would require kernel threads or some other mechanism to preserve CPU context between blocks and subsequent wake-ups. Expert does not use kernel threads, keeping the kernel small and efficient.

The standard I/O channel implementation uses a pair of FIFOs which are themselves implemented using event counts designed for synchronisation between user domains. They are unsuitable for use between user domains and the kernel, and furthermore are over-engineered for the simple non-blocking case required in this particular circumstance. By only allowing the reading of an event count's value, rather than also allowing blocking until a particular value is reached, the event count implementation need not maintain a list of blocked threads. With this requirement lifted, a simple integer suffices to provide communication (but not synchronisation) between user domains and the kernel. These ultra-lightweight event counts are called NBECs (Non-Blocking Event Counts).

#### NBECs

An NBEC is the address of a word of memory. Reading the NBEC is simple: the address is dereferenced to get the event count's value. Incrementing the NBEC is only slightly harder: a `load`, `increment`, `store` instruction sequence must be run without being interleaved with an NBEC read operation. In this case, this means without taking an interrupt part way through the sequence. On the Intel IA32 and IA64 architectures, this can be achieved with a `lock inc` instruction. RISC architectures lack atomic increments of memory locations, so multiple instructions are required to read, increment and write back a memory location. Since untrusted applications should not be allowed to disable interrupts to make such multi-instruction code atomic, the only remaining approach is to use `cas` (compare-and-swap) or `ll/sc` (load-locked

```

again: ld  r1 <- (r0)
      add r2 <- r1, #1
      cas (r0), r1, r2
      jne again

```

**Figure 4.3: Pseudo-code to atomically increment a word.**

and store-conditional). For example, Figure 4.3 gives code to increment the NBEC at the address in `r0`. If another increment operation modifies the event count's value between the load and the `cas` instructions, then the `cas` fails, and the operation is begun anew.

NBECs are directional, like any other event count. The event transmitter must have read/write access to the memory word used, while the receiver must have read access to the word. If the transmitter also allocates the NBEC, then this is easy to arrange: the NBEC may be allocated on any publicly-visible heap the transmitter chooses. However, if the transmitter deems the values transmitted to be sensitive, it is necessary to allocate the NBEC on a private heap shared only with the receiver's protection domain.


One major restriction of this scheme is that the receiver must trust the transmitter not to make the memory inaccessible at an unfortunate time. Where the receiver is the kernel, and the transmitter an untrusted client, this cannot be relied upon. Moreover, cleanly closing NBECs in the event of the death of a transmitter is also a problem.

There are a number of solutions to this problem, but none of them are particularly compelling. The receiver could catch memory faults resulting from reading a closed (or invalid) NBEC, but this requires much machinery and would complicate fault dispatching in the common case, for little gain in the rare case that an NBEC is implicated. Alternatively, NBECs could be defined to require double-dereference to read or increment, thus allowing a central location (e.g. the Domain Manager) to mark dead NBECs as such. However, this would need code similar to that in Figure 4.3 on all architectures to implement both reads and increments atomically, thus destroying the simplicity which was originally so attractive.

Therefore, Expert uses the Binder<sup>1</sup> to allocate NBECs from its own memory regions, whose continued availability it can ensure. NBECs have two additional flag bits describing whether the receiver or transmitter has closed this channel:

---

<sup>1</sup>The Binder is a trusted system service used to set up user-to-user event channels.



**Figure 4.4: I/O channel, kernel side non-blocking.**

if either are set then the channel has become disconnected and the remaining endpoint can take action to recover. When such action has been taken, the other bit is set: channels with both bits set are closed by both transmitter and receiver and so may be garbage collected by the Binder. The current Expert prototype only allows allocation of NBECs and discards rather than re-using them when closed, however this two-bit scheme should solve the problem in an acceptable manner.

### Interrupt-atomic FIFOs and I/O channels

Interrupt-atomic I/O channels are implemented using two FIFOs each with one NBEC and one standard event count to control access to slots in a shared buffer as shown in Figure 4.4. There are four “flavours” of FIFO, depending on whether the producer and/or consumer side is non-blocking. Since only the kernel side of the I/O channels need to be non-blocking, only two of these possible combinations are used for user-to-kernel transport in Expert.

The arrangement of blocking and non-blocking event counts is such that when the producer (the client in user-space) queues a packet for transmission by calling `PutPkt()`, the client blocks if there is insufficient space left in the top FIFO. A successful client `PutPkt()` increments channel 0 (an NBEC) and thus does not wake the user portion of the device driver. Later the kernel-resident transmit scan polls the I/O channel by calling `GetPkt()`, which reads

the NBEC but cannot block should the top FIFO be empty. As previously discussed, blocking is undesirable anyway. When the transmit scan does dequeue a packet from the top FIFO, it increments channel 1, thus waking the client if it had blocked in `PutPkt()` due to a full top FIFO.

At some later stage, the packet's transmission completes and the buffer is collected by the kernel-resident driver for return to the client as part of the transmit complete interrupt processing. Now the kernel performs a `PutPkt()` on the lower FIFO; the kernel cannot block waiting for space to become available in the FIFO, but again this would not be desirable. Lack of space is caused by the client being slow to collect tx acknowledgements, and only affects this single client, not the entire system. Also, the client can ensure the FIFOs are deep enough to hold as many buffers as it allocates, so that even in the extreme case when all packet buffers are awaiting collection by the client they can all fit. So, assuming there is room in the lower FIFO, the kernel queues the transmitted packet, and increments the channel 1 event count, thus unblocking the client if it attempted a blocking `GetPkt()` when there were no tx acknowledgements to collect.

In this manner, kernel-facing FIFO interfaces are non-blocking, while user-facing FIFO interfaces support blocking. Also, the user-space portion of the device driver is never woken by clients, since the NBECs are explicitly polled by the kernel in response to a `kick_tx CALLPRIV`. This ensures the user portion of the device driver is not on the data path, and leads to the performance benefits described in Section 4.4 below.

### **Application control over batch sizes**

The FIFO between the driver and the application means the cost of trapping to the kernel can be amortised over multiple packets, at the cost of increased latency. Because FIFO enqueue and dequeue operations are exposed to the applications, applications can control whether they operate in batch mode, attempting to process as many packets as possible, or in packet-at-a-time mode, where latency is minimised at the cost of extra `kick_tx` calls. For example Figure 4.5 shows latency-optimised code to echo all packets received, leading to one kick per packet. Figure 4.6 shows the same application re-written to batch as much work together as possible, leading to higher latencies but fewer kicks thus making more CPU time available to other applications. Which variant should be used depends on the specific application's latency requirements;



```

while(1)
{
    IO_Rec    recs[2];
    uint32_t  nrecs;

    /* Receive packet.  Block until get one. */
    nrecs = IO$GetPkt(rxio, recs, 2, FOREVER);

    /* Queue it for transmission. */
    IO$PutPkt(txio, recs, nrecs);
    /* Send now. */
    IO$Flush(txio);
    /* Collect TX acknowledgement, potentially blocking. */
    nrecs = IO$GetPkt(txio, recs, 2, FOREVER);

    /* Send empty buffer back to driver for future RX */
    IO$PutPkt(rxio, recs, nrecs);
}

```

**Figure 4.5: Latency-optimised packet reflector.**

this scheme allows explicit programmer control over the amount of batching.

### 4.3.3 Transmit scheduling

Although with Ethernet a station's access to the media cannot be guaranteed, there are still reasons to schedule individual applications' access to the media. Non-local flows may need to conform to a traffic specification in order to meet an SLA (Service Level Agreement) with the ISP. Within this aggregate, individual flows may have differing priorities or timeliness constraints. Another use for transmit scheduling is ACK-spacing, which reduces network congestion.

Scheduling media access by applications allows the NEOS to enforce such constraints. There exists much prior research on packet scheduling algorithms [Nagle87, Demers90, Parekh93, Parekh94, Floyd95], and so this dissertation does not seek to extend this large body of work. Instead it presents a scheduler framework, delaying the choice of packet scheduler until system link time. The framework also simplifies a scheduler's implementation by separating the fundamental scheduler algorithm (responsible for selecting which flow should transmit next) from mundane tasks such as dequeuing the flow's packet, checking its source endpoint is correct, and enqueueing it on the hardware's transmit DMA ring.

Once again, transmit scheduling is a facility which should ideally be provided

```

while(1)
{
    IO_Rec    recs[2];
    uint32_t  nrecs;

    /* Block waiting for first packet. */
    nrecs = IO$GetPkt(rxio, recs, 2, FOREVER);
    do {
        /* Queue it for transmission (no context switch). */
        IO$PutPkt(txio, recs, nrecs);
        /* Get next packet or break out if there isn't one. */
    } while (nrecs = IO$GetPkt(rxio, recs, 2, NOBLOCK));

    /* Start sending queued packets now. */
    IO$Flush(txio);

    /* Collect any TX acknowledgements and recycle the buffers. */
    nrecs = IO$GetPkt(txio, recs, 2, FOREVER);
    do {
        /* Send empty buffer back to driver. */
        IO$PutPkt(rxio, recs, nrecs);
    } while (nrecs = IO$GetPkt(txio, recs, 2, NOBLOCK));
}

```

**Figure 4.6: Batching packet reflector.**

by smart hardware. Following the Expert architecture, a smart device is emulated by the kernel to allow dumb Ethernet devices to be safely shared amongst untrusted applications.

Expert's I/O scheduling abstraction is based on Nemesis, which is in turn based on the ANSA Project's concept of an *Entry*: I/O channels requiring service are bound to an *IOEntry*; one or more service threads call the *IOEntry*'s *Rendezvous()* method to collect the next quantum of work to be performed (i.e. packet), or block if there is no work currently. Thus, an instance of an *IOEntry* object encapsulates both the scheduling discipline and the list of principals (I/O channels) to be arbitrated between.

Expert introduces *NBIOEntry* as a sub-type of *IOEntry*; an *NBIOEntry* has a *Rendezvous()* method which instead of blocking the calling thread returns the time at which the *Entry* would like to regain control, its *wake-up time*. An *IOEntry* needs to block in two circumstances: either because all I/O channels have no data pending transmission, or all have exceeded their rate limit. The wake-up time is the special value *infinity* in the first case, or the time when the first rate-controlled flow becomes eligible to transmit again in the second case.

An `NBIOEntry` is needed because `Rendezvous()` is called as part of the transmit scan in kernel mode with interrupts disabled, and thus blocking would deadlock the kernel. Instead, the transmit scan uses the returned wake-up time to set a callback to run the transmit scan function again at the wake-up time. This may involve programming the timer hardware to generate an interrupt at this time if there is no interrupt already set for an earlier time.

The overall behaviour is that the timer hardware is used to pace outgoing packets, and thus the granularity of the scheduler is limited only by the system timer's resolution. Small inter-packet gaps might require a high rate of timer interrupts, potentially swamping the CPU. However this is not likely, as this high timer interrupt rate is needed only when the system has only a single high bitrate I/O channel active. As more I/O channels become active, the `NBIOEntry` needs to block less often since the probability of all channels being idle or ineligible simultaneously drops, and so fewer timer interrupts are needed.

Given that transmit scans are run from timer as well as tx-complete interrupts, a further reduction in the number of client kicks is possible. The `PCSR` also contains a timestamp giving the time at which the next transmit scan will run. This allows latency-aware clients to avoid performing a `kick_tx` if there will be a scan soon enough to meet their needs. The likelihood is that most clients will not be latency-aware and thus unnecessary `kick_tx` calls will be made, however the information is trivial to publish so it is made available anyway. At high loads the transmit scan will almost always be run from the transmit complete interrupts anyway, so clients can just check the boolean in the `PCSR` rather than performing 64-bit arithmetic on timestamps to discover if a kick is needed.

A further optimisation `Expert` makes is that kicks are channel-specific. This allows the `NBIOEntry` to be notified of individual channels becoming runnable when previously they had no packets pending. This additional information means the scheduler implementation can segregate channels into those which are active, and those which are waiting for more packets from client applications. By only scanning channels on the active list, the scheduler is made more efficient in the presence of many inactive channels.

`Expert` has a number of schedulers provided. The basic round-robin scheduler demonstrates how simple a scheduler need be: the complete code for the `Rendezvous()` method is given in Figure 4.7, and the remaining code to

finish the definition takes approximately 150 lines of boiler-plate.

## 4.4 Results

This section presents results quantifying the performance of systems using a variety of different device driver configurations, and shows that Expert's division of labour allows tight control over both CPU and network resources consumed by packet flows, without undue penalties in traditional metrics such as latency or throughput.

Five device driver configurations are measured, exploring all combinations of transmit and receive processing occurring either in kernel or user-space, and comparing them to Linux as an example of a system with all components (including protocol processing) executing in the kernel.

**Linux** Version 2.2.16 of the Linux kernel, using version 0.91g of the tulip device driver. Interrupts, receive processing, transmit processing as well as protocol processing all occur in the kernel. Linux was chosen as an operating system which has been extensively tuned, and thus gives a reference performance achievable on the test hardware when no particular attention is given to QoS issues.

**kRX-kTX** This is the configuration that is proposed by this dissertation, the Expert architecture. Both transmit and receive processing is performed in kernel mode; no portion of the user-space device driver is on the data path. Protocol processing occurs in the user application, unlike Linux. The packets are fully demultiplexed on arrival, rather than being demultiplexed in a layered fashion interleaved with protocol processing, as in Linux. Also, user applications can transmit without trapping to the kernel because of the transmit scan; Linux requires a kernel trap per packet transmitted.

**uRX-kTX** Receive processing is moved to the separately-scheduled user-space portion of the device driver. Device interrupts are converted to events by the kernel, and all interrupt processing is performed by the user-mode device driver. Transmissions are handled in the kernel, with user applications issuing `tx_kick CALLPRIVs` as described in Section 4.3. The transmit scan is run both in kernel mode via the `CALLPRIV` or a kernel

```

/*
 * Wait for any IO channel to become ready.
 * "to" is the absolute time to time out.
 */
static IO_clp Rendezvous_m(NBIOEntry_clp self,
                          /* IN OUT */
                          Time_ns      *to)
{
    nbioentry_st *st = self->st;
    bindlink_t   *this, *end;
    uint32_t     nrecs;

    /* Scan the binding list starting from the previous binding, and
     * return the next one with work to do. */

    /* exit if: 1) scanned entire list, but no bindings have work (ret = NULL)
     *          2) found binding (ret = binding->io)
     */

    this = st->last;
    if (!this)
        return NULL; /* no bindings registered yet */

    end = this; /* get back here => didn't find anyone */

    do {
        this = this->next;
        if (this == &st->bindings)
            this = this->next;

        /* Is there work on this IO channel? */
        IO$QueryGet(((binding_t*)this)->io, 0, &nrecs);
        if (nrecs)
        {
            st->last = this;
            return ((binding_t*)this)->io;
        }
    } while (this != end);

    /* Block for whatever time was passed in: */
    return NULL;
}

```

**Figure 4.7: Round-robin transmit scheduler**

timer callback, and also from user-space in response to transmit complete interrupts. Interrupts are occasionally disabled by the user-level driver while it runs to enforce mutual exclusion between itself and kernel timer callbacks. Thus, the user-space device driver is on the data path to handle interrupts and demultiplex arriving packets, but not for transmission. Protocol processing occurs in the user application.

