
QUANTUM HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION FOR POLYNOMIAL-SIZED CIRCUITS

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(joint work with Yfke Dulek and Christian Schaffner)

<http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.09717>



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1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
 2. PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME
 3. NEW SCHEME
-

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+



EVALUATION



+



+



DECRYPTION



+



f(CAFE)

Classical homomorphic encryption: Gentry [2009]

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key

quantum



ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+ $|\psi\rangle$




EVALUATION



+



+



DECRYPTION



+



$U|\psi\rangle$



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

2. PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME

3. NEW SCHEME

QUANTUM HOMOMORPHIC ENC

	homomorphic for	compactness	security
Not encrypting	Quantum circuits	yes	no
Quantum OTP	no	yes	yes
append evaluation description	Quantum circuits	Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates)	yes
Clifford Scheme	Clifford circuits	yes	computational

Quantum one-time pad:

pick $a, b \in_R \{0,1\}$

$$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle$$



THE CLIFFORD GROUP

Generated by $\{H, P, \text{CNOT}\}$

$$H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix} \quad P = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & i \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\text{CNOT} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Commutation maps Pauli operators to Paulis (normalizer of Pauli group)

$$HX = ZH$$

$$PZ = ZP$$

$$HZ = XH$$

$$PX = XZP$$

$$\text{CNOT}(X \otimes I) = (X \otimes X)\text{CNOT}$$

$$\text{CNOT}(I \otimes Z) = (Z \otimes Z)\text{CNOT}$$

Not a universal gate set

(e.g. efficient classical simulation possible)




CLIFFORD SCHEME

Ingredient 1: quantum one-time pad

encryption: pick $a, b \in_R \{0, 1\}$

$$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle$$



decryption: $X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle \mapsto |\psi\rangle$


Ingredient 2: classical homomorphic encryption (as black box)

[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00

[Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09



CLIFFORD SCHEME



$$H \left(|\psi\rangle_{a,b} \right)$$



=

$$HX^aZ^b|\psi\rangle$$

=

$$X^bZ^aH|\psi\rangle$$


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CLIFFORD SCHEME


Classical homomorphic encryption

Quantum one-time pad




CLIFFORD SCHEME: CNOT

$$(X^a Z^b \otimes X^c Z^d) |\psi\rangle$$



2 qubit $|\psi\rangle$




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

$$T = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\pi/4} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$TZ = ZT$$

$$TX = PXT$$



how to apply correction P^{-1} iff $a = 1$?

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

	homomorphic for	compactness	security
Not encrypting	Quantum circuits	yes	no
Quantum OTP	No	yes	inf theoretic
append evaluation description	Quantum circuits	Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates)	yes
Clifford Scheme	Clifford circuits	yes	computational
[BJ15]: AUX	QCircuits with constant T-depth	yes	computational
[BJ15]: EPR	Quantum circuits	Comp of Dec is prop to $(\#T\text{-gates})^2$	computational
[OTF15]	QCircuits with constant #T-gates	yes	inf theoretic
Our result	QCircuits of polynomial size (levelled FHE)	yes	computational

(comparison based on Stacey Jeffery's slides)

[BJ15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

[OTF15] Y. Ouyang, S-H. Tan, J. Fitzsimons. Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes. [arxiv:1508.00938](https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00938)



✓ HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

✓ PREVIOUS RESULTS: CLIFFORD SCHEME

3. NEW SCHEME



ERROR-CORRECTION 'GADGET'



- Build a 'gadget' that applies P^{-1} iff $a = 1$

- Apply correction iff :

$$a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, \text{lock}(a)) = 1$$



Properties:

- Efficiently constructable
- Destroyed after single use

EXCURSION

Theoretical Computer Science: Barrington's Theorem



PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

$$f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}$$

- computes some Boolean function $f(x,y)$
- list of instructions: permutations of $\{1,2,3,4,5\}$

x_i	0: $\pi \in S_5$
	1: $\sigma \in S_5$

y_j	0: $\pi' \in S_5$
	1: $\sigma' \in S_5$

x_k	0: $\pi'' \in S_5$
	1: $\sigma'' \in S_5$

⋮

output: $\dots \circ \sigma'' \circ \sigma' \circ \pi$

- id $\Rightarrow f(x,y) = 0$
- (fixed) cycle $\Rightarrow f(x,y) = 1$

length: # of instructions



EXAMPLE PBP OR(x,y)

x	y	OR(x,y)
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	1

length 4:

x	0: (12345)
	1: id


y	0: (12453)
	1: id

x	0: (54321)
	1: id

y	0: (15243)
	1: (14235)


output:

OR(0,0)




id
0

OR(0,1)




(14235)
1

OR(1,0)



(14235)
1

OR(1,1)




(14235)
1



BARRINGTON'S THEOREM (1989)

Theorem (variation): if $f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is in NC^1 , then there exists a width-5 permutation branching program for f with length polynomial in $(n+m)$



Classical homomorphic decryption functions happen to be in NC^1 ... [BV11]

[Barrington 89] Bounded-Width Polynomial-Size Branching Programs Recognize Exactly Those Languages in NC^1 , J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 38 (1): 150–164, 1989

[BV11] Z. Brakerski, V. Vaikuntanathan. Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE. FOCS 2011



ERROR-CORRECTION GADGET



- Build a 'gadget' that applies P^{-1} iff $a = 1$





- :Apply correction iff


$$a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, \text{lock}(a)) = 1$$



has a poly-size PBP





ERROR CORRECTION GADGET



ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

Branching program for decrypt(, )



PBP for
 $a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, \text{a})$ }


P^{-1} iff permutation \neq id }

reverse PBP for
 $a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, \text{a})$ }

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET



$$P^a \left(T|\psi\rangle \text{ (padlock } a,b) \right)$$





gadget structure

Update key depending on teleportation outcomes & gadget structure

PBP for $a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, a)$

P^{-1} iff permutation $\neq \text{id}$


reverse PBP for $a = \text{decrypt}(\text{key}, a)$




$$T|\psi\rangle \text{ (padlock } c,d)$$

SECURITY

All quantum information: quantum one-time pad
(perfectly secure if classical info is hidden)



Gadget structure, each 'connection':
Random choice out of 4 Bell states
(perfectly secure if classical info is hidden)




All classical information: classical homomorphic scheme
Security of classical scheme is the only assumption



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW


KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets




ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys




EVALUATION

- after H / P / $CNOT$: classically update keys
- after T : use 


DECRYPTION

- classically decrypt pad keys
- remove quantum one-time pad



APPLICATIONS

- Delegated quantum computation in two rounds
 - No memory needed on Alice's side
- Gadget generation on demand
- Circuit privacy




FUTURE WORK

- non-leveled QFHE?



- verifiable delegated quantum computation



- quantum obfuscation?

- ...



THANK YOU!

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