This blog aims to provide further guidance on detecting malicious IIS modules and other capabilities that you can use during your own incident response investigations.
As organizations increase their coverage of multifactor authentication (MFA), threat actors have begun to move to more sophisticated techniques to allow them to compromise corporate resources without needing to satisfy MFA.
The Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) details a recent ransomware incident in which the attacker used a collection of commodity tools and techniques, such as using living-off-the-land binaries, to launch their malicious code.
In this follow-up post in our series about threat hunting, we talk about some general hunting strategies, frameworks, tools, and how Microsoft incident responders work with threat intelligence.
At Microsoft, we define threat hunting as the practice of actively looking for cyberthreats that have covertly (or not so covertly) penetrated an environment.
Microsoft security researchers have discovered a post-compromise capability we’re calling MagicWeb, which is used by a threat actor we track as NOBELIUM to maintain persistent access to compromised environments.
This blog outlines DART’s recommendations for incident responders to investigate potential abuse of these delegated admin permissions, independent of the threat actor.
This blog discusses DART’s investigation techniques and approach to responding to password spray attacks while outlining recommendations for protecting against them.