**kRX-uTX** Interrupt handling and receive processing happens in the kernel as a direct response to interrupts being raised. Transmission happens in user-space; user applications queue their data in standard I/O channels, and the user portion of the device driver services the channels when it is next given the CPU by the system scheduler. The transmit scan is not used in this configuration. The user-level portion of the driver blocks a thread in the network scheduler rather than using a kernel timer triggered callback to idle during inter-packet send gaps. Protocol processing occurs in the user application.

**uRX-uTX** Both transmit and receive are handled in user-space, the kernel does nothing other than convert interrupts into events sent to the user-level device driver. This is similar to the classic Nemesis model. The device driver is fully on the data path, needed for interrupt processing, receive demux, and transmit processing. Protocol processing occurs in the user application.

In all the follow experiments, `fox` (the machine under test) is a 200MHz Intel Pentium Pro, with 32MB RAM and a DEC DE500BA 100Mb/s Ethernet adaptor (which uses the 21141 chipset). `Fox` runs the appropriate operating system being tested. The machines `meteors` and `snapper` are used as traffic generators or monitors in some of the following experiments. `Meteors` is a dual-CPU 731MHz Intel Pentium III with 256MB of RAM and has an SMC 1211TX EZCard 10/100Mb/s Ethernet adaptor based on the RealTek RTL8139 chipset. It runs Linux 2.4.2 SMP with the `8139too` driver version 0.9.13. `Snapper` is also a dual-CPU 731MHz Intel Pentium III, and has 896MB RAM and the same Ethernet adaptor as `meteors`. `Snapper` runs Linux 2.4.3 SMP and the same Ethernet driver as `meteors`. A Cisco Catalyst 3548XL switch connects the test rig together. Since it has a backplane forwarding bandwidth of 5Gb/s [Cisco99] and 48 ports each at 100Mb/s is only 4.8Gb/s, it is effectively non-blocking in this configuration.

The rationale behind using these faster machines as load generator and monitor

station is that it makes overloading the test machine easy, and increases the probability that the monitoring station will be able to capture packets without losses. Looking at the behaviour of different systems when they are overloaded is instructive because this is where differences in architecture matter – if a system cannot shed load in a controlled fashion then it cannot offer different service levels, and is vulnerable to denial of service attacks.

#### 4.4.1 Traditional performance metrics


This section examines peak bandwidth, latency, and forwarding performance for the five systems described above. These metrics are the dominant way of characterising a network element from an external perspective. Little attention is paid to QoS metrics; these are fully covered in Section 4.4.2.

##### Mean sustained bandwidth

This experiment measures the maximum sustainable transmit bandwidth achievable by each test configuration, and whether it depends on the number of clients competing to transmit. Of interest here is not so much the absolute maximal bandwidth available, but its jitter – how does the presence of additional clients affect how smooth their flows are?

The setup is as follows: `fox` runs between one and six sender clients, each attempting to transmit MTU-sized UDP datagrams as fast as possible. On Expert and Nemesis the sender clients are given CPU and network scheduler parameters allowing them to make use of any extra time in the system, thus emulating the best-effort behaviour of Linux; this also ensures that the schedulers do not artificially limit performance. `Snapper` runs a listener process for each sender which discards the received output, and uses `tcpdump` to monitor the arriving packets. The packet arrival times are processed to calculate the mean bandwidth over successive 200ms intervals, and these bandwidth samples are then averaged to give an overall mean bandwidth for each configuration. The 95% confidence interval of the samples is also calculated, giving a measure of the jitter in the stream.

Figure 4.8 shows how for 1, 2, 4 and 6 competing clients, the bandwidth under both Linux and Expert is independent of the number of clients: both manage just under 95.7Mb/s regardless of how many clients compete for the available



**Figure 4.8: Mean sustained bandwidth vs. number of clients.**


bandwidth. Nemesis’ performance degrades as more clients are added; it is not clear how its performance might behave with more clients because attempts to run the experiment with more than 6 clients met with difficulties due to insufficient memory.

The 95% confidence intervals are more interesting: Nemesis has the largest (3.9Mb/s), while Linux shows a slightly lower jitter than Expert, having a confidence interval of 0.05Mb/s (compared to Expert’s 0.07Mb/s). Expert is marginally faster overall, reaching 95.6Mb/s while Linux gets 95.5Mb/s.

Thus, Linux and Expert are indistinguishable when considering aggregate bandwidth. The reality is much different if we compare the behaviour of individual client flows, however.

Figure 4.9 shows the same 2-, 4- and 6-client experiments discussed previously, but breaks down the bandwidths into one bar per client. Here we can see that as the number of competing clients increases, the individual flows increase in jitter. The 6-client experiment shows the largest difference between the three OSes, and Linux is seen to share the bandwidth out unfairly, and with large oscillations between the clients (confidence interval of 10.7Mb/s). Nemesis is more stable, with a confidence interval of 2.24Mb/s, but Expert is almost





**Figure 4.9: Per-client bandwidth.**

two orders of magnitude more stable than Linux, with a confidence interval of 0.201Mb/s. Furthermore, Expert’s confidence interval is this low regardless of the number of clients.

Also, neither Expert nor Nemesis dropped any packets, while Linux provided no back-pressure at all to the transmitting clients. Once more than two clients were competing for the same output bandwidth, Linux started silently dropping between 72% and 75% of the packets presented for transmission by clients. This failure is noted in the Linux `sendto(2)` manpage:

`ENOBUFS` The output queue for a network interface was full. This generally indicates that the interface has stopped sending, but may be caused by transient congestion. (This cannot occur in Linux, packets are just silently dropped when a device queue overflows.)

To summarise: Expert can transmit marginally faster, and can share available bandwidth significantly more fairly and smoothly than either Linux or Nemesis. Nemesis has lower jitter than Linux when two or more clients compete for bandwidth, but lower overall performance.

## Latency


Low latency of packets traversing a network stack is important because as link speeds increase, the time spent by a packet queued in a buffer in a NEOS becomes a large component of the total end to end latency. Furthermore, since latency is cumulative, even small latency contributions in a NEOS can add up to significant delays in the complete network.

Latency varies with load, and should be at a minimum on an unloaded system. Therefore, this experiment measures the latency of the system under test by sending a single UDP packet to a user application which simply reflects the packet back to its source; the system is otherwise unloaded.

The system under test is `fox`. `Meteors` runs a UDP pinger application which writes a sequence number and cycle counter timestamp into each UDP ping packet sent. When replies are received, their round trip time is calculated from the cycle counter value in the packets and logged to a file. Several UDP pings are sent, spaced by around 100ms to ensure the system returns to the idle state, and the average UDP ping time is plotted. `Meteors` sweeps through a range of packet sizes sending 400 pings at each size before moving onto the next. The UDP payload sizes used are 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 64, 80, 128, 256, 400, 512, 700, 1024 and 1400 bytes. The predominance of small sizes is to probe for any special case handling of small packets, for example TCP ACKs. Also, small packets may arise as a result of cross-machine RPC, where latency greatly affects overall performance.

Figure 4.10 shows how the UDP ping time for the five systems under test vary with packet size. The lines all have the same gradient, showing that all systems have the same data-dependent processing costs, however their different absolute displacements quantify each system's per-packet overhead.

The `uRX-uTX` configuration has the highest per-packet overhead which is unsurprising given that 3 context switches are required to process each UDP ping packet. Linux has the lowest overhead, closely followed by `Expert`. The two intermediate systems, `uRX-kTX` and `kRX-uTX`, are someway between `Expert` and `uRX-uTX`. Looking at the smallest packet size (8 bytes), the gains expected by calculating the sum of the improvement of each of the two intermediate systems is 0.156ms, which predicts accurately the measured improvement of `Expert` over `uRX-uTX` of 0.168ms. `Expert` is better than expected presumably due to the benefit of entirely eliding the user-portion of the device driver from




**Figure 4.10: Latency: UDP ping time against packet size.**

the data path.

### Forwarding performance

This experiment characterises the systems' performance under increasing load. In this experiment, `meteors` generates a flow of packets which are received by `fox` and forwarded to `snapper`. The flow ramps up in rate from 1000pps to 19,000pps, sending 600 packets at each rate. The packets are UDP packets with 32 bytes of payload holding sequence number, timestamp and checksum information. `Meteors` logs the send time and sequence number, while `snapper` logs the arrival time and sequence number seen, allowing post-analysis of the logs to calculate the average packet rate over each flight of 600 packets. Both sender and receiver rates are calculated, and the sequence numbers are used to match them up. This allows a graph of input rate against output rate to be plotted.

Figure 4.11 shows how the five systems under test performed as the offered load was ramped up. Configuration `uRX-uTX`, with the device driver fully on the data path, cannot handle more than 3300pps, and in fact as the offered load



**Figure 4.11: Forwarding performance against load.**

increases further actually gets worse, dropping to around 1400pps at loads over 10,000pps.

The intermediate systems (uRX-kTX and kRX-uTX) perform a little better, managing 3800pps before dropping back down to 2400pps at offered loads over 10,000pps.

Expert does much better, managing up to 9000pps before losses start to occur, reaching a peak of 11,500pps before settling back to 9000pps at maximum load, at which point it is dropping just over 50% of packets sent to it.

Linux does very well, only starting to drop at 12,500pps. However, once overloaded Linux suffers very badly from livelock. Overload happens at input rates somewhere over 17,000pps, and is catastrophic – immediately almost 60% packet loss is seen. The outlying point where Linux seems to recover is in fact an unstable data point where Linux is queueing packets faster than it can drain them, so momentarily it achieves very impressive performance, which quickly degrades to the cluster of points at around 8000pps on the y-axis.

So, while Expert does not match Linux’s peak performance, Expert manages better when overloaded and comes close to Linux’s performance. Again, the

fact that neither of the intermediate schemes approach Expert's performance is due to the fact that the device driver is still on the data path, impeding performance.

#### 4.4.2 QoS metrics

##### Jitter due to kernel resident driver


Because Expert places the data handling portions of network device drivers in the kernel, this may increase the jitter in CPU guarantees since interrupts are disabled for longer periods of time. This experiment places a lower bound on the jitter by measuring how long it takes to process an interrupt for the Ethernet device. This is a lower bound on user-space visible jitter because while an interrupt is being processed the scheduler is no longer in control of the CPU, and so no scheduler would be able to offer guarantees at finer timescales than the time taken to service interrupts.

Each kernel is instrumented to record the number of cycles it takes to run the device driver every time it is entered due to an interrupt. These samples are aggregated and counted to form a distribution. Again, `fox` is the machine under test and it runs the instrumented kernel. To load `fox`, `meteors` is configured to send it 32-byte UDP packets with exponentially distributed inter-send times with a mean of  $125\mu\text{s}$  (corresponding to 8000pps.)

An exponential distribution is picked because measurement of real traffic arriving at my own workstation showed that packet inter-arrival times were exponentially distributed. The mean is chosen by consulting Figure 4.11 to find a rate which can be handled by Expert. By picking a load near the middle of the graph and using an exponential distribution, a wide portion of the load-space is covered, including rates which Expert cannot handle without dropping packets. While varying the packet size is also possible, it was felt that the range of loads explored by varying the arrival rate was sufficient.

The experiment lasts five minutes, during which time approximately 2.4 million packets are sent at rates ranging from 120pps to 19,000pps, thus covering the full spectrum of conditions from fairly idle to fully loaded. `FOX` forwards the packets to `snapper` (which discards them), so this experiment exercises both transmit and receive portions of the system under test.

Figure 4.12 shows how long it takes to service an IRQ for the Ethernet device




**Figure 4.12: Distribution of time taken to process an Ethernet IRQ.**

under Linux, Expert and Nemesis. A predictable system is one where on average interrupts are likely to be disabled for a short length of time and so do not introduce excessive jitter into the schedule. The size of the distribution's tail must also be considered: a long-tailed distribution indicates a system where occasionally the scheduler loses control for very large amounts of time, and this will increase the jitter in client CPU allocations. For example, the distribution for Linux shows just such a long tail, reaching up to 0.5ms to process an interrupt in the worst case; this is because Linux is also performing protocol processing in the kernel before returning control to the interrupted application. By comparison, Nemesis has both a much tighter distribution and a significantly lower mean ( $5\mu s$  versus Linux's mean of  $39\mu s$ ). Nemesis' worst-case IRQ processing time is  $8\mu s$ , which is smaller than Linux's best-case ( $10\mu s$ ).

Expert's performance is somewhere in between the two extremes, as expected. Expert's mean is  $30\mu s$ , which is better than Linux but much worse than Nemesis. Expert is designed to give high performance without losing predictability: this is evinced by the small size of the distribution's tail compared with Linux. Expert's worst-case time is  $95\mu s$ , far less than  $520\mu s$  for Linux. This is almost certainly due to not performing protocol processing as part of IRQ processing<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Strictly speaking, protocol processing in Linux happens in a bottom-half handler after IRQ



**Figure 4.13: Distribution of IRQ times for different driver models.**

To discover which aspect of Expert’s device driver model accounts for its predictable IRQ processing time, this section now presents the results of running the same experiment on the kRX-uTX and uRX-kTX configurations, comparing them against Nemesis (i.e. uRX-uTX) and Expert (i.e. kRX-kTX).

Figure 4.13 presents kRX-uTX and uRX-kTX alongside the Nemesis and Expert results from the previous graph. This shows that doing the receive processing in the kernel is what pushes the minimum and mean IRQ processing time up: both Nemesis and uRX-kTX have almost identical distributions. kRX-uTX shows almost the same behaviour as Expert, except that Expert has a slightly tighter distribution; this is presumably because Expert offers more opportunities to amortise IRQ work, so work queues do not build up to the same extent.

Table 4.1 shows how many IRQs were processed during each experiment, as well as the average number of IRQs needed to forward each packet. Both Nemesis and uRX-kTX place interrupt handling in user-space, and so take far fewer interrupts than the three other configurations. This is because once the kernel has converted an interrupt into an event to the device driver domain, that

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handling. However, IRQs remain masked for the entire time and the scheduler is not entered, so an interrupted process loses the CPU for at least this long.

OS	IRQs processed	IRQs per packet
Linux	4,140,000	1.73
Expert	3,840,000	1.60
kRX-uTX	2,590,000	1.08
uRX-kTX	1,540,000	0.64
Nemesis	1,490,000	0.62

**Table 4.1: Number of IRQs processed during experiment.**

interrupt is masked until the driver is later run. It is unmasked once the driver has performed whatever device-specific handling is needed. While it might appear that these are more efficient results, note that this means the device is ignored for longer, which can cause the receive DMA ring to overflow (see table 2.1).


### Forwarding costs

One way to measure of the efficiency of each driver scheme is to monitor how much CPU time is left free for other user applications while forwarding packets – an efficient scheme will leave more CPU time free than an inefficient scheme. As well as efficiency, it is desirable to remain in control of how much time is consumed in forwarding packets. This experiment measures the fraction of CPU time used to forward packets on Expert and Linux, both when a forwarder application is run as a best-effort task on a loaded system, and when the forwarder application has been given a guarantee (on Expert) or maximum priority (on Linux).

In this experiment `fox` is again used to forward packets from `meteors` to `snapper`. `Fox` runs two user-level processes: one which forwards the packets, and a second which emulates a CPU-bound process by consuming as much CPU time as it is allocated. This “slurp” application<sup>3</sup> loops reading the processor cycle count register and maintains an exponentially weighted moving average of how many cycles it takes to make one pass around its main loop; it declares itself to have been de-scheduled if the time to make a pass exceeds its current estimate by more than 50%. The fraction of the CPU received by slurp is calculated by dividing the runtime by the sum of the de-scheduled time and the runtime (i.e. all cycles available). For example, running slurp on an idle Ex-

<sup>3</sup>slurp is based on code originally written by Keir Fraser.





**Figure 4.14: Fraction of CPU used in forwarding packets.**

pert system reports that 97.5% of all cycles are available to user applications, whilst an idle Linux system makes 99.8% available.

The traffic profile generated by *meteors* is as before: 32-byte UDP packets with exponentially distributed inter-send times having a mean of  $125\mu s$ . The machine *snapper* records the sequence numbers of forwarded packets, and is used to calculate how many were lost. The experiment runs for approximately 48 seconds, sending around 400,000 packets.

Figure 4.14 shows the percentage of CPU time needed to forward packets, calculated from the slurp data monitoring free CPU time. This way of calculating used CPU ensures that that all forwarding costs are included irrespective of their source: kernel, driver or application. Nemesis was not included in these tests since at this load it loses approximately 75% of the test traffic, freeing CPU time which it allocates generously to the slurp application which receives around 58% of the machine's cycles. However, at 75% loss it cannot really be considered to be forwarding packets, so is excluded.

The two left-hand columns compare Expert and Linux when the forwarder is given a best-effort (BE) scheduling guarantee. In this case Linux does marginally better, achieving slightly lower CPU cost and a lower loss rate, for much the

same jitter. However, if Expert is configured to give the forwarder application a guarantee of 3ms CPU time every 5ms (i.e. 60%), and under Linux the forwarder is given a “nice” value of -20 (the highest priority available under Unix) then the two right-hand columns show the resulting used CPU and loss rates. It can be seen that Expert is in control of resources expended, allowing a much larger percentage of the CPU to be used,<sup>4</sup> resulting in an aggressive reduction in the loss rate. The effect under Linux is visible, but does not greatly affect the loss rate: Linux is unable to grant the forwarder application any more CPU time. This shows that while Expert may not perform quite as efficiently as Linux, it remains in control of the CPU resources it hands out.

## 4.5 Summary

This chapter described how Expert virtualises network devices at a low level of abstraction, placing the minimal functions needed for protection and multiplexing within the kernel while leaving protocol processing to fully scheduled user-space applications. Expert’s network device architecture can be summarised as a kernel-based emulation of a user-safe network device, allowing controller-less network devices to be treated as next-generation smart devices.

To achieve this, Expert introduces the following novel mechanisms:

- **Transmit descriptor re-writing.** Application-supplied latency tolerances can be used to calculate receive interrupt mitigation parameters, and on the transmit side DMA descriptor re-writing is used to limit transmit complete interrupts. Reducing the number of interrupts taken increases the amount of work which can be done by the interrupt handler once entered, thus amortising the cost of taking the interrupt over multiple packets. Descriptor re-writing to coalesce transmit complete interrupts reduces the interrupt rate by a factor of 15.6 for a DMA ring size of 32, and saves 19.4% of CPU time.
- **Asynchronous communication.** Where synchronisation between user-space and the kernel is not needed, communication can take place by publishing data in a pre-arranged location. This technique is used both in the way user transmit channels are speculatively polled by the kernel

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<sup>4</sup>The time used is higher than the 60% guarantee given because the measured time includes all overheads, not just the time spent by the forwarding application with the guarantee.

by the transmit scan, and in the way that the kernel makes the interface status available in the PCSR. This feature makes possible the following two mechanisms:

- **Transmit scan.** As the transmit DMA ring drains, the transmit scan optimistically polls user I/O channels for further packets which may be loaded onto the DMA ring. This amortises the cost of entering the kernel, either due to a user transmit wake-up, a transmit complete interrupt, or the timer used for rate control. The transmit scan reloads an average of 7.9 packets per scan at high loads, thus saving that many user-kernel crossings, and so saving 24% CPU.
- **Explicit wakeups.** By reading the PCSR, user applications discover whether a transmit scan will shortly be performed, allowing the application to explicitly wake the transmission subsystem only when absolutely necessary. For example, when two non-batching transmitter clients compete, reading the PCSR allows 95% of wake-ups to be elided as unnecessary and reduces the CPU time required by 1.5%. More competing clients allow greater savings: with four clients 99.9% of wake-ups are elided, and 1.7% CPU is saved. This is because as more clients are multiplexed together, the transmission subsystem is more likely to be awake already: efficiency increases as load rises.
- **Batch size control.** Expert allows applications to trade efficiency against jitter by controlling how many packets are batched together before processing them. Some applications need low jitter packet handling, some are jitter-tolerant: Expert allows each to be handled appropriately. For example, a packet reflector configured to process 32 packets per batch uses 5.4% less CPU time than a jitter-reducing one which processes each packet as soon as possible. The measured jitter for the batching reflector is 8.4% worse than the non-batching reflector.

A comparative evaluation of Expert and intermediate device driver configurations shows that the full benefits of the Expert architecture are only realised when both transmit and receive processing is performed in the kernel; the intermediate configurations show some benefit over placing the device driver fully in user-space, however the difference is not compelling. The comparison with Linux is favourable, with Expert showing marginally lower raw performance traded for major increases in livelock resistance, stability and control over how resources are consumed.

# Chapter 5

## Paths

The previous chapter described how Expert eliminates from the data path shared servers that drive network devices in user-space. However, shared servers are still needed for a variety of reasons. This chapter examines those reasons, and describes how some classes of server are unnecessary: their functionality can be replaced by a limited form of thread tunnelling.

Servers fall into two categories: those on the control path used to monitor, configure, and control the system as trusted mediators of exchanges; and those on the data path for protection, security, correctness, multiplexing or reliability reasons. Servers on the control path are uninteresting from a performance point of view – their impact is limited. The performance of servers on the data path, however, is a critical component of the overall performance of the system. This chapter describes how the functions typically performed within such servers may be executed directly by application threads in a secure manner.

### 5.1 The case for tunnelling in a vertically structured OS

We assume that a vertical approach has already been taken in designing the system: this means that all processing that untrusted user applications are able to perform themselves happens within their own protection domains using their own guarantees. Any processing that applications cannot be trusted with must happen in a server, which may be for a number of different reasons:

**Correctness.** The application cannot be trusted to correctly implement the

server functions. For example if multiple applications get data and place it in a shared cache for subsequent use, they must agree on cache replacement policies, and implicitly trust each other to only encache valid data. Concrete examples include rendering font glyphs in a font server, getting blocks off local disk, performing DNS queries, or retrieving web objects. Correctness is not limited to cache maintenance: in some situations, protocol implementations must be correct, for example forcing the use of a known-good TCP implementation.<sup>1</sup>

**Security.** The application is not trusted by the system, so it cannot authenticate, authorise, or grant resources. This sounds somewhat tautologous, but one practical upshot is that applications cannot be trusted with key material, so for example they cannot be secure VPN end-points.

**Multiplexing.** The application cannot be trusted to arbitrate access to some scarce resource. The previous chapter addressed this specifically with respect to network devices, but any other system-wide resource which needs mediation cannot be accessed directly by applications. Protection is related to multiplexing: just as an application is not trusted to share a resource, so it is not trusted to maintain the data privacy and integrity of competing applications.

**Minimum privilege.** The application cannot be trusted to access only its own address space. Applications inevitably have bugs, and limiting their access rights is a useful debugging tool which promotes the speedy discovery of these bugs. By placing functions in a server, they are isolated from the rest of the system (and vice versa), permitting each to be debugged with known (limited) interaction between them. Tight access rights act as assertions about application behaviour.

The first three of these reasons reduce to forcing the application to perform some function using system-approved code in a privileged protection domain. The last is a case of executing the application's code in a fresh, unprivileged, protection domain.

Placing such code in a server task is the usual solution, however this leads to the following problems when the server is on the data path:

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<sup>1</sup>Arguably, a TCP sender should not need to trust the TCP receiver's correctness, however the protocol was designed when end-systems could generally trust each other and so makes a number of design decisions which today are questionable [Savage99].

1. When a single data flow is processed by multiple cooperating servers, each with its own resource allocations, it is hard to understand the allocation levels needed to achieve a balanced system, i.e. one in which each server task has a sufficient resource allocation, and no more.
2. There is a performance penalty due to the overheads of context switching between tasks on a per-packet basis. These may be amortised by batching multiple packets together before context switching; however this will by definition increase their latency. There is a fundamental trade-off between batch granularity and context switch overheads.
3. Multiple tasks co-operating to process a flow complicates resource reclamation since resources are owned by tasks, not flows. If the resources associated with a flow need to be retracted, all the tasks involved need to participate in the revocation. Depending on the system, atomic resource release may be impossible.
4. When multiple tasks co-operate to process multiple flows, there are two additional problems. Firstly, each task needs to perform a demultiplex operation to recover the flow state. Secondly, if flows are to be differentiated within a task, the task needs to sub-schedule any processing it does. However, this aggravates the first problem by greatly increasing the number of scheduler settings needing to be decided for the system as a whole.

Expert introduces the notion of a *path* which is allocated resources such as CPU time guarantees and memory, and can cross protection domain boundaries to tunnel into code which would previously have needed to be within a server task. Paths are further described in Section 5.2.3.

Paths solve the problems above for the following four reasons: (1) By using one path per data flow, the processing performed on the flow can be given a *single* guarantee regardless of how many protection domains it needs to cross, thus simplifying resource allocation. (2) Since paths are able to cross protection domain boundaries in a lightweight fashion, the latency experienced by packets being processed can be reduced by avoiding the need to batch packets together before a protection crossing. (3) Because paths provide a principal to which resources are allocated (regardless of where allocation was made), discovering all the resources which need to be reclaimed is simplified. Finally, (4) paths provide a consistent execution context within which processing can

take place. This eases access to path-local state avoiding the need for further demultiplexing.

These aspects of paths are discussed in more detail in the following sections, starting with a description of how Expert manages modules of code and execution contexts.

## 5.2 Code, protection and schedulable entities

Unix joins the two unrelated concepts of *protection domain* and *schedulable entity* together into a single *process* abstraction which is the principal to which both CPU time and memory access rights are granted. Shared library schemes improve on this by allowing a process to dynamically link in new code, but fundamentally the model is still that of an address space containing data and code which is executed.

Expert provides a richer variety of code, protection and schedulable entities, giving the application programmer more choice in how to go about solving problems.

### 5.2.1 Modules

Modules in Expert are identical to Nemesis modules [Roscoe94]. They are passive shared libraries similar to shared libraries under Unix. Modules are purely code, with no thread of execution associated with them. Because they keep no mutable state they may be freely shared between multiple protection domains and so are mapped globally executable. Each module is named and has a typed interface declaring types and method prototypes. Access to the module is by looking up its name in a global namespace to discover the address of its jump table (and thus entry points for each method provided).

Modules which maintain per-instance state such as heap managers, hash tables and FIFOs have their state explicitly passed in for each method invocation via a pointer to an opaque structure. This structure is initially allocated by an invocation on an associated factory module. This arrangement makes callers responsible for holding module state, thus ensuring the memory resources are accounted to the correct principal.

Because modules are globally executable, their page table entries do not need to

be modified during a context switch. This reduces the cost of a context switch, and also means cached module code is still valid and need not be flushed, thus reducing cold cache penalties.

## 5.2.2 Tasks

Tasks are one of the two schedulable entities present in Expert, and are analogous to processes in other operating systems. A task is composed of:

- a scheduling domain (sdom) which specifies the task's CPU guarantee and accounts consumed CPU time;
- a protection domain (pdom) which both grants memory access privileges and owns stretches of memory; and
- an activation vector, initially pointing to the task's entry point, which most commonly installs a user-level thread scheduler before subsequently overwriting the activation vector with the scheduler's entry point.

These components of a task strongly reflect Expert's Nemesis heritage; an Expert task corresponds closely to a Nemesis domain.

Tasks provide a way for programmers to capture resource consumption which happens in a self-contained or CPU-bound manner with little communication with other components, be they devices or other tasks or paths (see later). This is the traditional scheduling abstraction provided by the vast majority of operating systems, and so programmers are familiar with the execution environment.

Tasks make procedure calls into modules, and while executing such code the task is charged for any memory allocated and CPU cycles expended. Tasks may bind to and make invocations on other (server) tasks, although if significant data is exchanged then this is an indication that a path may capture the data flow and resource consumption better.

Tasks are useful for providing services such as a system-wide traded namespace, low bandwidth serial I/O, network management (port allocation, participating in routing protocols), load monitoring, control interfaces, or scripted boot-time system configuration. While such functions could be placed in the kernel, implementing them as scheduled user-space tasks allows their resource usage to be limited or guaranteed as need be.



### 5.2.3 Paths

In a NEOS, it is expected that the majority of processing will be data-driven, i.e. triggered in response to packet arrival or departure. Paths are Expert's second schedulable entity and exist to capture the resources consumed by packets as they pass through the system. They provide a consistent context across both code modules and protection domain boundaries. The motivation for paths in Expert is similar to that for paths in Scout (and Escort) as described in Section 2.1.2, however Expert focuses more on using paths for resource control, not just accounting.

An Expert path is a combination of a CPU guarantee (sdom), a base protection domain for path-local allocations (pdom), and an entry point which performs any initialisation needed before entering the main packet processing loop.

Typically the initialisation phase will set up one or more I/O channels with demultiplex filters selecting which packets are to be received by this path. Because the kind of packets processed by a path are known ahead of time, path-specific optimisations may be performed, such as code specialisation using invariants, or stack simplification. This aspect of paths in Expert is identical to paths in Scout.

Paths are intended to be lightweight, allowing many hundreds or even thousands of them to be concurrently active. Paths have a single thread of execution and are not usually activated; the motivation for this is explained in Section 5.3.3.

The main distinguishing feature of a path is its ability to traverse multiple protection domains while remaining in the same scheduling domain. This means that system functions can remain protected in a modular fashion without forcing the unit of scheduling to follow the module boundaries. As the path traps into a foreign protection domain the foreign domain's rights are merged into the path's existing rights; thus the protected module can access its private state as well as path-local state. The mechanism is described fully in Section 5.3.2.

In general, paths are indicated when data must cross one or more protection domain boundaries, and there is a need to segregate multiple data flows and treat them with different levels of service. Example applications which would benefit from being implemented as paths include transcoding, encryption, VPN encapsulation and NAT.

Expert paths have the following features in common with Scout paths: they enable fast access to per-flow state across modules; they allow code specialisation because the types of packets which will be processed are known ahead of time; they provide a principal to which resources allocated across modules and protection domains may be accounted; and they are run in response to data arrival. This is where the similarities end, however. Scout paths can only be established following pre-determined connections between modules, whereas Expert paths may use any modules including dynamically loaded ones. Scout paths process their packets to completion without preemption, whereas Expert paths are properly scheduled and may lose the CPU to prevent another path's guarantee from being violated. Escort adds memory protection to Scout, however it does not provide ways of amortising the cost of crossing these protection boundaries. Expert uses pod I/O channels (described later) to give the application programmer control over how and when packets cross protection boundaries along a path.

#### 5.2.4 Protected modules

A pod (Protected Module) is similar to a module but it cannot be called in an arbitrary fashion: access is restricted to a single advertised entry point. Each pod has an associated protection domain (its *boost pdom*), and its code is mapped executable only by this protection domain. When the Loader<sup>2</sup> loads a pod, it allocates a fresh pdom and registers it together with the pod's entry point with the kernel. Paths can trap into the pod by invoking a special kernel call which notes the boost pdom and forces the program counter to the pod's entry point.<sup>3</sup>

The kernel keeps a stack recording the boost pdom of each pod called, allowing (limited) nested invocation of one pod from another. The access rights in force at any time are the union of all pdoms on the boost stack plus the path's base pdom. This leads to a "concentric rings" model of protection, and is done for performance reasons: it makes calling into a pod a lightweight operation because as the access rights are guaranteed to be a superset of those previously in force, no caches need to be flushed on entry.

Returning from a nested call is more expensive: there is by definition a reduc-

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<sup>2</sup>Described later in Section 5.3.1

<sup>3</sup>This is a software implementation of the CAP computer's ENTER instruction, except that a stack switch is not forced. S. Mullender mentioned such a possibility during the initial design of Nemesis [Leslie02], however the idea was not pursued.

tion in privileges, so page table entries must be modified and the appropriate TLB entries flushed. However, this penalty is unavoidable; it is mitigated in systems which permit multiple nested calls to return directly to a prior caller (as in EROS) but I believe that common programming idioms mean that such tail-calls are rare. For example, error recovery code needs to check the return status from invoking a nested pod; often a return code needs mapping.

All pods are passive: they have no thread of execution associated with them. This is in contrast with most other thread tunnelling schemes where the servers tunnelled into can also have private threads active within them. Passive pods make recovery from memory faults easier since they are localised to the tunnelled thread. Other tunnelling schemes need complex recovery code to deal with failure of a server involved in a deeply nested call chain, whereas with passive pods a memory fault can terminate a tunnelled path without needing to terminate or unload the pod it was executing in at the time.

### **5.2.5 CALLPRIVS**

A CALLPRIV (first described in Section 3.4.2) can be used by drivers to make available small functions which run in kernel mode. While superficially a pod may appear similar to a CALLPRIV, pods are fundamentally different for two reasons. Firstly, because pods run in user mode with interrupts enabled they can be preempted, and the system scheduler remains in control of the CPU. This allows code in a pod to run for arbitrary lengths of time without jeopardising any other path or task's CPU guarantee. Secondly, since pods run within their own protection domain this allows finer-grained protection of memory; there is no need to grant access to the whole of memory, as is the case with a CALLPRIV running in kernel mode.

So, pods are most suitable for longer running (or potentially unbounded) processing, while CALLPRIVs are useful for small, tightly-defined critical sections.

## **5.3 Expert pod implementation**

This section describes how Expert implements the concepts described above.

### 5.3.1 Bootstrapping

#### System loader


Expert relies on the Loader (a trusted system task) to relocate and register new modules and pods with the kernel at run time. Since Expert is a single address space system, modules and pods are dynamically loaded at addresses which may vary from run to run. Modules and pods are stored in the filesystem as partially linked objects so the Loader has enough information to relocate the code to its ultimate load address once this has been determined. This is the first of the Loader's two roles.

The Loader's second role is to register information from modules and pods with a namespace traded system-wide to allow other components to find the newly loaded code. This takes place in two different ways depending on whether a module or a pod has been loaded. For a module, the Loader registers types and interfaces defined by the module with the typesystem, and exports the module's entry point to the namespace. For a pod, the Loader performs the same actions but also allocates a fresh pdom and marks the pod's pages "readable and executable" by this pdom only. The Loader then registers the pod's entry point and pdom with the kernel, by calling `Pod$Register()` on the privileged `Pod` interface shown in Appendix A.1.

#### Binding to a pod

Some systems do not require a binding phase before calls are made, for example the CAP computer allowed calls to be made without prior negotiation. However, using an explicit bind phase has a number of benefits:

- The pod can perform client access control checks at bind time, rather than on every call, thus saving time on the fast path. This would not have been a benefit for the CAP computer since it did access checks using dedicated hardware.
- The pod can allocate and initialise per-client state at bind time.
- A pointer to this per-client state can be stored with the binding record to speed pod access to it. This technique removes the need for each pod along a path to perform a demultiplex operation on each packet to recover its processing state.




**Figure 5.1: Steps involved in making a pod offer. See text for details.**

- A pod may be instantiated multiple times re-using the same code, allowing clients to select between instances by binding to a specific pod offer. This is not possible if the binding is implicitly specified by the code entry point and client id. This may not seem important, but consider a pod implementing a shareable hash-table: it would be unwise to assume each client would only ever need a single hash-table.

Given these advantages, Expert uses an explicit bind stage before client calls into a pod are permitted.

Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of calls involved in making a pod offer. In step (1), the System task has just finished invoking the Loader and is in possession of a newly registered Pod.ID. It calls `Pod$Init()` via IDC, asking the Pod Binder to create a new instance of the pod and make an offer for it available under the given name. The Pod Binder inserts a temporary binding for Pod.ID with a NULL state pointer into its own bindings list, and uses the `ntsc_call_pod()` system call<sup>4</sup> to tunnel into the pod (2). When a pod is called with NULL state, this is taken to be an initialisation request. The pod performs any pod-specific initialisation needed, and returns an opaque, non-NULL pointer `offer_st` which uniquely describes this pod instance. The Pod Binder makes a `Pod.Offer()` by wrapping this pointer and the original Pod.ID, then exports it to the whole system by placing it in a publicly traded namespace (3).

<sup>4</sup>Described later in Section 5.3.2



**Figure 5.2: Steps involved in binding to a pod offer. See text for details.**

Pod clients can inspect these offers, but not modify them. Clients bind to an offer by name via IDC to the non-privileged `PodBinder` interface exported by the Pod Binder task. Appendix A.2 describes the interface.

Figure 5.2 shows how the interface is used by a client wishing to bind to an offer.

Binding is a two-stage process. First, the client must open the offer by calling `PodBinder$Open()` via IDC to the Pod Binder (1.1). This names the offer in the trader rather than passing in an offer directly, ensuring that arbitrary offers cannot be forged by untrusted clients. The Pod Binder looks up the given name in the trader (1.2), then writes an “unfixed” binding entry to the client’s binding table (1.3).

At this stage, the pod has not been informed of the client’s desire to bind to it. This happens when the client “fixes” its open binding in the second stage. The client performs an `ntsc_call_pod()` requesting to bind to the pod (2.1). The pod determines that the call is a bind request because the state it is passed

in is the `offer_st` it returned earlier. The current implementation distinguishes `offer_st` pointers by setting their bottom bit, however should this technique not be possible on the particular architecture under consideration other techniques are available; for example the both bind and offer state records could consist of a common initial portion holding a flag whose value specifies whether this is normal call or a bind request. The pod may reject the bind request and return an error code. Should the pod accept, it allocates and initialises any per-client state it needs (`bind_st`), then calls `PodBinder$setState()` via IDC (2.2) which updates the client's binding table to hold the new `bind_st` pointer (2.3).

The client's binding table is mapped read-only to the client to prevent it inserting forged bindings into the table. Only the Pod Binder task is privileged to update client binding tables.

The advantage of this two-stage binding scheme is that the pod is tunneled into by the client to perform the majority of the work of the bind: this means the pod's bind request handler runs in the same environment as future calls will do, so it can fully vet the client. Also, per-client state can be allocated either from the client's own heap if it does not need to be trusted, or in a pod-local heap with suitable protection if it must be trusted. Another advantage is that the bind happens using client CPU resource guarantees; should binding be an expensive operation then it is correctly accounted.

Note that the first call the client makes to the pod completes the binding process, but is otherwise ignored.

### 5.3.2 Calling a pod

Having opened and fixed an offer to get a binding id, the client may now make calls on this binding by tunnelling a thread into the pod. This section describes how this tunnelling behaviour is achieved on the Intel processor architecture. Similar implementation tactics are likely to work on other CPU architectures since no special features of the Intel architecture are assumed, but CPUs with a software-loadable TLB would most likely permit a simpler implementation.

#### Triggering the switch

So that pods maintain their integrity, clients may only call them at their publicly advertised entry point. This can be enforced in one of two ways. In both

cases, pod code must not be directly executable in the client's protection domain (otherwise the client could simply jump into the pod at any point of its choosing). This means that client will take a page fault if they try to execute pod code directly.

The first way of triggering a switch is to use these page faults. For example, Escort (the version of Scout with memory protection) looks up the faulting address in an in-kernel table and if it is a known entry point it performs a protection switch. This means that a protected call in Escort is no different from a normal procedure call which has a certain pleasing simplicity about it, however it does mean that all page faults need to be tested to determine whether a protected module call is being attempted. This slows every page fault, even if they are unrelated to cross-pdom calls.

The alternative, used by Expert, is to use a system call implemented using a software interrupt to a handler which performs the minimal checks needed and changes protection domain. This has the advantage that on most processor architectures, taking a software interrupt is faster than a page fault since the page tables do not need to be walked. For example, a system call on the test machine takes 280 cycles on average while a page fault takes 440 cycles<sup>5</sup>. It also avoids polluting the fast-path of the page fault handler.

Expert introduces the `ntsc_call_pod()` system call, which takes as arguments a binding id, a method number, and an opaque pointer to the method arguments.

### **Pre-switch checks**

The kernel implementation of `ntsc_call_pod()` checks that the binding id is within the binding table in the client's PCB, and that there is room on the boost pdom stack for another pdom; these are the only tests needed, and both are simple compares of a value against a limit.

Invalid (i.e. unallocated) binding ids are dealt with by having the Pod Binder pre-allocate all possible binding ids to point to a stub which returns an error code, thus creating a fast path by eliminating such error checking from the in-kernel code. This is a specific use of the following general optimisation technique: all inputs to a function should be valid or easy to validate, aiming

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<sup>5</sup>In both cases, the measured value is the time taken to switch from user mode to a C environment in kernel mode, then restore and switch back to user mode.



to reduce the number of special cases or error recovery code needed in the function itself.

The binding id is used to index into the client's binding table to recover the pod id to be called, and the state pointer to be passed in (either offer state or binding state). The pod id is used to index into an in-kernel pod table to discover the pod's entry point and pdom.

The entire code to perform these checks, switch protection domain, and call the pod entry address comes to just 44 instructions.

### **Argument marshaling**

There is no marshaling needed when a client tunnels into a pod – types are represented as defined by the native procedure call standard, either on the stack or in registers as appropriate. For the Intel x86 architecture, they are passed on the client's stack frame.

Large arguments are passed by reference in pre-negotiated external buffers. For example, packet data are passed using pod I/O channels; this is covered in more detail in Section 5.3.4.

Pointers passed into a pod should not be blindly dereferenced by the pod; otherwise a malicious client might be able to read memory it does not normally have access to by using a pod to perform the access on its behalf. Similarly, pods should not write through pointers passed to them without first checking they point to reasonable areas. Pointers to large arguments like packets can be checked to ensure that they lie within address ranges pre-negotiated at bind time. For other pointers, the pod should manually walk the canonical protection tables to discover the rights the client has on the memory the pointer refers to, and reject the call if the rights are insufficient.

There are two approaches to verifying the common case of arguments which are pointers into the client's stack. If the client is reasonably trusted, then merely checking the pointer argument against the stack pointer is enough. This gives some protection against bugs, but because a malicious client can set the stack pointer to an arbitrary value before calling a pod, a paranoid pod would have to perform the full pointer check described above.

An alternative to passing pointers is to pass small integers. The pod can use them to directly index into a per-client table to retrieve an appropriate state

pointer. The small integers can easily be range-checked to avoid illegal accesses, and since the table is per-client undesirable snooping of another client's data is avoided. The use of small integers as file descriptors in Unix is an example of this technique.

### **Pdom stack manipulation**

The last thing the kernel does before calling the pod is to push the pod's pdom onto the pdom stack, thus making available the rights granted by that pdom the next time a page fault occurs.

Expert, like Nemesis, requires a software loadable TLB, and emulates one on architectures without native support. This is done by maintaining a minimal set of hardware page table entries which shadow a definitive set of protection rights held by a pdom. When a page fault occurs, the kernel looks up the definitive rights in the pdom and inserts an appropriate entry into the hardware page tables. When a protection switch occurs, these extra page table entries are removed and the TLB is flushed. The next time an access is attempted which is not in the page tables, the page fault handler consults the new pdom's access rights to determine whether a hardware page table entry should be added, or whether a genuine access violation has occurred. Most of the time, the code or data being accessed is globally accessible and so the number of page faults taken is low. This scheme's efficiency is further improved by noting each pdom's working set when it is de-activated, and speculatively re-inserting those mappings into the page table when switching back to that pdom.

Expert modifies this scheme to use a stack of pdoms as the canonical protection information, rather than just a single pdom. When a page fault occurs, the access is allowed if any pdom on the current stack would allow it.

The `ntsc_call_pod()` system call also needs to mark the current contents of the hardware page table as non-authoritative since the pdom stack has changed, otherwise clients can leave low privilege rights in the page table which are now inappropriate for a higher privileged pod.

When the pod call returns the boost pdom is popped off the pdom stack, any extra page table entries which were added are removed, and the TLB is flushed. This ensures that pages which were previously accessible while running in the pod are no longer available. Another system call, `ntsc_popadom()`, is used to pop the topmost pdom off the stack, and is called before returning from the

pod.

To avoid each pod ending with `ntsc_popadom()`, `ntsc_call_pod()` actually calls a wrapper function rather than calling the pod directly. This wrapper calls the pod's entry point, then pops the pod's boost pdom, before finally returning from the original `ntsc_call_pod()` system call to the pod's caller. This scheme is very similar to the way signals are handled in Unix: a special `sigreturn()` system call exists to resume the main user program once its signal handler returns, and the kernel arranges that this system call is made by modifying the return address of an extra procedure call record it places on the user stack.

### 5.3.3 Pod environment

This section describes how and why the runtime environment is modified when a thread runs within a pod.

#### Activations and thread scheduling

Normally when the kernel grants the CPU to a task, it is activated as described in Section 3.2. This allows the efficient implementation of user-level thread schedulers by making it easy for the scheduler to be up-called regularly: the task's activation vector is set to the user-level scheduler's entry point, thus allowing user control over which thread to resume when receiving the CPU. Critical regions in the user-level thread scheduler are implemented by disabling activations during these critical regions by setting a flag in the DCB. This flag is checked by the kernel when activating a DCB to determine whether to resume or activate the DCB.

However, allowing a thread to tunnel into a pod breaks the implicit assumption in this scheme: it is no longer the case that all threads share the same protection rights on memory. This means each thread context slot must also store the pdom stack in force for that thread, and thread to thread context switches would need kernel intervention if a protection switch is also involved.

Other operating systems which allowed tunnelling such as Mach or Spring did not feature activations, and thus the kernel was always involved in switching between threads. What are the choices available to Expert?

1. **Allow activations.** If activations are allowed while some threads are within pods, then the kernel must be involved in thread switches. Also, the context slots could not be stored in user-writable memory, since otherwise it would be possible to modify an untrusted thread's saved pdom stack and resume the thread to bypass the protection scheme. Context slots cannot even be kept in read-only memory, since this would let an untrusted thread monitor the context slot of a tunnelled thread and thus discover data held in the thread's registers which should be protected. Therefore the context slots would need to reside in kernel memory, but this would complicate the kernel by needing a dynamic memory allocator.

Another problem is that if the context slots are writable and managed by the user-level scheduler, then it can perform a lightweight `setjmp()` to save a thread's state when it blocks. This is cheaper than saving all the thread's state since only the callee-saves registers need to be written to the context slot; the caller-saves registers will have already been saved on the thread's stack by the compiler as part of its implementation of the procedure call standard. The kernel is only needed to resume a thread if the kernel preempted it. If, however, the context slots are not writable by the user-level thread scheduler then the kernel is needed to resume all threads, regardless of how they lost the CPU.

If activations were allowed, which activation handler should the kernel call when activating a tunnelled thread? Certainly not the client's, because if the kernel called the client's activation handler then it would be running untrusted client code using the pod's boost pdom, which would violate the protection scheme. Alternatively, the kernel might run an activation handler specified by the pod, allowing it to schedule the threads currently within itself in any manner it chooses. While this initially sounds attractive, note that the pod might not run the thread from the path which was granted the CPU. This destroys the direct connection between a path's CPU guarantee and its rate of progress, and defeats the purpose of this work.

2. **Disable activations.** Activations could be disabled when a thread tunnels into a pod: threads would always be resumed if preempted while running within a pod.
3. **Single threaded.** A new schedulable entity could be introduced, which does not normally run in a multi-threaded manner, and thus it would not need activating either to regularly re-enter a scheduler.

Expert uses a combination of these last two: paths are intended to be single threaded, and this is enforced by having `ntsc_call_pod()` disable activations while a call is in progress. The `ntsc_popadom()` system call re-enables the usual activation/resume scheme once there is only one pdom left on the pdom stack, i.e. control has returned to the base pdom.

This allows both paths and tasks to call pods. Applications requiring a full-featured multi-threaded environment can be implemented using tasks. The advantage of allowing tasks to call pods is that control and initialisation of pods may be done by tasks. Paths can then be used as lightweight single-threaded I/O threads, typically collecting an input packet, processing it through one or more pods before queueing the result for output. This is much like the Scout model of a path, except that because Expert paths are preemptively scheduled by the kernel, they may embark on more CPU-intensive processing without affecting the responsiveness of the system (Scout copes with this by having the programmer add explicit yield points to the code).

Note that if a thread which has tunneled into a pod blocks, the entire task or path owning the thread is blocked. This means that pods may use IDC to call other tasks, but such calls will block all threads in the caller task or path for the duration of the call. Pods “capture” threads which tunnel into them: the caller is no longer in control of its own thread. This is required for security, but can lead to unintended consequences in multi-threaded tasks: user-level threads will not be scheduled in a timely manner, event delivery and timeouts will be delayed, and incoming IDC calls will not be processed. This leads to the potential for deadlock if a task tunnels into a pod which ultimately makes an IDC call back to the original task. For all these reasons, single-threaded paths are the most suitable entity to call into pods. Tasks should limit themselves to calling pod methods which are short-running and non-blocking. If a task needs to perform many long-running or blocking calls, this is an indication that a path is more appropriate way of capturing the control flow.

## **Locks**

Taking out locks in pods can also cause an effect similar to priority inversion: because paths tunnelling into a pod bring their resource guarantees with them, if the pod serialises their execution then a path with a large CPU guarantee can become rate-limited by a path with a lower CPU guarantee. Several solutions to this problem exist:

- Paths running in a locked critical region can inherit the highest CPU guarantee of all blocked paths. This is analogous to priority inheritance in a priority-based system [Lampson80].
- [Menage00, Section 5.6.2] advocates having servers underwrite critical sections, providing spare CPU cycles to ensure a minimum rate of progress through critical sections. Menage also suggests that servers could simply reject calls from principals with insufficient CPU guarantees.
- [Harris01, Section 7.6.3] suggests temporary CPU cycle loaning, where blocked paths donate their cycles to the path currently running in the critical region, thus “pushing” it through. The pushed path later repays the loaned cycles once it has exited the critical section.
- Non-blocking data structures such as those proposed by [Greenwald99] can be used.
- Critical regions can be kept to a minimum number and length. This pragmatic solution is no defence against malicious paths which might proceed arbitrarily slowly, however it works well in most situations. A pod written in this style will typically prepare all the details needed before taking out a lock and making the update, thus expunging all superfluous code from the critical region. This is the approach taken by Expert.

As with any case of abnormal termination, if any locks are held then the data structures protected by the locks may be in an inconsistent state. Standard solutions to this include rolling back changes, working on shadow copies before committing, forced failure of the whole component, or using lock-free data structures.

### **Stack switching**

Conventional wisdom says that each protection domain should have its own stack. This would imply that each pod would need to switch to a private stack for the duration of its processing. This is the approach taken by Spring<sup>6</sup> each server protection domain has a pool of threads, each of which includes a pre-allocated stack. Execution takes place in the context of a “shuttle” which con-

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<sup>6</sup>Spring was discussed in Section 2.3.3.

trols the scheduling and accounting of the processing regardless of which protection domain it occurs within.

The reason for this is so that other threads which have not tunnelled cannot spy on the tunnelled thread's stack and so snoop sensitive intermediate data. More importantly, if the stack is writable by other threads which have not tunnelled, then one could re-write a return address in a stack frame of the tunnelled thread and so divert it to run malicious code.

There are several advantages to not switching stacks on protection switch. The performance is better, since arguments can be passed on it directly without needing to be copied across, and stack pages are likely to be already in the cache and already have a valid TLB entry. Also memory usage is reduced, by requiring only  $T$  stacks rather than  $T \times P$  for  $T$  threads traversing  $P$  pods. This could be mitigated by only allocating  $N < T$  stacks and sharing them on the assumption that it is highly unlikely that all threads will simultaneously tunnel into the same pod.

There is also the question of when stacks should be allocated: the logical time is during the bind phase, however the allocation code needs to recognise multiple binds from the same client and re-use the same stack for each.

Another alternative would be to use a single stack, and merely change the access rights to flip it into the pdom being tunnelled into. This has an associated performance cost, since the stack pages would need to have their entries in both the client and pod pdoms updated to reflect the change in permissions. The hardware page tables and TLB would not need updating however, because as both the stack permissions and current pdom have changed together the effective access rights remain unmodified – the pdom updates are needed in case the pod is preempted and later resumed.

The `ntsc_call_pod()` system call does not switch stacks, but instead uses the caller's stack while running inside a pod. The stack access rights are unmodified. This is safe because since activations are disabled no other thread can read or write the stack if the pod is preempted. The scheme has the twin merits of being simple and fast.

In any case, a paranoid pod can manually perform a stack switch as its first action, since the binding state passed in by the kernel can contain a pointer to a pre-prepared stack. If the kernel were to always switch stacks, a pod would no longer have the choice of whether to run on the same stack as its caller or

not. Instead, Expert allows a range of security policies to be used depending on how trusted the code running on a particular system is.

One remaining concern is that the pod could exhaust the available stack space. A malicious client could use this to force the pod to take an unexpected memory fault, which could compromise the security of the system. While this kind of attack is not expected (given that the memory protection in Expert is mainly a debugging and system partitioning tool rather than a security device), it can be protected against by having pods check the stack pointer on entry and return immediately if there is insufficient stack space remaining.

## **Pervasives**

Both Nemesis and Expert keep a per-thread list of pointers to commonly used (i.e. pervasive) objects. This pervasives record includes pointers to the current threads package, an events package for synchronisation, a default heap allocator, a virtual processor interface, standard input, output and error I/O streams, and various library entry points (e.g. for libc).

These objects form part of the processing environment of a thread, and must be vetted when a thread tunnels into a pod. For example, if a pod calls `printf()` then this will ultimately translate into method calls on the standard output object in the pervasives record. Should the pod fail to override this object, then it risks losing control to untrusted user code. A similar situation arises for all the other members of the pervasives record.

Therefore, one of the first things a pod should do is to change the current pervasives to point to its own, trusted set. Typically, this will include known-good I/O streams for diagnostic output, a trusted events package, and a private heap manager.

How much is shared with the untrusted caller application is up to the pod. For example if the pod wishes to also allocate state in the caller's heap then the caller and the pod must agree on the format of the heap's state record. The pod can then create its own trusted heap manager using system-wide library code and the state pointer for the untrusted client heap. This is feasible because paths are encouraged to use the system-wide libraries, so allowing interoperability with pods. The disadvantage is that paths have less flexibility over the implementation of their data structures if they are forced to use standard libraries. This is another reason why paths are kept separate from tasks: paths



run in a stricter and less flexible environment, and benefit by being able to cross protection boundaries efficiently.


The same issues surrounding shared heaps also apply to sharing event count and sequencer primitives. In this case, the motivation is to allow a multi-threaded task or path the ability to run single threaded while within a pod. The pod creates at bind time a minimal events package which understands the standard layout of a system-provided events package, but blocks the entire task (or path) rather than yielding to another thread should the current thread of execution block. This is needed to allow multi-threaded tasks to call pods, but causes the task to lose control over the scheduling of its threads once one of them tunnels into a pod. As previously discussed in Section 5.3.3, this is useful for the initialisation and configuring of pods, but otherwise tasks are not expected to make frequent calls to pods; single-threaded paths are more suited to making frequent pod calls.

While the overhead involved in scrubbing the runtime environment on each call might seem high, the new pervasives records can be prepared at the bind stage, so that a single memory write is all which is required to enable it while processing a call. Incidentally, such scrubbing would be needed in any system supporting tunnelling; by making it explicit Expert gives the pod control over how much of the client it wishes to trust, allowing the security policy to range from fully trusting the client pervasives (insecure), to building a complete set of fresh pervasives from scratch (secure).

#### **5.3.4 Pod I/O channels**

The movement of packetised data is expected to be a major feature of applications running on a NEOS. This section describes how pod calls can be used to transfer such data between a client protection domain and a pod. This is useful for three reasons:

1. Pods are most likely to be on the data path, and in a NEOS this means the packet processing path. It is also desirable to link pods together via I/O interfaces to form packet processing chains.
2. A uniform I/O API can be used, regardless of whether the packet data is carried between two tasks using an I/O channel or within a path via pod calls.



**Figure 5.3: Pod I/O scenarios.**

3. The I/O API allows multiple packets to be batched together before flushing them further down the pipeline, which amortises the cost of switching protection domain. While cost of `ntsc_call_pod()` is far lower than using a full I/O channel,<sup>7</sup> the costs are large enough to be worth spreading over multiple packets.

The two basic scenarios when a path may want to call a pod to process packets are shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3(a) shows the “pod on a stick” scenario: here the data flow is from the path, through the pod, then back to the same path’s protection domain for further processing. Figure 5.3(b) shows the “pod consumer” scenario: in this case data flows from the path’s protection domain and is disposed of by one or more pod(s). The pod is responsible for handing the data on to another pod, or ultimately to the network device driver in the kernel for transmission.

An example of the “pod on a stick” scenario would be a shared packet cache. A concrete example of this might occur in a network-based personal video recorder implementation, where each connected client (or class of client) is serviced by a dedicated path. The shared cache would store a moving window of recently streamed video packets so that any of the per-client paths can seek backwards in the stream, without each needing to keep a private cache. To ensure paths see a consistent cache state it would be implemented as a pod, and paths call the pod to write new data to it or read from it. Perhaps some paths represent users who have paid for certain video streams, and so other paths

<sup>7</sup>see Table 5.1


should not be able to read packets from those streams from the cache. To enforce this, the cache would need its own protection domain. If the cached data does not need to be segregated then the paths could use lock-free algorithms to access the cached data and so avoid the need to call a pod.

The second of these scenarios matches the structure of a layered network stack: each layer performs its processing, then hands the packet on to the layer below it for further processing. For example, if the lower layers of a protocol stack need to be trusted, then they could be implemented as a pod which paths tunnel into to transmit data. The ring-like manner in which recursive pod calls encapsulate each other (while mainly a performance trade-off) is suitable for a system where successively lower layers of a protocol stack are more trusted than those above them; this is a typical arrangement in many kernel-based systems, where the user-kernel boundary induces a coarse-grained two-level trust boundary between untrusted protocols implemented in user-space (e.g. HTTP), and trusted implementations residing within the kernel (e.g. TCP).

## **Implementation**

The implementation of pod I/O channels in Expert is inspired by I/O channels in Nemesis, and similarly has two FIFOs which are used to exchange `iorecs` describing buffers within a pre-negotiated data area. However the implementation can be more efficient for two reasons. Firstly, because of the single-threaded nature of paths these pod I/O channels will never be accessed concurrently. This means concurrency controls can be dispensed with, leading to a more efficient implementation. Secondly, the client remains in control of the batching behaviour by explicitly calling `IO$Flush()` when it is prepared to push data further along the processing path. The `IO$Flush()` method performs an `ntsc_call_pod()` to transfer control to the pod to allow it to drain queued packets from the I/O channel. Section 5.4.2 presents results showing how the batch size can affect the performance of a pod I/O channel by an order of magnitude, so being able to control it to trade latency against efficiency is crucial.

The relaxed concurrency requirements means simple integers are used to control access to the FIFOs – full inter-domain event counts are not needed. Each FIFO has two counters associated with it: one which records how many packets have been inserted into the FIFO (the write counter), and one which records how many have been read (the read counter). They are used to determine



**Figure 5.4: FIFO and counter ownership in a pod I/O channel.**

whether there is data to be read or space for writing, and if so, which FIFO slot should be read or written next. Their purpose is identical to the inter-domain event counts used to implement Nemesis I/O channels.

The difference is that Expert merges the implementations of the two FIFOs. This is possible because they are always used in pairs, and the FIFOs share the same memory access requirements as the counters. For both FIFOs each counter is writable by either the producer or the consumer, but not both. Figure 5.4 shows which FIFOs and counters are owned (i.e. writable) by the producer (client) and consumer (pod): the outbound FIFO needs to be writable by the producer, along with its write counter `owr`. The read counter for the outbound FIFO `ord` needs to be read-only by the producer, since it is updated by the consumer. The return FIFO needs the mirror image of these rights: the FIFO should be writable by the consumer, with its write counter `rwr` writable by the consumer but read-only to the producer. The read counter `ord` should be read-only to the consumer, and writable by the producer.

By gathering the client-writable FIFO and the two client-writable counters into a single block of memory, Expert ensures that all have the same access rights, and all are close together to ensure they are cache-efficient. Similarly, the pod-writable FIFO and the other two pod-writable counters are gathered together into another “split-FIFO”. These two split-FIFOs are only usable as a pair, but this is their intended purpose. By contrast, Nemesis I/O channels implement each FIFO using event counts, which take longer to increment or test than the single memory words used as counters by Expert.

In order to create such a pod-based I/O channel, the pod allocates a data area on the client's heap (so that both the client and the pod have write access to it). The pod then allocates its split-FIFO on a heap which the client has only read access to. The pod retains write access to the return split-FIFO and the associated counters. Finally it allocates the client's split-FIFO on the client's own heap, so the client may write to it. The pod returns a descriptor containing: pointers to the data area and the two split-FIFOs; the binding id and method number to be used to flush data onwards; and the FIFO depth. From this descriptor, the client then creates an instance of the I/O interface. The pod does the same, but swaps the split-FIFOs over in its copy of the descriptor, thus ensuring it reads what the client writes and vice versa.

Note that because the pod is granted a superset of the client's access rights to memory, the pod has write access to the client's split-FIFO. This is unimportant, since the client is already assumed to trust the pod.

## 5.4 Results

### 5.4.1 Micro-benchmarks

Micro-benchmarking is concerned with measuring the performance of individual small components of a system, leading to the (fallacious) assumption that knowing the performance characteristics of the components allow some measure of the complete system behaviour to be deduced. This is not the case for a number of reasons [Bershad92]:

- Measuring an operation in isolation does not accurately reflect its performance when used as part of a real system, as it does not consider cache effects.
- Micro-benchmarks give no indication of how often a benchmarked operation is performed. Amdahl's Law says that:

$$Speedup_{overall} = \frac{1}{(1 - Fraction_{enhanced}) + \frac{Fraction_{enhanced}}{Speedup_{enhanced}}}$$

This means that unless the operation being benchmarked occurs frequently (i.e.  $Fraction_{enhanced}$  is large), its cost is mostly irrelevant.

- The results are impossible to compare, both across time (wait another

OS	proc call	system call	CALLPRIV	pod call	IPC
Linux (hot)	7	340	n/a	n/a	3500
Linux (cold)	44	760	n/a	n/a	9100
Expert (hot)	7	280	260	2900	19000
Expert (cold)	44	460	390	5000	21000

**Table 5.1: Cycles taken for different calls with hot and cold caches.**

18 months and performance will double), and across architectures (what takes 20 cycles on a CISC CPU may take 30 cycles on a RISC CPU).

Despite these obvious pitfalls, micro-benchmarks can be used to give a rough idea of the cost of various primitives. This section presents micro-benchmark results comparing the cost of various protection switching schemes under Linux 2.2.16 and Expert. A proper evaluation of a moderately complex system built using the primitives presented here is discussed in the next chapter.

As in previous experiments, `fox` is used as the test platform. It is an Intel Pentium Pro running at 200MHz, with 32MB RAM, 256KB L2 and a split L1 cache: 8KB I/8KB D.

Table 5.1 shows how many cycles it takes to execute a variety of different types of call. The cache hot number is given first, then the cold cache. The cold cache number is more meaningful, since calls which span protection domains are likely to be made infrequently and thus without already being in the cache.

The tests are as follows: “proc call” is a C-level procedure call to a function which takes no arguments and returns no value. The “system call” is `getpid()` on Linux, and `ntsc_send()` on Expert (a comparable minimal system call, since getting the current process ID does not require a kernel trap). The “CALLPRIV” test is a trap to kernel, null procedure call, then return back to user-space. The “pod call” is a switch from the untrusted client protection domain to a pod environment with scrubbed pervasives, and back again. The “IPC” test sends 4 bytes to another protection domain, and waits for a 4 byte response. It does this using pipes under Linux, and a full event-count I/O channel under Expert.

For hot cache experiments, the result quoted is the average of 100,000 calls. The cold cache results are an exponentially weighted moving average of 40 calls, with activity in between each timed call to ensure the cache is filled

with unrelated code and data. For Linux, this consists of forking two `cat` processes and blocking for one second; the `cat` processes pull data through the data cache, and because they are run as part of a shell script, much code is executed thus clearing the instruction cache. For Expert, the caches are cleared by listing a large traded namespace and blocking for one second. The results from the procedure call experiments were used as a sanity check to verify that the results matched across Linux and Expert.

Unsurprisingly, a procedure call takes the same amount of time on both operating systems. A system call is marginally faster on Expert, but full IPC is much slower. One possible reason for such slow IPC on Expert is that I/O channels offer a richer feature set, including using scatter-gather lists, blocking with timeouts, and preserving message boundaries, none of which were used with pipes under Linux.

More interestingly, the table shows that an Expert pod call is between 17% and 45% faster than IPC on Linux. It also has better cache behaviour than IPC on Linux, as can be seen from the cold cache numbers. If the pod trapped into is configured to switch to a private stack, the cost rises to 4100/6300 cycles for warm and cold caches respectively. Instrumenting the protection fault handler shows that this extra cost arises because twice as many faults are taken when the stack needs to be switched.

In summary, I/O using IPC on Expert is 85% slower than I/O using pods. The next section presents further evidence for this.

## 5.4.2 Pod I/O performance

This section profiles the performance of the pod I/O channel mechanism which is constructed over the basic `ntsc_call_pod()` system call.

In these experiments, `fox` is again the machine under test. A test client is run which establishes a pod I/O channel to a pod in another protection domain. The client sends 100,000 sequence-numbered packets to the pod, which verifies each sequence number before returning the packets unmodified back to the client. The client measures the number of cycles taken to transfer and retrieve all 100,000 packets, and divides to get an average number of cycles expended per packet. These are the quoted results in each case. The client is written to queue as many packets as possible before flushing them.

In all cases, the cache will be hot since the I/O operations are performed in a tight loop. This is reasonable because it reflects how the API is used in real applications: typically, they repeatedly call `GetPkt()`, process the data, then call `PutPkt()` to pass it on. Once an I/O channel fills, the application calls `IO$Flush()` thus yielding to allow the next stage on the path to enter its processing loop.

### **Comparison against other I/O schemes**

With a 32 packet deep pod I/O channel, Expert takes 580 cycles per packet. By comparison, a Nemesis I/O channel of the same depth between two protection domains and running the same I/O benchmark takes 6900 cycles per packet.


Linux running a port of the I/O API using two pipes (one for each direction), and the `readv()` and `writev()` system calls for scatter/gather I/O takes 7300 cycles per packet, however with Linux it is impossible to control the batching so it may well context switch for each packet. A Linux implementation using SysV shared memory regions may improve the performance by allowing better control over the synchronisation of the producer and consumer process, as well as removing copying overheads. However, note that in all tests the packets were only four bytes long (the sequence number), so copy-related overheads are minimal thus minimising any pipe-related penalty Linux might incur. Nemesis and Expert pod I/O channels are both zero-copy, so the payload size is not a factor.

### **Effect of batch size**

To discover how much of an effect the batch size has, I repeated the Expert pod I/O experiment with a range of I/O channel depths ranging from one packet (i.e. no queueing) to 512 packets. Figure 5.5 shows how many cycles per packet are taken to complete the previous experiment for I/O channel depths increasing in powers of two.

Even when Expert cannot batch because the channel depth is limited to one packet, at 5500 cycles Expert's pod I/O channels are still faster than both Nemesis with 32-deep channels and Linux. It can also be seen that at a depth of 32 packets, most of the efficiency gains have been achieved, and deeper channels will merely increase latency and waste memory.





**Figure 5.5: Pod I/O depth vs. cost.**

## 5.5 Summary

This chapter has argued that allowing threads to tunnel between protection domains is useful for a variety of reasons. By using only one resource principal across multiple protection domains, resource allocation and scheduling is simplified. Switching between tasks requires a scheduler pass which can be avoided by tunnelling, allowing finer-grained de-composition of system functions.

Expert allows the application programmer a very wide variety of ways of managing code and threads. Tasks are used for traditional batch-mode processing where little I/O is required, for example system services. Paths have a more restrictive run-time environment but benefit from being able to make calls into protected modules (pods). Tasks are used to implement and call active servers, paths tunnel into passive pods.

Pods use an explicit binding phase to perform vetting and to setup any per-path state needed. The kernel makes it easy for a pod to access this per-path state by passing it as a parameter to all pod calls. Pods are more privileged than their callers: these concentric rings of protection map naturally onto protocol stacks,

and allow efficient tunnelling. Pods can choose their security policy: if a pod trusts its client, it may use the client's environment without limit as if it were the client. If not, it may replace its inherited environment with a secure one, including the option of performing a stack switch.

Pods can be considered a generalised form of SysV STREAMS [Sun95], where there is no restriction on the interface offered by a pod. Thus, pods may be used to implement stackable components, such as STREAMS modules or protocol boosters [Feldmeier98].

Packet I/O to pods is implemented behind the same API as packet I/O to tasks, bringing the same benefits: explicit control over batching, scatter/gather, and bind-time checks allowing an uncluttered fast-path.

While the performance of the `ntsc_call_pod()` system call and the pod I/O transport built using it is impressive, the application design flexibility enabled by pods remains their *raison d'être*. The next chapter presents the design of a complex streaming system supporting different levels of service which is nevertheless simple to implement by using pods as an integral part of its design.

## Chapter 6

# System evaluation


This chapter presents an extended example which demonstrates how Expert's network driver model together with paths allow the CPU and memory resources used to be scheduled and accounted. This is so that when overloaded the system may shed load gracefully, thus degrading the externally observed quality of service in a controlled manner.

A streaming media transcoder is used as the example application run over Expert. The following section motivates the example, and further describes the application's requirements. The next section describes how Expert's features are used to implement the application. The final section presents a macroscopic performance evaluation, and compares an implementation making full use of Expert's features against a single-task implementation.

### 6.1 Motivation

A new radio station, *Rock Ireland*, wishes to make its broadcasts available via the Internet so as to reach a sizeable expatriate community. However, *Rock Ireland* also needs to recoup the costs of its Internet operation, so it decides to charge listeners for access to the streaming broadcast. To encourage new listeners, *Rock Ireland* wants to provide a low-quality stream for free.

The radio station produces its output as a 44.1KHz stereo 192Kb/s stream of MPEG-1 Layer III audio (MP3) [Pan93]. The subject of this example is a media transcoder used to convert this source stream into three quality tiers: gold (the unmodified stream, which is full-price), silver (44.1KHz stereo, 128Kb/s, at a



**Figure 6.1: Proposed location of transcoders within the network.**

slightly cheaper price) and bronze (11KHz stereo, 32Kb/s, available for free).

Figure 6.1 shows how transcoders can be positioned towards the edge of the network, moderately close to the clients they serve, thus minimising the traffic crossing the core.

This extended example describes the design and implementation of such a transcoder, and shows how Expert's combination of paths and tasks allows precise control over the scheduling and protection of the various components which form the transcoder application. Control over resource scheduling allows the transcoder to degrade the level of service experienced by non-paying customers to ensure that paying customers are served promptly, allowing the system to satisfy more paying clients. The fine-grained protection offered by Expert should also increase the robustness of the system, although no empirical evidence is offered for this.

An implementation taking full advantage of Expert's features is compared to an implementation with no memory protection using a task with threads. This allows the overhead of fine-grained memory protection to be quantified, as well as clearly demonstrating the need for proper scheduling to segregate the CPU requirements of the individual streams when overloaded. Such a task-based implementation strategy might be a suitable way of porting the application to an OS lacking paths.

### 6.1.1 Requirements

**Isolation.** Since some listeners pay money to listen to the streams, such streams should be flawless and uninterrupted. The listeners who have paid nothing must make do with whatever spare capacity is available in the system.<sup>1</sup> Thus the gold, silver and bronze tiers are not only media quality metrics, but should also reflect the OS resources needed while processing streams of these tiers to ensure that streams from higher tiers are processed in a timely manner without loss.

This does not establish a route through the network with a guaranteed quality of service, but it is assumed that the bottleneck resource in this case is the CPU in the transcoder, not the network: the maximum bandwidth emitted is 2.8Mb/s. However, should network resources also need to be reserved, Expert's path mechanism provides a natural entity to which such a bandwidth reservation might be allocated. Alternatively, if the expected competition in the network is purely local due to other traffic flows through the transcoder, then the network driver's transmit scheduler could be used to rate-limit some flows in order to preserve capacity for others.

**Per-client customisation.** To stop non-paying clients from snooping on the streams which are paid for, gold and silver streams should be encrypted with a per-client key. While this cannot stop a client from re-broadcasting a paid-for stream, it foils freeloaders between the transcoder and the client. Some kind of fingerprinting or digital watermarking scheme may also be a requirement. However, note that digital watermarks may be erased, so they do not provide a robust way of preventing re-broadcasting; using them may be required to meet some contractual obligation.


Per-client audio splicing may be done, for example to target adverts, offer different disc-jockey "personæ", or provide personalised news and weather.

The salient point is that there is a requirement to perform client-specific non-trivial processing on streams which are paid for, be it encryption, watermarking or some other customisation. In this example, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is used as the processing performed [FIPS-197].

**Protection.** The principle of minimum privilege should be applied when de-

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<sup>1</sup>Of course, an unscrupulous radio station may wish to deliberately downgrade the quality of the bronze stream to provide an incentive for listeners to pay for the higher quality streams.



**Figure 6.2: Data flow through the transcoder. See text for description.**

signing the application: individual components should only be given access to the minimum areas of memory they need to perform their functions. This reduces the probability of accidental or malicious damage, whether caused by programmer error, or Trojan code. For example, the encryption keys should only be readable by the encryption modules, so that key material cannot be leaked from the system. Also, it may be the case that externally-provided media codecs are used, in which case they might not be trusted as much as code written in-house.

The transcoder architecture described in the next section uses Expert's paths to meet these three requirement. In order to discover their cost and benefit, a comparison is made with an implementation using a single task, thus foregoing the desirable isolation and protection properties described above.

## 6.2 Architecture and implementation

Figure 6.2 shows how packets flow through the transcoder. Arrows depict data movement and rate; thicker arrows correspond to higher data rates. The modules implementing the basic functionality are shown in rounded rectangles: DEC is an MP3 decoder instance, each ENC is an MP3 encoder instance, and each AES is an instance of an encryption module together with its key mate-

rial. The rectangles represent the paths in this system: the common-rx path handles network receive, decoding, and encoding; the gold paths perform encryption and transmission, one per gold stream; the silver paths do the same for each silver stream; and the bronze path encodes and transmits one or more bronze streams. Note that there is a one-to-one mapping between gold and silver streams and their associated paths, whereas there is a single bronze path to handle all bronze streams; this diagram shows three streams at each tier. Using a path per stream allows independent scheduler control over each of the paid-for streams to meet the isolation requirement, and provides memory protection. Since bronze streams have no special scheduling needs, they can all be handled by a single path.


The common-rx path decodes MP3 to PCM (Pulse Code Modulation) samples then encodes back to MP3 again rather than operating directly in the Fourier domain (which should be more efficient) for simplicity of implementation.<sup>2</sup> The common-rx processing is given its own path because it performs work which is needed by the other paths: if it does not make adequate progress, then no other path will. Therefore, making common-rx a separate path allows its scheduler settings to be appropriately tuned to ensure it is run frequently enough.

Figure 6.2 also shows how other paths interact with the common-rx path via its three caches: the 192, PCM, and 128 caches. The caches hold the received 192Kb/s MP3 frames (192 cache), the result of decoding them into PCM samples (PCM cache), and the result of re-encoding them to 128Kb/s MP3 (128 cache). Each cache is a ring buffer which allows multiple paths to make read accesses concurrently with write accesses from the common-rx path.

To mediate these concurrent accesses, the caches are implemented as protected modules (pods) into which paths may tunnel to insert (common-rx) or read (all other paths) buffers containing either MP3 frames or PCM samples, depending on the cache in question. These pods are shown by dotted rectangles in the diagram. The state for the AES modules is held within pods to protect their key material from the application logic and network stack also running within the path.

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<sup>2</sup>Source code for both MP3 encoders and decoders is widely available, but Fourier domain transcoders are less prevalent.



**Figure 6.3: Cache data structure. Larger numbers indicate newer entries.**

### 6.2.1 Caches

The caches perform several functions. They decouple the common-rx path from its clients, while making available the last few packets processed to absorb jitter in the system. They allow the controlled “spying” of intermediate packets in the common-rx decode pipeline, without requiring readers to receive every packet. Ensuring all readers receive all packets would limit the pipeline to proceeding at the rate of the slowest reader. This would let paths with small CPU guarantees rate-limit paths with larger guarantees: a classic example of priority inversion.

Caches maintain a read pointer for each reader, and a current write pointer; Figure 6.3 shows this arrangement. The read pointer may not overtake the write pointer – attempting a read when there is no data available blocks the reader. However, the read pointer may fall so far behind that it is no longer within the range of the cache. Readers in this situation have their read pointer set to the oldest valid contents of the cache, and are notified of how many entries have been skipped over. Writers always write to the write pointer, and because readers may be left behind, writers need never block.

There are a constant number of buffers in the cache (five in these experiments), allowing readers to view a fixed amount of history (around 130ms, given 5 MP3 frames of 627 bytes each, arriving at 192Kb/s). Inserting a new buffer into the cache returns the oldest buffer, which has been evicted. Rather than storing buffers inline in the cache,  $(base, length)$  pairs reference externally allocated buffers; this delegates the allocation of buffers and their permissions to the writer. This implies that if the cache read operation returned such pairs to the caller, the buffer referenced must not be overwritten until the client has finished using the reference. This violates the design goal of not blocking the



writer, so instead the cache read operation copies the contents of the referenced buffer into a fresh location provided by the caller.

The cache insert and read algorithms are implemented in a pod for a number of reasons. Concurrency control is simplified by providing a central location where a lock can be taken out. From a CPU scheduling perspective, the cost of performing the copy on reading a buffer is accounted to the reader. Also, because pods are explicitly bound to by clients, the per-client binding can include the client's read pointer, speeding access to it.

An alternative implementation would be to place the cache control data structures in a stretch of memory to which all clients have read/write access, and use lock-free algorithms to manage concurrent updates to the cache. This would be an interesting approach; the cache behaviour is complex enough to provide some entertainment designing such an algorithm, however, all clients would need to fully trust each other's cache update algorithms. This is the approach's Achilles' heel: one poorly coded cache client would affect the stability of all the cache clients.

## 6.2.2 Buffer allocation and usage

At initialisation time, the common-rx path allocates, binds to, and exports the three caches. It stocks them with their initial buffers, allocating them writable by itself, but with no access to the other paths.

The 192 cache is somewhat special: its buffers come from the network stack. The common-rx path strives to keep three-quarters of the available networking buffers in the driver ready to be received into, but enters the remaining buffers in the 192 cache to make them visible to gold paths. On packet arrival, common-rx inserts it into the 192 cache, evicting the oldest buffer; this buffer is handed back to the device driver to be received into, maintaining the 3:1 split between network driver and cache.

Eviction is used in a similar manner all the way along the decode-encode pipeline. For example, the result of decoding is placed into a pre-prepared buffer and inserted into the PCM cache, returning an evicted buffer which is noted for decoding into next time around. The same technique is used with the result of the encoder and the 128 cache.

Because of the nature of the MP3 format, several MP3 frames are needed before

any PCM samples are produced. The encoder is similarly bursty, accepting multiple buffers of samples before producing the next MP3 frame. This is dealt with by pushing the data (MP3 frame or samples) only as far down the pipeline as it will go while still generating output, and relying on a continual stream of incoming frames to drive the whole pipeline forwards. This eliminates the need to have threads shuffling output from one stage to the next: the pipeline is driven entirely by network packet arrival events.

### 6.2.3 Alternative architectures

Having described the path-based architecture above, this section describes two alternative architectures, neither of which use paths. The first alternative presented shows how the previously stated requirements can be met using just tasks, but argues that it would be inefficient. The second alternative shows how an efficient task-based implementation is possible if the requirements for protection and isolation are relaxed.

While it would be possible to implement the application purely using paths (for example for use on Scout or Escort), the path-based version on Expert uses separately scheduled tasks to implement system services such as the binder and namespace trader, the serial console driver, the ps2 keyboard driver, Ethernet card initialisation and media detection, network connection setup and teardown, and an interactive shell from which the system may be configured and new paths or tasks started. By scheduling these components separately as tasks, their impact on the transcoder application is bounded. In Scout, such tasks would either reside in the kernel, or be forced into a path model which does not closely match their use.

#### **Task-based**

The simplest way of implementing the presented path-based architecture on systems which do not allow tunnelling would be to use a task everywhere the architecture calls for a path. When gold, silver and bronze tasks need to read data from the common-rx task, this must be via one of the standard IPC mechanisms. In this case, using an I/O channel would be most appropriate since the buffer could be passed between the protection domains without needing to be marshaled. Note that the copy out of the cache would still be required to enable the cache writer to remain non-blocking, but a further copy to marshal between

protection domains would be avoided by using an I/O channel.

This design retains the advantages of the path-based architecture: the common-rx, gold, silver, and bronze components are separately scheduled, and so may be given appropriate guarantees; and the separate tasks ensure that processing occurs in distinct protection domains. It is not possible to protect the AES key material as tightly as in the path architecture, and in the common-rx task the cache data structures are not protected from the decoder and encoder, but aside from these minor differences, the task-based architecture is functionally identical to the path-based one.

However, since the measurements in Section 5.4.2 show that using I/O channels is approximately a factor of ten slower than tunnelling into a pod, this architecture would be quite inefficient.

### **All-in-one**

The all-in-one architecture avoids the performance problem with the task-based architecture by using a single task containing a user-level thread for each path in the original design. The common-rx, gold, silver and bronze threads all run within a single protection domain. The task containing these threads is given a CPU guarantee, but the individual threads are scheduled by a round-robin user level scheduler and so have no guarantees.


This arrangement means that there is no memory protection between the encoder, decoder and AES components. Because the thread scheduler is round-robin, there is no possibility of isolating the more important common-rx, gold and silver threads from the bronze thread. This could be achieved by replacing the thread scheduler with one implementing a more sophisticated algorithm. This is not done in the all-in-one architecture in order to allow a comparison between a system providing proper isolation (the path-based one) with one which does not (the all-in-one design).

Synchronisation between the various threads is done by an implementation of the cache using a mutex to protect the cache data structures and a condition variable to allow readers to block and later be woken by inserts. Locking is still required between the writer and the reader threads since the readers must see a consistent view of the cache control data structures.

Other than this change in cache synchronisation primitives, the implementation

Architecture	implemented?	protection?	isolation?
path-based	✓	✓	✓
task-based	✗	✓	✓
all-in-one	✓	✗	✗

**Table 6.1: Architecture summary.**



**Figure 6.4: Experimental set-up.**

of the all-in-one architecture is identical to the path-based implementation, using threads rather than paths, naturally.

Table 6.1 summarises for each of the discussed architectures whether it has been implemented, whether it provides memory protection between the application’s components, and whether it provides quality of service isolation between streams.

### 6.3 Results

This section describes two experiments. The first experiment quantifies the cost of using paths to achieve proper protection between the components in the transcoder, by comparing the amount of CPU time needed to achieve loss-free operation both in the path-based and the all-in-one implementations. The second experiment quantifies the benefit which scheduling provides, by monitoring the transmission rates of the produced streams for both the path-based and all-in-one implementations.

Figure 6.4 shows the experimental set-up. In both experiments, hornet (a Pentium II 300MHz running Linux) is used as the “radio station” source, sending a stream composed of 192 Kb/s MP3 frames. The frame size is variable, but is typically around 627 bytes. Each frame is encapsulated in a UDP packet and

sent to `fox`. The stream lasts around 146 seconds, and is paced to deliver it in real-time. `fox` is the machine under test, and runs either the path-based or the all-in-one implementation of the transcoder under `Expert`. It derives a number of output streams from the input and sends them to `snapper` (running Linux), which discards them. `Snapper` also runs `tcpdump` to calculate the bitrates achieved by each stream from `fox`.

### 6.3.1 Cost of protection


In this experiment, `fox` runs the transcoder application on an otherwise unloaded system, and grants the application as much CPU time as it desires: no CPU limit is in place. The amount of CPU time actually consumed is recorded by the scheduler as a fraction of the total cycles available to it.

The transcoder application is initially configured to serve one gold, one bronze and one silver stream. The experiment consists of measuring the CPU time requirement for both the path-based and the all-in-one designs as additional silver streams are added. When loss begins to occur because the transcoder application would need more CPU time than is available, no more silver streams are added and the experiment for that architecture is over.

Figure 6.5 shows the measured CPU time required for loss-free operation of the transcoder. The “path-based” line shows the cost for the path-based architecture; the other line shows the cost for the all-in-one architecture. The path-based version is, as expected, more expensive. Adding protection and proper scheduling costs between 2% and 5% more than doing without, and the slightly larger gradient indicates a higher per-stream overhead in the path-based architecture than in the all-in-one case.

The authors of `Escort` noted an increase in CPU requirements of between 200 and 400 percent when adding memory protection to `Scout` [Spatscheck99, Section 6]. In their case, this large performance gap may be explained by the fact that `Scout` runs without protection, entirely in the CPU’s supervisor mode; by comparison, the all-in-one design runs within one user protection domain with occasional traps to supervisor mode to perform network I/O. The architectural difference between `Scout` and `Escort` is thus much greater than the difference between the all-in-one and the path-based designs: all-in-one and `Scout` are not analogous systems.

Table 6.2 shows the fraction of total CPU time spent in each path for a path-



**Figure 6.5: CPU time required to service one gold, one bronze, and a varying number of silver streams.**

Path	CPU needed (%)	Proportion (%)
common-rx	40.3	45.0
gold	1.6	1.7
silver	1.2	1.2
bronze	46.3	51.8
Total	89.4	100.0

**Table 6.2: CPU requirements by path. Totals may not add up due to rounding.**

based transcoder configured with one each of the gold, silver and bronze streams. The CPU requirement is given both as a fraction of all the cycles available on the machine, and as a proportion of those spent in the transcoder. The remaining cycles not spent in the transcoder are expended on other system tasks and in the idle loop, neither of which are recorded in the table above.

The most expensive component in the architecture is the MP3 encoder, which accounts for the majority of time spent in common-rx and bronze. One possible reason for this is that when sample rate conversion is performed, the samples

must be copied and smoothed to avoid aliasing, and this greatly increases the CPU cost. It was originally envisaged that the silver streams would be 56Kb/s at 22KHz, however preliminary work showed that the sample rate conversion from 44.1KHz down to 22KHz required too much CPU time to fit the proposed experiment on the test machine; transcoding from 44.1KHz at 192Kb/s to 44.1KHz at 128Kb/s requires no sample rate conversion and is thus cheap enough for the experiment to be viable.


A similar breakdown of costs for the all-in-one design is not available, because the CPU usage of the individual threads is not visible to the system-wide scheduler and so went unrecorded. The total for all threads was recorded, and came to 86.7% of the machine.

Because all-in-one is more efficient, it can serve about half as many more silver streams for the same CPU budget. However, the next experiment shows that once this limit is exceeded, i.e. when the system becomes overloaded, all-in-one cannot discriminate between its clients and all streams begin to suffer loss. A more efficient implementation such as all-in-more merely delays the point at which overload is reached.

### **6.3.2 Benefits of isolation**

In order to correctly handle overload situations, clients belonging to separate resource tiers must be distinguished, and their effects isolated from each other. This can be done by exposing the clients as first-class scheduling entities (paths in this case), and running them with an appropriate quality of service.

In this experiment, `fox` services five gold streams, one bronze stream, and an increasing number of silver streams. The path-based version is configured to give the common-rx path a 45% share of CPU, the gold and silver paths get 2%, and the bronze path is allocated 15%. All of these shares of CPU time are allocated over a 100ms time period, and all paths are allowed to use any slack time in the system. These guarantees are sufficient to meet the CPU needs for the common-rx, gold and silver paths, but the bronze path ideally needs approximately 46%. This means that the bronze path will mostly be running on slack time in the system, i.e. as the number of silver paths increase, the CPU available to the bronze client will diminish. In this manner, the transcoder's administrator has expressed the policy that the bronze path's performance is unimportant compared to the common-rx, gold and silver paths.



**Figure 6.6: Achieved bitrates for gold, silver, and bronze streams with and without isolation.**

For the all-in-one version of the transcoder, the task is allocated 85ms/100ms which allows it to monopolise almost all the machine’s resources. It is also allowed the use of slack time in the system.

The produced streams are captured by `snapper` which calculates the average bandwidth achieved by an average gold and silver stream, and the average bandwidth of the single bronze stream, over the whole experiment. In a loss-less transcoder, the gold streams should average 192Kb/s, the silver streams 128Kb/s, and the bronze stream 32Kb/s.

Figure 6.6 shows these average bandwidths for the all-in-one case and the path-based case. Ideally, all the lines should be horizontal and co-incident, which would indicate that regardless of offered load, the streams continue uninterrupted. However, it is clear to see that the gold and silver streams without isolation (i.e. the all-in-one design) suffer large amounts of loss as the load increases. In comparison, the gold and silver streams with isolation (i.e. the path-based version) continue almost unhindered, all the losses being concentrated on the bronze stream.

Lack of memory on `fox` prevented more silver clients from being run to further



extend the graph. However, once the CPU requirements of both the gold and silver clients together reach a level where stealing cycles from the bronze client is no longer sufficient, the gold and silver streams would begin to experience loss.

Admission control could be used to reject requests to start new streams, thus preventing the system becoming overloaded in the first place. While this is true, the use of admission control is orthogonal to the techniques presented in this dissertation.

To verify that the scheduler was correctly sharing resources between CPU-bound tasks as well as the paths this chapter has focused on, a background task was run during this experiment. It ran in a loop, consuming as much CPU time as the scheduler allocated it, and occasionally printing how much it consumed. It was given a best-effort guarantee only. Despite this task's presence, the paths ran according to their guarantees and were able to produce the results discussed above.

## 6.4 Summary

This chapter used a media transcoder to show how paths can be used in a real application to:

- map resource consumption onto meaningful entities, so that allocations can be easily tuned;
- make efficient accesses to shared data;
- tightly control the visibility of sensitive data such as key material.

A path-based implementation of a media transcoder was compared to one implemented within a single task using multiple threads. While the all-in-one task implementation was 2%-5% more efficient when the system was not heavily loaded, under high load it could not protect the CPU allocations of some media streams by sacrificing the performance of others.

Despite the presence of a CPU-bound task running alongside the paths, the scheduler isolated the processing for the paths making up the transcoder application from the best-effort CPU-bound task.

## Chapter 7

# Conclusion

This dissertation has presented a number of techniques for managing resources in a network element. This chapter summarises the work and its conclusions, and proposes strategies for implementing the core contributions in the context of more mainstream operating systems. Finally, topics for future study are proposed.

### 7.1 Summary

Chapter 2 reviewed prior work establishing the concept of a *path* as a core OS abstraction. Particular attention was drawn to the work on Scout, which advocates using paths to encapsulate the processing performed on flows of packets. The lack of a traditional task-like scheduling class in Scout (and its successor Escort) was discussed, along with a selection of techniques the Scout developers have evolved to deal with this deficiency.

The conclusion drawn was that although paths are attractive when processing packet flows, this is really the only setting when they are useful; tasks remain necessary for system management and other background activities.

Chapter 2 continued by discussing Resource Containers, work motivated by the fundamental mismatch between the original task-based design of operating systems such as Unix, and their use in today's network-centric environment. The solution proposed by Resource Containers is to dissociate the scheduled entity from the process abstraction; effectively creating a path-like entity which is separately scheduled. Threads in a resource container cannot tunnel into

other user-level protection domains however, so their use is limited.

IPC systems specialise in moving control flow and data across protection boundaries in a controlled manner. Chapter 2 went on to describe IPC systems, classifying them into those which block the calling thread and continue the call within a separately scheduled server, and those which tunnel the calling thread directly into the server. The Spring and Mach thread tunnelling systems were described; however both are complicated by the need to handle failures mid-call, and the baroque debugging and signal environment present in Unix.

Vertically structured systems strive to minimise IPC by making applications responsible for the majority of their own processing. Both Nemesis and Exokernels were discussed. Driver support for non-self-selecting network devices was found to be lacking, forcing a separately scheduled device driver onto the data path to demultiplex received packets and to check and schedule outgoing packets.

In summary, current OS designs are poorly adapted to performing I/O-driven processing with quality of service guarantees. Expert is introduced as an OS which offers a hybrid between path- and task-based systems, allowing paths to be used to capture resource usage which is driven by network flows, and tasks to be used for resource usage which is mainly compute-bound.

Chapter 3 provided a brief summary of the Nemesis operating system. Since Expert is largely based on Nemesis, many of the properties of Nemesis also hold true of Expert, (e.g. both are single address space systems). Describing Nemesis also allows a clear separation between the new features which Expert introduces and the pre-existing Nemesis work.

Expert's network device driver model was presented in Chapter 4. The aim was to examine the performance impact of placing the device driver in the kernel (where it enjoys low latency access to its device) compared with a fully scheduled scheme with the device driver as a server in user-space (which minimises crosstalk due to network interrupt processing). While accepting that smart devices capable of being exposed directly to untrusted user applications are desirable, Expert takes a pragmatic approach to dealing with the cheap and widely available range of network devices which are sadly not user-safe. In the same way as cheap controllerless modems are now commonplace, cheap but dumb Ethernet cards look set to become widespread.

Expert's network driver model consists of emulating the low-level API pre-

sented by a user-safe device within the kernel, thereby making dumb hardware easily (although not directly) accessible to untrusted user programs.

The Expert device driver was benchmarked in a number of different configurations against Linux, a widely available Unix implementation. Expert had slightly higher latency than Linux, but Expert survived livelock better, and was able to share out transmit resources fairly. The distribution of time spent with interrupts disabled was measured, giving a lower bound on the scheduling jitter introduced. This showed that Expert's mean was about an order of magnitude larger than Nemesis', however it was 30% lower than Linux's. More importantly, the distribution for Expert had a much shorter tail than for Linux: this implies that the worst-case scheduling jitter introduced in Expert is more tightly bounded than in Linux.

Having dispensed with the need for a shared server to handle the network device, Chapter 5 discussed how tunnelling could be used to further reduce the need for shared servers. Paths in Expert were described, their defining feature being their ability to make calls into protected modules (pods) residing in a different protection domain without losing the CPU.

Micro-benchmarks were run to quantify the cost of various control transfer mechanisms. While tunnelling into a pod is just under ten times more expensive than making a system call, it is 17-45% faster than pipe-based IPC on Linux and almost an order of magnitude faster than Expert I/O channels.

Chapter 6 presented an extended example, showing how paths can be used in a moderately complex application to segment the work into units which can be given meaningful resource guarantees, and thus isolated from each other. Large-scale benchmarks showed the overhead of using paths to achieve fine-grained memory protection cost around 2-5% more CPU time than an implementation optimised for speed using multiple threads within a single task's protection domain. Naturally, the cost will depend on how often tunnelling occurs in the application; these figures apply only to the specific mix of tunnelling and processing in the example application described.

A second experiment showed how effective scheduling of the application's components could isolate the lucrative processing from the effects of best-effort processing, thus allowing more paying streams to be serviced.

## 7.2 Contributions

Expert uses a number of novel concepts:

- **Transmit descriptor re-writing.** This technique mitigates the number of “transmit complete” interrupts generated by devices, dynamically adjusting the interrupt frequency to minimise latency at low loads and maximise throughput at high loads.
- **Transmit scan.** By amortising the cost of entering the kernel to deal with a network interrupt by speculatively reloading the transmit DMA ring, CPU cycles spent crossing the kernel-user boundary are saved. The higher the transmit load, the more is saved. This is an example of emulating a feature of a smart adaptor (in this case the transmit process) within the kernel.
- **Publicly readable system status records.** Kernel-to-user and user-to-kernel communication is made more efficient by publishing information at well-known locations in publicly readable stretches of memory. The only restriction is that synchronisation is not possible with this scheme, meaning that achieving a consistent view of multi-word data is troublesome. While the technique has been used previously (for example in Nemesis’ public information page and DCB) it is a powerful one and deserves to be used more widely. In Expert, it is used to eliminate redundant wakes of the transmit subsystem, and to read packet buffers from the application transmit queues. The closest prior work is in the AFS filesystem, where the `gettimeofday()` system call can be avoided by resolving the address of a private kernel symbol holding the current time, and using `mmap()` to map the page containing it into the AFS process’s address space. This is ugly, and requires the AFS process to be run as a privileged user in order to map kernel memory.
- **Explicit batch-size control.** Protection switch overheads can be amortised by batching up work before making the switch. Expert allows applications direct control over the trade-off between small batches to achieve low latency at a higher cost than large batches which increase latency but improve throughput. Batch size may be controlled in network transmissions and in pod I/O channels by the use of an explicit `Flush()` call. The precise semantics of `Flush()` depend on the kind of I/O channel in use: for pod I/O channels `Flush()` tunnels into the pod to drain

the channel, whereas for I/O channels to the network driver `Flush()` ensures a transmit scan will be run shortly.

- **Lightweight protection switches.** Expert's pod system provides the minimum kernel support needed for thread tunnelling. No marshaling is performed, arguments are not vetted, the pod's runtime environment is not scrubbed, and the stack is not switched. All of these extra features may be added on a per-pod basis depending on the application's requirements. A concentric model of protection is developed, allowing efficient tunnelling into pods, and easing the sharing of information between a pod and its callers. In this manner, Expert provides the basic mechanism for thread tunnelling with few restrictions on application flexibility. The only constraint is the concentric protection scheme; lifting this restriction is left to future work.

These concepts allow network flows to be handled both efficiently and predictably.

By making both tasks and paths scheduled by a single system-wide scheduler, guarantees given to data-driven processing are integrated with those of more traditional compute-bound tasks. Background services such as serial console drivers and shells are implemented as tasks, and thus have bounded impact on the rest of the system. This mix of paths and tasks is unique to Expert: this dissertation has provided evidence to support the thesis that both are useful in systems which strive to isolate data-flow driven processing from background CPU-bound tasks. Such isolation is desirable in order for the system scheduler to remain in control of the machine's resources when overloaded.

The philosophy behind this work has been to address in a pragmatic manner the problem of processing data flows with a commodity workstation to achieve high performance in the face of dumb devices, but without sacrificing quality of service isolation.

### 7.3 Integration with mainstream OSes

It is interesting to speculate how some of the ideas embodied in Expert might be integrated with a mainstream operating system such as Linux.

### 7.3.1 Network driver scheme

There is a large body of research already published on user-space networking in a Unix environment [Thekkath93, Maeda93, Edwards95, Basu95, Black97, Pratt01]. Much of this is still relevant. Where devices have been designed appropriately, they may be exposed directly to user applications. For all other devices, the same split between user-space and kernel processing described in Chapter 4 is valid: the demultiplex must happen in the kernel, allowing the received packets to be directly delivered into an application's socket buffers.

The transmit scan can be implemented by checking all sockets buffers for pending output and speculatively loading them onto the DMA ring as described in Section 4.3.

The BSD sockets API is not amenable to zero-copy operation, since the destination buffer addresses are known too late to be useful. A modified API that exposes the pipelining inherent in any network stack, and thus gives more flexibility over buffer management, would be needed to derive the full performance gains available.

### 7.3.2 Pods on Linux

Pods in Expert fulfil what would be two distinct roles in a multiple address space system such as Linux. With multiple address spaces tunnelling can either be between process address spaces (as in Spring), or within a single process's address space but into a more privileged library (as in the Protected Shared Library scheme [Banerji97]).

The Expert model merges the access rights of the caller and the callee: this would be impossible with cross-address space calls but perfectly feasible if pods are modelled as shared libraries with protected state.

The kernel would need to be modified to add a new system call to perform the protection switch, and the trusted loader would also need to reside in the kernel. An infrastructure for naming and binding to pods would also need to be developed.

Under Unix a process's runtime environment is implicit, unlike the pervasives record in Nemesis and Expert. This makes the job of scrubbing the execution environment somewhat harder. For example, the kernel `call_pod()` routine

should mask all signals, otherwise an application's signal handler could be run with pod privileges. A full list of state held in the kernel and standard library would need to be compiled, to ensure it is preserved across pod calls and not harmful to the correct operation of the pod.

### 7.3.3 Paths on Linux

The benefits of paths come from knowing ahead of time what kind of packets will be received, so allowing customised or specialised handlers to be used. This is likely to arise out of any user-space networking scheme since the kernel will need to fully demultiplex packets as they arrive. Therefore, "paths" on Linux could be implemented by using a user-space network stack along with upcalls simulated by using the POSIX.1b asynchronous I/O API. This would allow a handler function to be directly invoked on packet arrival in user-space.

## 7.4 Future work

This dissertation described how a uni-processor machine with dumb devices might be scheduled to control resource usage in a network element. However, network elements are becoming increasingly complex, now sporting a range of processors of varying powers at a variety of distances from the data path. A future avenue of research might be to investigate how resources in such non-uniform multi-processor systems may be controlled in a unified manner.

Today's devices can readily saturate the interconnects in a modern workstation. In addition to scheduling the system's CPU(s), a NEOS would need to schedule access to the interconnect, be it the buses in a workstation or the switching fabric in a router chassis. Investigating approaches to this remains future work.

Another area of interest might be to see what support an operating system might offer for connection splicing, an increasingly common technique used in load balancers in front of server arrays. By integrating packet classification with the retrieval of application-supplied state, it should be possible to service spliced connections faster.

Small changes to the `ntsc_call_pod()` system call would allow pods to either use the concentric model of protection described in this dissertation, or use a more classic protection switch model: the difference lies in whether the pod's



priority is pushed onto the boost priority stack, or swapped into the top position. Enabling both schemes to co-exist would enable any of the other tunnelling schemes described in the related work chapter to be implemented over this basic primitive.

Once paths are in widespread use within an OS, it becomes easy to write an “ntop” diagnostic tool. In the same way as “top” produces a real-time display of the largest consumers of CPU time, ntop would show a list of the largest streams of data traversing a network element. Network monitoring tools already provide this kind of display, however ntop would also allow the resource guarantees on each stream to be changed interactively, much like changing the priority of a process with top. This could ease the acceptance of new protocols, since network administrators could monitor the traffic levels and easily change scheduling parameters as the need arises. Perhaps more routers would run with IP multicast enabled if the administrator could write a rule that said multicast traffic (and related processing) should take no more than 10% of the router’s resources.

# Appendix A

## Interfaces

This appendix shows the MIDDLE interfaces used in Expert to define the APIs used in manipulating Pods.

### A.1 Pod.if

Pods provide shared code which runs in its own protection domain. Pods are invoked by the `ntsc_call_pod` system call, which needs to be passed a PodID. These PodIDs are indices into the system-wide pod table maintained by this module. Once the loader has finished relocating a new pod, it calls the Register method on this interface to inform the kernel of the existence of a new pod.

```
Pod : LOCAL INTERFACE =  
    NEEDS ProtectionDomain;  
BEGIN
```

```
    ID: TYPE = CARDINAL;
```

Pods are identified by PodIDs, typically small numbers from 0 upwards. They are indices into the kernel's pod table storing pod entry addresses and the pdom they should execute in.

```
    Entry: TYPE = DANGEROUS ADDRESS;
```

Pod's entry point. It is called as a C function with the following prototype:

```
    uint32_t pod_entry (void *binding_state,
```

```

uint32_t method,
void      *arguments);

Register : PROC [ entry : Entry,
                  podid  : ProtectionDomain.ID ]
RETURNS [ ok : BOOLEAN,
          podid : ID ];

```

Returns True for success, in which case podid is valid. Once loaded, a pod is registered with the kernel by called Register. This also assigns it a unique Pod.ID.

```

Init : PROC [ podid : ID,
             name  : STRING,
             args  : DANGEROUS ADDRESS ]
RETURNS [ ok : BOOLEAN ];

```

Initialises podid with args (pod-specific format), and if successful places an OfferP name into the (presumably traded) namespace.

Once registered, a pod is then initialised to get an offer\_state pointer. This together with the Pod.ID returned at the registering stage is used to make a Pod.Offer:

```

Offer : TYPE = RECORD [ podid : ID,
                       offer_state : DANGEROUS ADDRESS ];

OfferP : TYPE = REF Offer;

```

## Pod Initialisation and Binding

Pod initialisation is carried out by the Pod Binder domain. It generates a temporary PodBinder.Binding with a NULL state, and insert it into its own DCB. It then executes a `ntsc_call_pod(bid, 0, NULL)` with this binding. Method 0 in the pod, with a NULL state is taken to be an initialisation request. The pod should check that this is a bona-fide call from the PodBinder task, then perform any initialisation required. Finally, it returns a pointer to any instance-specific data it needs, which becomes the `offer_state` pointer in the Offer

See the untrusted interface `PodBinding.if` for details of how clients bind to pod offers.

END.

## A.2 `PodBinder.if`

Clients make invocations on pods via `Bindings`. This interface is used by unprivileged clients to bind to pod offers which have previously been exported to a traded namespace.

```
PodBinder : LOCAL INTERFACE =
    NEEDS Pod;
BEGIN

    Binding: TYPE = RECORD [ podid : Pod.ID,
                            state : DANGEROUS ADDRESS ];
```

`Bindings` are kept in the read-only portion of client PCBs, and record which pods have been bound to, along with state for each binding.

```
BindingID: TYPE = CARDINAL;
```

A small integer used to refer to a `Binding`. It is used to designate which binding is to be called by the `ntsc_call_pod()` system call.

Binding to an offer is a two-stage process; first the client calls the `PodBinder` to `Open` the offer, then the client fixes it. Fixing a `BindingID` is done by the client calling the pod, thus allowing the pod to allocate per-client state or reject this client. Once fixed, the `BindingID` may be used by the client to call methods in the pod.

A `BindingID` is generated by `Opening` an offer:

```
Open : PROC [ offer_name : STRING ]
    RETURNS [ ok : BOOLEAN,
            bid : BindingID ];
```

Once an offer had been opened and a `BindingID` for it is known, the client should `ntsc_call_pod()` on the `BindingID`, passing it in as the argument. If the call returns 0 then the bind has been accepted by the pod and the `BindingID`

has been fixed. A non-zero return value indicates that the pod has declined the binding; the value returned may indicate a pod-specific reason why. The BindingID remains unfixed, and may be used again in another attempt to fix it (perhaps the binding was declined due to temporary circumstances).

```
SetState : PROC [ bid    : BindingID,
                  state  : DANGEROUS ADDRESS ]
          RETURNS [ ok   : BOOLEAN ];
```

The SetState method changes the state pointer associated with bid to state. It returns True if it was successful, or False if the change was denied for security reasons. The change is only permitted if the topmost pdom on the current pdom stack is the same as that of the pod associated with bid. This restriction effectively means that SetState may only be called from within a pod to change its own state for future invocations. Changing another pod's state is not permitted, nor is it permitted for the base pdom to change a pod's state.

```
Close : PROC [ bid : BindingID ]
        RETURNS [ ok : BOOLEAN ];
```

Clients may Close a BindingID at any time. The bid is no longer valid and should not be used in ntsc\_call\_pod(). It does not matter if bid is fixed or unfixed. Returns True if it succeeds, False if it failed (e.g. because bid was invalid).

END.

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